Narrative:

On approach to the airport; a possible static discharge or lightning strike was encountered while descending through approximately FL070 on downwind followed by an right engine anti-ice EICAS message. The QRH checklist was initiated but was not finished due to time constraints as the approach clearance was given shortly thereafter. A sharp intercept vector to final from approach combined with a 40-knot crosswind component at altitude prevented the flight guidance from completely capturing the localizer; which also prevented it from capturing the glide slope.a go-around was executed passing the final approach fix. The initial climb was runway heading to FL060. The relief pilot then completed the QRH checklist; which stated the requirement to avoid icing conditions. A heading and descent to 4;000 feet was requested to VMC conditions. At this point; visual contact and visual separation was maintained with the terrain. A further descent was requested to 3;000 feet into uncontrolled airspace in order to maintain VMC conditions and a warmer total air temperature (tat) due to rain showers in the area. Even though the lower altitude was below the MSA per the ILS 21 approach chart; it was not below the radar minimum altitude. After maintaining VMC conditions and/or maintaining the tat above the engine anti-ice requirement; the approach was requested and resumed. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. It did become apparent during the vectoring that other aircraft were being issued holding clearances to allow us to land; hence the priority handling from ATC.adding to the challenge was a FAA inspector in the cockpit riding jumpseat; which in and of itself should not have been an issue. However; upon gate arrival after setting the parking brake and shutting down the engines I took a moment to immediately enter the maintenance discrepancies into the ACARS. Prior to calling for the parking checklist and finishing our cockpit duties; the FAA inspector began to debrief us with his thoughts; including the failure to comply with his request that we make a PIREP to approach about the possible lightning strike. He questioned me about the go-around decision and the subsequent steps that were taken to avoid icing conditions. A full cockpit debriefing then ensued amongst us all for approximately five or ten minutes. A final item in the debriefing was that the inspector said I needed to file a report with the company regarding the lightning strike. To me this meant a company report; and with him still in the cockpit; I referenced the fom requirements for a company report and a lightning strike. Nothing was found; but he still insisted that I should file a company report. So; at this point I thought perhaps I should at least verbally debrief the dispatcher; and I got out of my seat and exited the aircraft to look for an agent and a cell phone to call. The only scenario that I could possibly imagine to require a company report was priority handling from ATC. I finally found an agent; and they said they would have a cell phone brought down in a few minutes. I returned to the cockpit; and the first officer and relief pilot were readying to leave the aircraft. Later that afternoon at the hotel; a stark reality occurred to me: the parking checklist was never called for or performed. The parking brake was set/verified set and the parking flow was completed after the engines were shut down; but the actual parking checklist was not.in my opinion; this was the resultant of a flight accented with a barrage of questions about B757 systems and navigation capabilities; actual satcom demonstration test calls to oceanic control centers; and queries about north atlantic normal and contingency procedures. While I was trying to eat my crew meal; I spent nearly fifteen minutes trying to prove to the FAA inspector that our transponder code was supposed to be set to code 2000 after 30 minutes into the oceanic track. The inspector insisted that the squawk code should remain the same all the way into santa maria airspace. I easily located the transponder procedures in the [company manual]; but the inspector only relented after I showed him the panel notes from the jeppesen at 1-2 chart; which was the same information verbatim in the [company manual]. I hesitate with this description of events; and I do not want to appear to be complaining about this particular inspector or even about having an enroute inspection. Actually; I usually find FAA inspectors to be quite interesting personally and professionally. However; at the very least this FAA inspector became a distraction with his inquisitiveness beginning with the cockpit preflight and lasting up to and including the approach phase by stating during sterile cockpit that we needed to make a PIREP to approach regarding the possible lightning strike. I certainly had no idea that the flight would culminate with a post flight threat.after returning from the trip; I did manage to have a short conversation with my assistant chief pilot about what is usually considered normal for an enroute inspection. My assistant chief pilot was candid and basically said it was up to the individual inspector; which is what I was expecting him to say. Also; we; as a crew; debriefed this event a second time with fresh eyes on the return flight. I asked the first officer if we ran the parking checklist after arriving. The 'deer in headlights' look was an obvious 'no.' I then asked; 'what could we have realistically done better?' the obvious answer was to complete the parking checklist. The relief pilot stated he could tell that we; as the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring; were becoming task saturated and he should have self-initiated the QRH checklist for the right engine anti-ice EICAS message. In hindsight; I now recognize my own task saturation when I heard the FAA inspector state that we needed to make the PIREP to approach; but being focused on flying the approach; I failed to follow up when the first officer did not make the radio report. And; the first officer being hard of hearing; which is another threat in itself; simply may not have heard the request from the inspector in the first place. I also recognize that I failed to heed a better suggestion from the first officer for shorter route in visually deviating around the weather to the final approach course; which may also have kept us from descending to a lower altitude. I thought the view out of my window was good; but the view out of my first officer's window was probably better. My final thoughts of the event overall are positive. Not positive in the sense that we failed to follow proper checklist discipline; but that this event truly was a real world learning experience that was fraught with threats. I pride myself with my own checklist discipline; and I was really taken aback when I realized that we failed to follow proper checklist procedures. In the future; I will endeavor to complete the parking checklist in a prompt manner upon gate arrival...no exceptions.note: prior to our return flight to newark; I briefly spoke with the contract maintenance technician that met our arriving flight; and he found no evidence of a lightning strike.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew reported encountering either a lightning strike or static discharge while on approach; which rendered anti-ice system inoperative.

Narrative: On approach to the Airport; a possible static discharge or lightning strike was encountered while descending through approximately FL070 on downwind followed by an R ENGINE ANTI-ICE EICAS message. The QRH checklist was initiated but was not finished due to time constraints as the approach clearance was given shortly thereafter. A sharp intercept vector to final from Approach combined with a 40-knot crosswind component at altitude prevented the flight guidance from completely capturing the localizer; which also prevented it from capturing the glide slope.A go-around was executed passing the final approach fix. The initial climb was runway heading to FL060. The Relief Pilot then completed the QRH checklist; which stated the requirement to avoid icing conditions. A heading and descent to 4;000 feet was requested to VMC conditions. At this point; visual contact and visual separation was maintained with the terrain. A further descent was requested to 3;000 feet into uncontrolled airspace in order to maintain VMC conditions and a warmer Total Air Temperature (TAT) due to rain showers in the area. Even though the lower altitude was below the MSA per the ILS 21 approach chart; it was not below the radar minimum altitude. After maintaining VMC conditions and/or maintaining the TAT above the engine anti-ice requirement; the approach was requested and resumed. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. It did become apparent during the vectoring that other aircraft were being issued holding clearances to allow us to land; hence the priority handling from ATC.Adding to the challenge was a FAA inspector in the cockpit riding jumpseat; which in and of itself should not have been an issue. However; upon gate arrival after setting the parking brake and shutting down the engines I took a moment to immediately enter the maintenance discrepancies into the ACARS. Prior to calling for the parking checklist and finishing our cockpit duties; the FAA inspector began to debrief us with his thoughts; including the failure to comply with his request that we make a PIREP to Approach about the possible lightning strike. He questioned me about the go-around decision and the subsequent steps that were taken to avoid icing conditions. A full cockpit debriefing then ensued amongst us all for approximately five or ten minutes. A final item in the debriefing was that the inspector said I needed to file a report with the company regarding the lightning strike. To me this meant a company report; and with him still in the cockpit; I referenced the FOM requirements for a company report and a lightning strike. Nothing was found; but he still insisted that I should file a company report. So; at this point I thought perhaps I should at least verbally debrief the dispatcher; and I got out of my seat and exited the aircraft to look for an agent and a cell phone to call. The only scenario that I could possibly imagine to require a company report was priority handling from ATC. I finally found an agent; and they said they would have a cell phone brought down in a few minutes. I returned to the cockpit; and the First Officer and Relief Pilot were readying to leave the aircraft. Later that afternoon at the hotel; a stark reality occurred to me: the parking checklist was never called for or performed. The parking brake was set/verified set and the parking flow was completed after the engines were shut down; but the actual parking checklist was not.In my opinion; this was the resultant of a flight accented with a barrage of questions about B757 systems and navigation capabilities; actual SATCOM demonstration test calls to Oceanic Control Centers; and queries about North Atlantic normal and contingency procedures. While I was trying to eat my crew meal; I spent nearly fifteen minutes trying to prove to the FAA inspector that our transponder code was supposed to be set to code 2000 after 30 minutes into the oceanic track. The inspector insisted that the squawk code should remain the same all the way into Santa Maria airspace. I easily located the transponder procedures in the [Company manual]; but the inspector only relented after I showed him the panel notes from the Jeppesen AT 1-2 chart; which was the same information verbatim in the [Company manual]. I hesitate with this description of events; and I do not want to appear to be complaining about this particular inspector or even about having an enroute inspection. Actually; I usually find FAA inspectors to be quite interesting personally and professionally. However; at the very least this FAA inspector became a distraction with his inquisitiveness beginning with the cockpit preflight and lasting up to and including the approach phase by stating during sterile cockpit that we needed to make a PIREP to Approach regarding the possible lightning strike. I certainly had no idea that the flight would culminate with a post flight threat.After returning from the trip; I did manage to have a short conversation with my assistant Chief Pilot about what is usually considered normal for an enroute inspection. My assistant Chief Pilot was candid and basically said it was up to the individual inspector; which is what I was expecting him to say. Also; we; as a crew; debriefed this event a second time with fresh eyes on the return flight. I asked the First Officer if we ran the parking checklist after arriving. The 'deer in headlights' look was an obvious 'no.' I then asked; 'What could we have realistically done better?' The obvious answer was to complete the parking checklist. The Relief Pilot stated he could tell that we; as the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring; were becoming task saturated and he should have self-initiated the QRH checklist for the R ENGINE ANTI-ICE EICAS message. In hindsight; I now recognize my own task saturation when I heard the FAA inspector state that we needed to make the PIREP to Approach; but being focused on flying the approach; I failed to follow up when the First Officer did not make the radio report. And; the first officer being hard of hearing; which is another threat in itself; simply may not have heard the request from the inspector in the first place. I also recognize that I failed to heed a better suggestion from the First Officer for shorter route in visually deviating around the weather to the final approach course; which may also have kept us from descending to a lower altitude. I thought the view out of my window was good; but the view out of my First Officer's window was probably better. My final thoughts of the event overall are positive. Not positive in the sense that we failed to follow proper checklist discipline; but that this event truly was a real world learning experience that was fraught with threats. I pride myself with my own checklist discipline; and I was really taken aback when I realized that we failed to follow proper checklist procedures. In the future; I will endeavor to complete the parking checklist in a prompt manner upon gate arrival...no exceptions.Note: Prior to our return flight to Newark; I briefly spoke with the contract maintenance technician that met our arriving flight; and he found no evidence of a lightning strike.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.