Narrative:

There has been a noticeable up tick of MEL issues. Frequently I am finding items differed with incorrect mels but of more concern are the recent rash of items deferred that are not deferrable using mels that are in no way applicable to the fault condition. One example being an aircraft with a level one fadec fault ECAM that required immediate maintenance action and was not deferrable that was was flying with a MEL applied for a class 2 maintenance message. My most recent issue so clearly illustrates the maintenance issues we are experiencing on line that I feel compelled to bring it to your attention.we showed in ZZZ1 after a red eye and a minimum rest layover for a 6 hour flight to ZZZ. On arrival at the airport the aircraft had a write up for a conditioning hot air valve that had become inoperable and due to a trim air valve already on MEL was required to be verified operational before each flight. There was a maintenance technician working when we showed up; however I observed him cycling the aft cargo hot air valve instead of the conditioning hot air valve. And when he was about to sign the aircraft off I discussed with him that he had been evaluating the wrong valve. When we checked the correct valve it was in fact still inoperable. It was then determined that the only way to proceed was to deactivate the conditioning hot air valve and and place that on MEL. Which the tech then did or so he thought. Now about an hour later the tech signed the aircraft off and we began our prep only to discover that the tech instead of deactivating the hot air valve had deactivated the cockpit trim air valve. So for the second time he was attempting to release an aircraft in an unairworthy condition. This tech had no understanding of the systems on which he was working and had no business working unsupervised on our aircraft. We did; another two hours later get the incorrectly deactivated valve restored and the correct valve deactivated but at the expense of increased workload reduced rest and arriving at our destination too late to get any dinner for the crew that night which all led to a fatigue call the next day.this person did not know the difference between the cargo heat and air conditioning systems; and their components; controls; and ECAM indications. A maintenance tech with no understanding of the aircraft on which he is working has no business performing work; especially evaluating and troubleshooting while unsupervised. Better training and supervision are needed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reported that Maintenance incorrectly deferred a hot air valve.

Narrative: There has been a noticeable up tick of MEL issues. Frequently I am finding items differed with incorrect MELs but of more concern are the recent rash of items deferred that are not deferrable using MELs that are in no way applicable to the fault condition. One example being an aircraft with a level one FADEC fault ECAM that required immediate Maintenance action and was not deferrable that was was flying with a MEL Applied for a class 2 Maintenance message. My most recent issue so clearly illustrates the Maintenance issues we are experiencing on line that I feel compelled to bring it to your attention.We showed in ZZZ1 after a red eye and a minimum rest layover for a 6 hour flight to ZZZ. On arrival at the airport the aircraft had a write up for a conditioning hot air valve that had become inoperable and due to a trim air valve already on MEL was required to be verified operational before each flight. There was a Maintenance technician working when we showed up; however I observed him cycling the aft cargo hot air valve instead of the conditioning hot air valve. And when he was about to sign the aircraft off I discussed with him that he had been evaluating the wrong valve. When we checked the correct valve it was in fact still inoperable. It was then determined that the only way to proceed was to deactivate the conditioning hot air valve and and place that on MEL. Which the tech then did or so he thought. Now about an hour later the tech signed the aircraft off and we began our prep only to discover that the tech instead of deactivating the hot air valve had deactivated the cockpit trim air valve. So for the second time he was attempting to release an aircraft in an unairworthy condition. This tech had NO understanding of the systems on which he was working and had no business working unsupervised on our aircraft. We did; another two hours later get the incorrectly deactivated valve restored and the correct valve deactivated but at the expense of increased workload reduced rest and arriving at our destination too late to get any dinner for the crew that night which all led to a fatigue call the next day.This person did not know the difference between the cargo heat and air conditioning systems; and their components; controls; and ECAM indications. A Maintenance tech with no understanding of the aircraft on which he is working has no business performing work; especially evaluating and troubleshooting while unsupervised. Better training and supervision are needed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.