Narrative:

This event happened during my two minute overlap of another sector. When I gave up the position; I had slowed down aircraft Z and had aircraft X on delay vectors in order to provide enough room for an opposite direction aircraft Y to depart sna. I asked the controller relieving me if he wanted me to work out this sequence and he replied that he 'was used to working whatever'. At this point; I had set up my plan for the odo (opposite direction operation); but I had not actually released the odo. As soon as the relieving controller (controller a) took the position; sna tower called asking for an update on the release; and the controller said 'released for departure; your discretion opposite direction'. Which is not the correct opposite direction phraseology. While doing my overlap I realized how time sensitive the departure was so I called sna tower and asked them to expedite the departure because we are trying to hit a gap in the arrival sequence. Sna tower said he was taking the runway now. When I looked at the asd-X for sna I saw that aircraft Y had not even began to take the runway. The sna tower controller was giving false information. Shortly after; but before the odo tagged up; controller a turned aircraft X left onto a downwind heading. This brought the airplane closer to the final and created a potential conflict with the odo departure. As soon as the odo tagged up; controller a based aircraft Z inside of aircraft a and descended him. This was before he was even talking to the odo. In my opinion there was inadequate spacing between aircraft Z and aircraft a to make that sequence work. Then the odo aircraft Y went NORDO (no radio) and separation was lost between multiple aircraft. Another controller came over to take over the hand off position and help controller a. I told the incoming hand off to hold aircraft B so that controller a could recover the sector and climb aircraft Y out of his airspace and get him on course. The new hand off made the coordination and then controller a said that he is fine and he can bring him in. He doesn't need to hold anyone. Why would he hold an aircraft? After watching the replay I saw that he had a MVA violation with aircraft Y because he could not climb him because aircraft B was in the way. And if he would have been held by the previous sector then that would not have been a problem. When I gave up the position I had left myself several outs. In case someone would go NORDO. This is a systemic problem with controller a. He is an extremely aggressive controller who takes unnecessary risks. He does not protect himself in case something goes wrong. He is creating an unsafe environment in the coast airspace.he should have never turned aircraft X towards the airport and towards the downwind. I had him pointed out with the adjacent sector so that he could be held to the west; away from the odo departing sna. There was a lgb arrival at 4000 ft that was above aircraft X. Our handoff is to the next sector at 3000 ft. He should have never descended the lgb arrival to 3000 ft. Because now he has to have lateral separation between that aircraft and aircraft X. So he can't turn aircraft X out of the way if he needed to. Aircraft Z should never have been put on a base heading and descended before the odo even tagged up off of the departure end. He was 'betting on the come'; that the odo would tag up and come on frequency quickly enough that he could be turned and climbed. He was trying to force aircraft Z in front of aircraft a on a straight in. So that he would not have to hold anyone. Controller a does this a lot. He creates an unsafe unworkable situation and then forces the pilots to make it work. By basing aircraft Z he is forcing aircraft a to follow with too little separation. Then take dramatic measures to maintain what little spacing the controller gave him. My last critique is that when I suggested and the hand off initiated a hold for aircraft B; he should have taken it. Rather than trying to recover and give himself some space and breathing room; he wanted to be mr. Super controller and make it work. It caused him a MVA deal. Also upon review I noticed that aircraft Y descended from 026 to 023 when he got very close to aircraft X. Which was most likely a TCAS.lastly the staffing in the area was poor that morning. Another controller was allowed to go work in the back on a detail when he was needed on the floor. Staffing is also poor in the evening after a sick out; and as of now no overtime has been called in.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SCT Controller reported relieving Controller had numerous procedural and operational failures.

Narrative: This event happened during my two minute overlap of another sector. When I gave up the position; I had slowed down Aircraft Z and had Aircraft X on delay vectors in order to provide enough room for an opposite direction Aircraft Y to depart SNA. I asked the controller relieving me if he wanted me to work out this sequence and he replied that he 'was used to working whatever'. At this point; I had set up my plan for the ODO (Opposite Direction Operation); but I had not actually released the ODO. As soon as the relieving controller (Controller A) took the position; SNA tower called asking for an update on the release; and the controller said 'released for departure; your discretion opposite direction'. Which is not the correct opposite direction phraseology. While doing my overlap I realized how time sensitive the departure was so I called SNA tower and asked them to expedite the departure because we are trying to hit a gap in the arrival sequence. SNA tower said he was taking the runway now. When I looked at the ASD-X for SNA I saw that Aircraft Y had not even began to take the runway. The SNA tower controller was giving false information. Shortly after; but before the ODO tagged up; Controller A turned Aircraft X left onto a downwind heading. This brought the airplane closer to the final and created a potential conflict with the ODO departure. As soon as the ODO tagged up; Controller A based Aircraft Z inside of Aircraft A and descended him. This was before he was even talking to the ODO. In my opinion there was inadequate spacing between Aircraft Z and Aircraft A to make that sequence work. Then the ODO Aircraft Y went NORDO (No Radio) and separation was lost between multiple aircraft. Another controller came over to take over the hand off position and help Controller A. I told the incoming hand off to hold Aircraft B so that Controller A could recover the sector and climb Aircraft Y out of his airspace and get him on course. The new hand off made the coordination and then Controller A said that he is fine and he can bring him in. He doesn't need to hold anyone. Why would he hold an aircraft? After watching the replay I saw that he had a MVA violation with Aircraft Y because he could not climb him because Aircraft B was in the way. And if he would have been held by the previous sector then that would not have been a problem. When I gave up the position I had left myself several outs. In case someone would go NORDO. This is a systemic problem with Controller A. He is an extremely aggressive controller who takes unnecessary risks. He does not protect himself in case something goes wrong. He is creating an unsafe environment in the coast airspace.He should have never turned Aircraft X towards the airport and towards the downwind. I had him pointed out with the adjacent sector so that he could be held to the west; away from the ODO departing SNA. There was a LGB arrival at 4000 ft that was above Aircraft X. Our handoff is to the next sector at 3000 ft. He should have never descended the LGB arrival to 3000 ft. Because now he has to have lateral separation between that aircraft and Aircraft X. So he can't turn Aircraft X out of the way if he needed to. Aircraft Z should never have been put on a base heading and descended before the ODO even tagged up off of the departure end. He was 'betting on the come'; that the ODO would tag up and come on frequency quickly enough that he could be turned and climbed. He was trying to force Aircraft Z in front of Aircraft A on a straight in. So that he would not have to hold anyone. Controller A does this a lot. He creates an unsafe unworkable situation and then forces the pilots to make it work. By basing Aircraft Z he is forcing Aircraft A to follow with too little separation. Then take dramatic measures to maintain what little spacing the controller gave him. My last critique is that when I suggested and the hand off initiated a hold for Aircraft B; he should have taken it. Rather than trying to recover and give himself some space and breathing room; he wanted to be Mr. Super Controller and make it work. It caused him a MVA deal. Also upon review I noticed that Aircraft Y descended from 026 to 023 when he got very close to Aircraft X. Which was most likely a TCAS.Lastly the staffing in the area was poor that morning. Another controller was allowed to go work in the back on a detail when he was needed on the floor. Staffing is also poor in the evening after a sick out; and as of now no overtime has been called in.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.