Narrative:

We experienced fuel transfer valve failure in flight. During the flight planning stages; I added 1000lbs of fuel for possible en-route turbulence and altitude flexibility. Thus; we were now planned to land with 7600lbs. If I remember correctly; ATC requested us to descend to either FL320 or FL300 early. Upon checking the fuel page when approaching the terminal area on downwind; I noticed the fuel transfer valves had not opened. I mentioned this to my first officer (first officer) and said let's re-check in a few minutes so they have a chance to open? We were now on an extended downwind; when we received a vector turning base leg. Upon rechecking the fuel page; it was still showing the valves closed. I clearly remember the left inboard tank was showing approximately 1500lbs and the right 1700lbs. We were down to approximately 6300lbs total fuel. The automatic valve transfer appeared to have failed - and without an associated ECAM. Therefore; we discussed the situation. Both of us felt they should have opened no later than 1700lbs. Therefore; we began reviewing viable options. Since we were on a 20 plus mile final and setting up for the approach per ATC; my mindset changed from thinking I had just over 6000lbs total usable fuel to potentially 2500-2800lbs. At 4000' and 20mi from the airport; it was not reasonable to message or phone maintenance. Both of us shared a safety concern and were uncomfortable about our apparent total usable fuel level (3000lbs current position). Over the years of being a captain on this jet; I've never seen the transfer valves fail to open. Drawing on experience and system knowledge; I was aware of a maintenance MEL procedure which would force transfer valves open for known faults or other related issues. The MEL would direct flight crews during preflight to cycle circuit breaker (circuit breaker) A10-11 and M 23/24 in order to force them open. Since we were absent and ECAM; QRH or memory procedure for this situation; I suggested to the first officer that we consider forcing those valves open using those circuit breaker's. These circuit breaker's only affected the transfer valve; not fuel pumps. This option seemed logical and safe option in light of the time constraints we had to rectify the situation. Moreover; I did not want to un-necessarily declare a fuel emergency if we could safely remedy the stuck valves. With the concurrence of the first officer; I elected to re-cycle circuit breaker's A-10/11 and M23/24 to force those valves to open. The fuel transfer process did begin after the circuit breaker's were cycled. After landing we contacted both local and maintenance and explained that the transfer valves failed to open around the 1500lbs-1700lbs levels. Additionally; a maintenance write-up for the valves failing to automatically open and the circuit breaker cycle was entered into the ACARS. Maintenance control mentioned that sometimes the sensor in the tanks might not trigger if we were prominently in a level flight - i.e. Extended downwind and not turning. Please note: since safety is always paramount; the option of doing nothing and hoping for the best; did not appear to be the best course of action.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Airbus flight crew reported that while flying a downwind vector for landing; two fuel transfer valves had failed to automatically open; trapping over 3000 lbs of fuel. The crew elected to cycle the transfer valve circuit breakers which successfully opened the stuck valves.

Narrative: We experienced fuel transfer valve failure in flight. During the flight planning stages; I added 1000lbs of fuel for possible en-route turbulence and altitude flexibility. Thus; we were now planned to land with 7600lbs. If I remember correctly; ATC requested us to descend to either FL320 or FL300 early. Upon checking the fuel page when approaching the terminal area on downwind; I noticed the fuel transfer valves had not opened. I mentioned this to my First Officer (FO) and said let's re-check in a few minutes so they have a chance to open? We were now on an extended downwind; when we received a vector turning base leg. Upon rechecking the fuel page; it was still showing the valves closed. I clearly remember the left inboard tank was showing approximately 1500lbs and the right 1700lbs. We were down to approximately 6300lbs total fuel. The automatic valve transfer appeared to have failed - and without an associated ECAM. Therefore; we discussed the situation. Both of us felt they should have opened no later than 1700lbs. Therefore; we began reviewing viable options. Since we were on a 20 plus mile final and setting up for the approach per ATC; my mindset changed from thinking I had just over 6000lbs total usable fuel to potentially 2500-2800lbs. At 4000' and 20mi from the airport; it was not reasonable to message or phone maintenance. Both of us shared a safety concern and were uncomfortable about our apparent total usable fuel level (3000lbs current position). Over the years of being a Captain on this jet; I've never seen the transfer valves fail to open. Drawing on experience and system knowledge; I was aware of a maintenance MEL procedure which would force transfer valves open for known faults or other related issues. The MEL would direct flight crews during preflight to cycle Circuit Breaker (CB) A10-11 and M 23/24 in order to force them open. Since we were absent and ECAM; QRH or memory procedure for this situation; I suggested to the FO that we consider forcing those valves open using those CB's. These CB's only affected the transfer valve; not fuel pumps. This option seemed logical and safe option in light of the time constraints we had to rectify the situation. Moreover; I did not want to un-necessarily declare a fuel emergency if we could safely remedy the stuck valves. With the concurrence of the FO; I elected to re-cycle CB's A-10/11 and M23/24 to force those valves to open. The fuel transfer process did begin after the CB's were cycled. After landing we contacted both local and maintenance and explained that the transfer valves failed to open around the 1500lbs-1700lbs levels. Additionally; a maintenance write-up for the valves failing to automatically open and the CB cycle was entered into the ACARS. Maintenance control mentioned that sometimes the sensor in the tanks might not trigger if we were prominently in a level flight - i.e. extended downwind and not turning. Please note: Since safety is always paramount; the option of doing nothing and hoping for the best; did not appear to be the best course of action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.