Narrative:

The inbound flight was late. Upon my arrival at the gate; I noticed that the yellow electric pump was running continuously. There was no cockpit indication that it was running; however; it could be heard from the cabin and the aircraft's exterior.instinctively; I pulled up the hydraulic systems page and verified that there was no indication that it was on. I then verified that the associated push button did not have any burned out lamps. I then noticed a yellow reservoir overheat indicated on the sd page. I pulled the QRH and called maintenance. We were able to shut the pump off by pulling circuit breakers. Numerous spurious ECAM warnings were triggered. Line maintenance came and verified that the pump was off. Pushed back in the circuit breakers and; noting no abnormalities; operations checked the system good.during our taxi to the runway; we checked the hydraulic page and noticed fluctuations of the yellow hydraulic quantity in correlation to thrust lever changes. We returned to the gate. Line maintenance noticed that the system was over-serviced. The yellow system was returned to a normal quantity and the lines were bled. Air was found in the lines of the closed system; but line maintenance assured us that there was no possibility of a leak. We performed a run-up and noted no abnormalities. Please note that the APU was also deferred.we departed for our destination and; again; noted no abnormalities.after block in; another yellow reservoir overheat was generated. We realized that it was likely associated with the forward cargo door operation. The first officer went outside and directed the ground crew to cycle the cargo door actuator switch; which stopped the pump from running. We reported this to maintenance via the phone and included this information in our logbook write up. We then reported ourselves as fatigued.we returned to the aircraft the following morning only to find that the yellow electric pump had been 'ops check good' and the write-up cleared. However; as soon as we applied power to the jet; the yellow hydraulic reservoir again overheated. We verified that the pump was off; notified maintenance; and again entered the discrepancy into the aircraft logbook. We also noted that the yellow quantity had a 'low' indication outside of the green band. Line maintenance came out and inspected the aircraft. He reported to us; the crew; and maintenance control that the cargo door actuating switch was not working properly; the logic of the system was not appropriate; and that the quantity was low. I was informed; after he got off the phone with maintenance; that he was to defer the cargo door switch. I expressed my concerns regarding the potential for a hydraulic leak and asked the maintenance technician to; before he complied with maintenance control's deferral request; verify that there was no leak. Not only did he find a leak; he found missing aircraft components. The leak was so severe that another aircraft had to be brought in and our neighboring flight canceled since we took their airplane.as illustrated by this situation; we on the line are beginning to see indicators that our current maintenance practices are adversely impacting the safety of our flight operations. Flight crews encounter multiple mels; incorrect paperwork; and aircraft that are being pushed beyond what may be safe. We have an understaffed maintenance control and our outsourced maintenance personnel; like our customer service agents; do not always have the appropriate resources. Because we have no longer have any spare aircraft; I believe that we run the risk of undermining our quality assurance procedures.I fear retribution and the loss of my job; or my seat position; for disclosing this and other information due to the current 'culture' at [here].

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported maintenance errors related to recurring hydraulic system malfunctions.

Narrative: The inbound flight was late. Upon my arrival at the gate; I noticed that the yellow electric pump was running continuously. There was no cockpit indication that it was running; however; it could be heard from the cabin and the aircraft's exterior.Instinctively; I pulled up the hydraulic systems page and verified that there was no indication that it was on. I then verified that the associated push button did not have any burned out lamps. I then noticed a yellow reservoir overheat indicated on the SD page. I pulled the QRH and called Maintenance. We were able to shut the pump off by pulling circuit breakers. Numerous spurious ECAM warnings were triggered. Line Maintenance came and verified that the pump was off. Pushed back in the circuit breakers and; noting no abnormalities; operations checked the system good.During our taxi to the runway; we checked the hydraulic page and noticed fluctuations of the yellow hydraulic quantity in correlation to thrust lever changes. We returned to the gate. Line Maintenance noticed that the system was over-serviced. The yellow system was returned to a normal quantity and the lines were bled. Air was found in the lines of the closed system; but line maintenance assured us that there was no possibility of a leak. We performed a run-up and noted no abnormalities. Please note that the APU was also deferred.We departed for our destination and; again; noted no abnormalities.After block in; another yellow reservoir overheat was generated. We realized that it was likely associated with the forward cargo door operation. The First Officer went outside and directed the ground crew to cycle the cargo door actuator switch; which stopped the pump from running. We reported this to Maintenance via the phone and included this information in our logbook write up. We then reported ourselves as fatigued.We returned to the aircraft the following morning only to find that the yellow electric pump had been 'ops check good' and the write-up cleared. However; as soon as we applied power to the jet; the yellow hydraulic reservoir again overheated. We verified that the pump was off; notified Maintenance; and again entered the discrepancy into the aircraft logbook. We also noted that the Yellow quantity had a 'low' indication outside of the green band. Line Maintenance came out and inspected the aircraft. He reported to us; the crew; and Maintenance Control that the cargo door actuating switch was not working properly; the logic of the system was not appropriate; and that the quantity was low. I was informed; after he got off the phone with Maintenance; that he was to defer the cargo door switch. I expressed my concerns regarding the potential for a hydraulic leak and asked the maintenance technician to; before he complied with Maintenance Control's deferral request; verify that there was no leak. Not only did he find a leak; he found missing aircraft components. The leak was so severe that another aircraft had to be brought in and our neighboring flight canceled since we took their airplane.As illustrated by this situation; we on the line are beginning to see indicators that our current maintenance practices are adversely impacting the safety of our flight operations. Flight crews encounter multiple MELs; incorrect paperwork; and aircraft that are being pushed beyond what may be safe. We have an understaffed Maintenance Control and our outsourced maintenance personnel; like our customer service agents; do not always have the appropriate resources. Because we have no longer have any spare aircraft; I believe that we run the risk of undermining our quality assurance procedures.I fear retribution and the loss of my job; or my seat position; for disclosing this and other information due to the current 'culture' at [here].

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.