Narrative:

The flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 was briefed to be standard flight. From the briefing prior to the flight; everything seemed ordinary. No indications on the flight deck of any pending malfunctions. FMS number 2 was meled one day prior but had no bearing on the flight control computers and ahrs (attitude and heading reference system) malfunctioning simultaneously. [First officer (first officer)] was the pilot flying; from the right seat; I was the pilot monitoring from the left seat. All call-outs during the takeoff roll were standard company calls. After I heard the malfunction chime; read that the red flt controls normal mode fail message was displayed on the EICAS; glanced our IAS which indicated between V1 and vr called continue then followed through with the first officer to assure that [the aircraft] rotated smoothly to 15 plus degrees pitch [and] hold the runway heading; called positive rate then put the gear up; watched the first officer use manual trim to help lower the nose after 400 feet. The first officer verbally confirmed that we were in direct mode and I agreed; pointing out the illuminated normal button. I reached for the checklist in the slot at the rear of the pedestal; [in] order to prepare for the running the checklist prior to landing but it slipped from my hand and slid 3/4 of the way down the aisle. I decided to remain in the cockpit after the first officer and I decided that the only item on the checklist to be examined was the possibility of pushing the normal. We collectively decided against it; as we were not convinced that this wouldn't have a negative outcome for the safety of the flight; especially since if the button was pushed so very low to the ground; [about] 1;900 feet AGL; then became uncontrollable if we de-selected it but it malfunctioned then we wouldn't have room to recover from and unusual pitch attitude. Better safe than sorry! Flying in direct mode proved to be wise as we learned that both flight computers (FCC1 & FCC2 as well as ahrs 1&2 had failed simultaneously). I coordinated the ILS with ZZZ2 approach control; and acquired the field on a wide 45 to the touchdown point; conversed with the first officer about 'going visual.' the first officer agreed; so I called the field and observed the first officer join the localizer slightly inside the final approach fix on speed; and glide slope. We conversed that flaps 3 was a good decision; less pitch variances close to the ground; thus less chance for destabilization. First officer called for the approach speed; I said use 140 kts; which turned out to ref +10. The first officer rounded out and flared making a small adjustment for drift in the crosswind; and braking upon touchdown along with deploying reversers. I noticed the first officer was holding the nose off. So I added a small amount of forward stick; achieving the desired outcome of establishing maximum braking with mains and nose wheel on ground and said I was doing this in order to maximize breaking efficiency. We turned off at taxiway X; towards the FBO ramp; declared to ATC that we didn't need any more assistance; when queried. I did the after landing flows/checklist and then shutdown flow and checklist. Followed by a short positive debrief with the first officer; called dispatch and maintenance control; took the chief pilot's call; called dispatch back for a verbal incident report.discovered with the mechanic; that the fault codes told of the double FCC and ahrs failures. EICAS flt control mode fail message (red message); uncommanded direct mode for flight controls engaged (replacing malfunctioning normal mode); EICAS flt control no dispatch (amber message) displayed after 400 feet AGL. FCC1; FCC2; AHRS1 & AHRS2 failed simultaneously during climb out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Embraer Legacy 550 Captain reported the simultaneous failure of both Flight Control Computers (FCC); and both Attitude & Heading Reference System (AHRS) computers immediately after takeoff; resulting in the aircraft reverting the Direct Mode for operating of the flight controls causing the aircraft to divert to a suitable airport.

Narrative: The flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 was briefed to be standard flight. From the briefing prior to the flight; everything seemed ordinary. No indications on the flight deck of any pending malfunctions. FMS Number 2 was MELed one day prior but had no bearing on the Flight Control Computers and AHRS (Attitude and Heading Reference System) malfunctioning simultaneously. [First Officer (FO)] was the pilot flying; from the right seat; I was the pilot monitoring from the left seat. All call-outs during the takeoff roll were standard company calls. After I heard the malfunction chime; read that the red Flt Controls Normal Mode Fail message was displayed on the EICAS; glanced our IAS which indicated between V1 and Vr called continue then followed through with the First Officer to assure that [the aircraft] rotated smoothly to 15 plus degrees pitch [and] hold the runway heading; called positive rate then put the gear up; watched the FO use manual trim to help lower the nose after 400 feet. The FO verbally confirmed that we were in Direct Mode and I agreed; pointing out the illuminated Normal button. I reached for the checklist in the slot at the rear of the pedestal; [in] order to prepare for the running the checklist prior to landing but it slipped from my hand and slid 3/4 of the way down the aisle. I decided to remain in the cockpit after the FO and I decided that the only item on the checklist to be examined was the possibility of pushing the Normal. We collectively decided against it; as we were not convinced that this wouldn't have a negative outcome for the safety of the flight; especially since if the button was pushed so very low to the ground; [about] 1;900 feet AGL; then became uncontrollable if we de-selected it but it malfunctioned then we wouldn't have room to recover from and unusual pitch attitude. Better safe than sorry! Flying in Direct Mode proved to be wise as we learned that both flight computers (FCC1 & FCC2 as well as AHRS 1&2 had failed simultaneously). I coordinated the ILS with ZZZ2 approach control; and acquired the field on a wide 45 to the touchdown point; conversed with the FO about 'going visual.' The FO agreed; so I called the field and observed the FO join the localizer slightly inside the final approach fix on speed; and glide slope. We conversed that flaps 3 was a good decision; less pitch variances close to the ground; thus less chance for destabilization. FO called for the approach speed; I said use 140 kts; which turned out to Ref +10. The FO rounded out and flared making a small adjustment for drift in the crosswind; and braking upon touchdown along with deploying reversers. I noticed the FO was holding the nose off. So I added a small amount of forward stick; achieving the desired outcome of establishing maximum braking with mains and nose wheel on ground and said I was doing this in order to maximize breaking efficiency. We turned off at taxiway X; towards the FBO ramp; declared to ATC that we didn't need any more assistance; when queried. I did the after landing flows/checklist and then shutdown flow and checklist. Followed by a short positive debrief with the FO; called Dispatch and Maintenance Control; took the Chief Pilot's call; called Dispatch back for a verbal incident report.Discovered with the mechanic; that the fault codes told of the double FCC and AHRS failures. EICAS Flt Control Mode Fail message (red message); uncommanded Direct Mode for flight controls engaged (replacing malfunctioning Normal Mode); EICAS Flt Control No Dispatch (amber message) displayed after 400 feet AGL. FCC1; FCC2; AHRS1 & AHRS2 failed simultaneously during climb out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.