Narrative:

I was sound asleep in the bunk room when I was awoken by a call from the flight deck. In my sleep stupor; all I registered was something about 'being sucked out by a cockpit window' and got up and headed toward the flight deck. Upon entering the flight deck; I saw both of the first officers strapped in their seats (with shoulder straps and everything fastened); both were wearing oxygen masks; left forward cockpit window was shattered and electrical arcing was occurring across the window. The relief pilot then exited my seat and I strapped in. The first officer then immediately keyed his oxygen microphone; pointed out that the window had failed and started reading off to me the 'window damage fwd left;right u' checklist that they had accomplished. As a part of his reading; he read the 'if a damaged window is deformed' portion; interjected his belief that it obviously was; and then followed up with the checklist guidance that we should 'plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.'my immediate concerns then shifted to the structural integrity of the window; the electric arcing that was still occurring; the availability of potential 'suitable' airports; the convective weather anticipated ahead and the very difficult and poor ATC communications that typically occur across [in this area]. To address my first concerns; I asked the first officer to request descent to FL330 (to reduce some stress on the window; yet leave me options for potential diversion and thunderstorm avoidance); I slowed the aircraft to 250kts; and looked for a way to eliminate the electrical arcing. Glancing at the overhead panel; I noticed that the left fwd primary window heat switch was off (per the checklist) but the left fwd backup window heat switch was still on. I then turned off that switch and the electrical arcing stopped. The first officer; who was considerably more experienced on this route than I am (only my second trip to ZZZ); then began advocating for a couple different potential divert options. I then quickly looked over some immediate possibilities; came up with some mental options and decided to call dispatch and maintenance. Having experienced a few cockpit window issues in the past on various aircraft (including a similar shattered window on a B-727); my initial inclination was that this wasn't that big of an issue but; with the checklist guidance leading us towards the possibility of the window structurally failing and the need for an emergency descent down to 10;000 ft with an immediate diversion; my concerns grew. I was unsure whether the structural integrity of the cockpit windows was different on this airplane with the unusual shape and size of the forward windows along with the differences in construction of the airframe (composite versus metal).as a conference call was established with dispatch and maintenance; I assigned the flying duties and ATC communications to the first officer and began the call. The first two areas I tried to have addressed were the structural integrity issues and input on a potential diversion decision. My diversion concerns included suitability (with more limited options as we moved south); poor ATC communications as we moved south and resources we'd have available if we diverted (including maintenance). My biggest concern though was obviously the structural one and the immense problems we'd face if the window suddenly failed at altitude. Speaking with maintenance; none of us on the flight deck were strongly reassured with his statement 'I think the window will hold' and continued to try to gather information and input. I then asked that [operations] be brought into the discussion to gather his input. He was very helpful and the consensus of the input I received was that continuation to destination was the safest course of action. I agreed with this input and decided to continue.a few minutes later; we entered a large overcast area and our engine and wing anti-ice systems automatically activated. Our flight deck discussions then turned back towards the structural integrity issues and whether any potential ice accumulations on the window may weaken it further. We were hesitant to climb higher (with extra air pressures) or go lower with fuel considerations and numerous thunderstorms ahead. We then decided to consult dispatch; [maintenance] and [operations] further. Again; everyone was helpful and the [operations] even offered to contact the 787 fleet for their input. The consensus was that everyone believed the window would hold; even with the icing conditions; and I decided once again to continue to destination.during this process; I did request that the international service manager (ism) come to the flight deck so I could brief her. Upon entering the flight deck; the ism was visibly shaken by the sight of the window but was also very professional and ready with a pen and paper to take notes. We did our best to reassure her; told her of our plans to most likely continue to ZZZ; explained the additional flight time we'd face at our reduced speed; and also instructed her what to do in the event of a worst case scenario of the window failing and the rapid decompression that would ensue. I briefed her that communications with us would be virtually impossible (with the extreme wind noise and the difficult conditions we'd encounter on the flight deck) and to go ahead and 'prepare the cabin' for an immediate emergency landing if she felt us descending rapidly and couldn't reach us. I also told her that I'd make an announcement later; when the passenger woke up; about our later than previously announced arrival time.continuing towards ZZZ; we prepared and briefed for the first officer taking over the flying duties; discussed possible taxi issues with restricted cockpit visibility; and requested a guide man be available to marshal in the aircraft with concerns about our ability to see and follow lead-in lights.everything then worked out as planned and briefed and we arrived safely at our destination and gate.in the aftermath of everything; I do wish that we had more information in our flight manual about the cockpit window structural characteristics and the window heat system; including the backup system. There is no information about how the backup 'antifogging' system works or operates and I find it troubling that additional electrical arcing continued on the window even after all checklist procedures were complied with. The arcing did not cease until we took steps beyond checklist guidance (i.e.; turning off backup system). I hope that some of these issues can be addressed in future flight manual updates.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B787 Captain reported that a forward cockpit window was shattered and electrical arcing was occurring.

Narrative: I was sound asleep in the bunk room when I was awoken by a call from the flight deck. In my sleep stupor; all I registered was something about 'being sucked out by a cockpit window' and got up and headed toward the flight deck. Upon entering the flight deck; I saw both of the First Officers strapped in their seats (with shoulder straps and everything fastened); both were wearing oxygen masks; left forward cockpit window was shattered and electrical arcing was occurring across the window. The relief pilot then exited my seat and I strapped in. The first officer then immediately keyed his oxygen microphone; pointed out that the window had failed and started reading off to me the 'Window Damage FWD L;R u' checklist that they had accomplished. As a part of his reading; he read the 'if a damaged window is deformed' portion; interjected his belief that it obviously was; and then followed up with the checklist guidance that we should 'plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.'My immediate concerns then shifted to the structural integrity of the window; the electric arcing that was still occurring; the availability of potential 'suitable' airports; the convective weather anticipated ahead and the very difficult and poor ATC communications that typically occur across [in this area]. To address my first concerns; I asked the First Officer to request descent to FL330 (to reduce some stress on the window; yet leave me options for potential diversion and thunderstorm avoidance); I slowed the aircraft to 250kts; and looked for a way to eliminate the electrical arcing. Glancing at the overhead panel; I noticed that the left FWD Primary Window Heat switch was off (per the checklist) but the L FWD Backup Window Heat switch was still on. I then turned off that switch and the electrical arcing stopped. The First Officer; who was considerably more experienced on this route than I am (only my second trip to ZZZ); then began advocating for a couple different potential divert options. I then quickly looked over some immediate possibilities; came up with some mental options and decided to call Dispatch and maintenance. Having experienced a few cockpit window issues in the past on various aircraft (including a similar shattered window on a B-727); my initial inclination was that this wasn't that big of an issue but; with the checklist guidance leading us towards the possibility of the window structurally failing and the need for an emergency descent down to 10;000 ft with an immediate diversion; my concerns grew. I was unsure whether the structural integrity of the cockpit windows was different on this airplane with the unusual shape and size of the forward windows along with the differences in construction of the airframe (composite versus metal).As a conference call was established with Dispatch and maintenance; I assigned the flying duties and ATC communications to the First Officer and began the call. The first two areas I tried to have addressed were the structural integrity issues and input on a potential diversion decision. My diversion concerns included suitability (with more limited options as we moved south); poor ATC communications as we moved south and resources we'd have available if we diverted (including maintenance). My biggest concern though was obviously the structural one and the immense problems we'd face if the window suddenly failed at altitude. Speaking with maintenance; none of us on the flight deck were strongly reassured with his statement 'I think the window will hold' and continued to try to gather information and input. I then asked that [operations] be brought into the discussion to gather his input. He was very helpful and the consensus of the input I received was that continuation to destination was the safest course of action. I agreed with this input and decided to continue.A few minutes later; we entered a large overcast area and our engine and wing anti-ice systems automatically activated. Our flight deck discussions then turned back towards the structural integrity issues and whether any potential ice accumulations on the window may weaken it further. We were hesitant to climb higher (with extra air pressures) or go lower with fuel considerations and numerous thunderstorms ahead. We then decided to consult Dispatch; [maintenance] and [operations] further. Again; everyone was helpful and the [operations] even offered to contact the 787 Fleet for their input. The consensus was that everyone believed the window would hold; even with the icing conditions; and I decided once again to continue to destination.During this process; I did request that the International Service Manager (ISM) come to the flight deck so I could brief her. Upon entering the flight deck; the ISM was visibly shaken by the sight of the window but was also very professional and ready with a pen and paper to take notes. We did our best to reassure her; told her of our plans to most likely continue to ZZZ; explained the additional flight time we'd face at our reduced speed; and also instructed her what to do in the event of a worst case scenario of the window failing and the rapid decompression that would ensue. I briefed her that communications with us would be virtually impossible (with the extreme wind noise and the difficult conditions we'd encounter on the flight deck) and to go ahead and 'prepare the cabin' for an immediate emergency landing if she felt us descending rapidly and couldn't reach us. I also told her that I'd make an announcement later; when the passenger woke up; about our later than previously announced arrival time.Continuing towards ZZZ; we prepared and briefed for the First Officer taking over the flying duties; discussed possible taxi issues with restricted cockpit visibility; and requested a guide man be available to marshal in the aircraft with concerns about our ability to see and follow lead-in lights.Everything then worked out as planned and briefed and we arrived safely at our destination and gate.In the aftermath of everything; I do wish that we had more information in our Flight Manual about the cockpit window structural characteristics and the Window Heat system; including the backup system. There is no information about how the backup 'antifogging' system works or operates and I find it troubling that additional electrical arcing continued on the window even after all checklist procedures were complied with. The arcing did not cease until we took steps beyond checklist guidance (i.e.; turning off Backup system). I hope that some of these issues can be addressed in future Flight Manual updates.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.