Narrative:

We were in radio contact with washington approach control on a downwind leg for runway 36 at washington national airport at 3000' MSL, heading 180 degree at 210 KTS as assigned. There were approximately 2 other aircraft on frequency inbound to dca at the time. Prior to turning base leg, washington approach controller instructed us to reset our squawk and descend to 2500'. While in the descent to 2500', we were instructed to turn right to 230 degree. After leveling at 2500' another controller instructed us to 'climb to 3000' and turn back left to 170 degree.' we immediately complied but at no time did we visly pick up any conflicting traffic and we were puzzled by the sudden change in vector and altitude. We were finally vectored onto the final approach for runway 36 and the final controller then came on the frequency to explain to us that we had taken another aircraft's squawk and altitude with a similar call sign on a discrete frequency. We continued to a landing at dca and after arrival at the gate I proceeded to our operations office and call washington approach control. I spoke with the supervisor and he explained that the approach controller on duty was working a military flight inbound to andrews AFB on a discrete frequency with a similar call sign and the controller failed to advise us of the similar call sign that he was working. We read back each clearance clearly using our complete call sign and at no time were we aware of taking the clearance for another aircraft nor were we aware of another aircraft on approach with a similar call sign. ATC pch control facs at congested airports such as washington national should be staffed sufficiently so that it is not necessary for 1 controller to work several flts on separate frequencys. As a minimum the controller should be required to advise all aircraft that he is working in his sector that he is using separate frequencys and he has similar call signs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF ACR LGT ARRIVING DCA APPARENTLY TAKES CLRNC INTENDED FOR ANOTHER ACFT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN ON A UHF FREQ. LGT DESCENDS AND TURNS TOO SOON.

Narrative: WE WERE IN RADIO CONTACT WITH WASHINGTON APCH CTL ON A DOWNWIND LEG FOR RWY 36 AT WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARPT AT 3000' MSL, HDG 180 DEG AT 210 KTS AS ASSIGNED. THERE WERE APPROX 2 OTHER ACFT ON FREQ INBND TO DCA AT THE TIME. PRIOR TO TURNING BASE LEG, WASHINGTON APCH CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO RESET OUR SQUAWK AND DSND TO 2500'. WHILE IN THE DSNT TO 2500', WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN R TO 230 DEG. AFTER LEVELING AT 2500' ANOTHER CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO 'CLB TO 3000' AND TURN BACK L TO 170 DEG.' WE IMMEDIATELY COMPLIED BUT AT NO TIME DID WE VISLY PICK UP ANY CONFLICTING TFC AND WE WERE PUZZLED BY THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN VECTOR AND ALT. WE WERE FINALLY VECTORED ONTO THE FINAL APCH FOR RWY 36 AND THE FINAL CTLR THEN CAME ON THE FREQ TO EXPLAIN TO US THAT WE HAD TAKEN ANOTHER ACFT'S SQUAWK AND ALT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN ON A DISCRETE FREQ. WE CONTINUED TO A LNDG AT DCA AND AFTER ARR AT THE GATE I PROCEEDED TO OUR OPS OFFICE AND CALL WASHINGTON APCH CTL. I SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR AND HE EXPLAINED THAT THE APCH CTLR ON DUTY WAS WORKING A MIL FLT INBND TO ANDREWS AFB ON A DISCRETE FREQ WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN AND THE CTLR FAILED TO ADVISE US OF THE SIMILAR CALL SIGN THAT HE WAS WORKING. WE READ BACK EACH CLRNC CLRLY USING OUR COMPLETE CALL SIGN AND AT NO TIME WERE WE AWARE OF TAKING THE CLRNC FOR ANOTHER ACFT NOR WERE WE AWARE OF ANOTHER ACFT ON APCH WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN. ATC PCH CTL FACS AT CONGESTED ARPTS SUCH AS WASHINGTON NATIONAL SHOULD BE STAFFED SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR 1 CTLR TO WORK SEVERAL FLTS ON SEPARATE FREQS. AS A MINIMUM THE CTLR SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ADVISE ALL ACFT THAT HE IS WORKING IN HIS SECTOR THAT HE IS USING SEPARATE FREQS AND HE HAS SIMILAR CALL SIGNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.