Narrative:

ATIS was reporting winds 290 at 13 gusting 22 and runway 24 was being used for takeoff and landing. I was pilot flying and my co-captain was pilot not flying and operating the radios. Delays during taxi were long; approximately 45 minutes to an hour. There were approximately 15 to 17 aircraft in front of us using both taxiways to runway 24 for takeoff. Radio traffic was extremely busy. Taxi checks and pretakeoff checklists were accomplished during this period with adherence to sterile cockpit procedures. At no time did we hear or observe any traffic using runway 19 as we were instructed to monitor the tower frequency. After a taxi time of approximately an hour we were given tower instructions to taxi into position and hold on runway 24. As we taxied into position we accomplished the final checks for takeoff; i.e. Ignitions on; pitot heat on; lights on; etc. At no time were we made aware of departing traffic on the crossing runway before our departure. Anticipating a short wait as we thought we were the only aircraft on an active runway and no traffic inbound for landing we took this time to do a quick review of the ruudy 6 and after takeoff procedures. During this time we received what we heard as our takeoff clearance. The non flying pilot read back the takeoff clearance with no response from the tower as would be expected. I began to add power and started the takeoff roll but also felt that something was amiss. I quickly glanced up and to my right saw a twin cessna departing on runway 19. I immediately cut the throttles to idle and began braking calling abort. As it was the very beginning of the roll I had only reached approximately 1/3 or so of full takeoff power. I was able to slow and stop well before runway 19 (1000 or so feet) and before the tower instructed us to stop. The crossing traffic was well beyond the intersection by this time and at no time did I anticipate or fear a collision. We were then instructed to cross runway 19 and contact ground control. This we did and ground directed back into the queue and we accomplished our checklists again. We departed 20 minutes later with no other issues. Upon our arrival at our destination I called the tower and explained the situation. I believe that a combination of factors contributed the this situation; number one being the very heavy radio traffic; with multiple communications being blocked by more than one aircraft attempting to transmit and blocking or garbling reception. Also; it would have been helpful as we taxied into position to have been given caution that another aircraft would be departing ahead of us on the crossing runway. In retrospect it seems that blocked radios may have interfered with us hearing of another aircraft readying to depart and identifying properly what we thought was our takeoff clearance. It also seems that our read back to the tower that we were cleared for takeoff was blocked by the other aircraft reading back its clearance at the same time; hence no warning that there was a conflict. I do acknowledge that I should have had the non-flying pilot verify the clearance but again we thought we were the only aircraft ready to go. Being unfamiliar with some teterboro procedures such as allowing aircraft to depart when under these circumstances also may have contributed to this situation. Had I realized this I would have been more vigilant.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C560XL air taxi flight crew reported a rejected takeoff when traffic was observed departing from the crossing runway.

Narrative: ATIS was reporting winds 290 at 13 gusting 22 and Runway 24 was being used for takeoff and landing. I was Pilot Flying and my Co-Captain was Pilot Not Flying and operating the radios. Delays during taxi were long; approximately 45 minutes to an hour. There were approximately 15 to 17 aircraft in front of us using both taxiways to Runway 24 for takeoff. Radio traffic was extremely busy. Taxi checks and pretakeoff checklists were accomplished during this period with adherence to sterile cockpit procedures. At no time did we hear or observe any traffic using Runway 19 as we were instructed to monitor the Tower frequency. After a taxi time of approximately an hour we were given Tower instructions to taxi into position and hold on Runway 24. As we taxied into position we accomplished the final checks for takeoff; i.e. ignitions on; pitot heat on; lights on; etc. At no time were we made aware of departing traffic on the crossing runway before our departure. Anticipating a short wait as we thought we were the only aircraft on an active runway and no traffic inbound for landing we took this time to do a quick review of the RUUDY 6 and after takeoff procedures. During this time we received what we heard as our takeoff clearance. The Non Flying Pilot read back the takeoff clearance with no response from the Tower as would be expected. I began to add power and started the takeoff roll but also felt that something was amiss. I quickly glanced up and to my right saw a twin Cessna departing on Runway 19. I immediately cut the throttles to idle and began braking calling abort. As it was the very beginning of the roll I had only reached approximately 1/3 or so of full takeoff power. I was able to slow and stop well before Runway 19 (1000 or so feet) and before the Tower instructed us to stop. The crossing traffic was well beyond the intersection by this time and at no time did I anticipate or fear a collision. We were then instructed to cross Runway 19 and contact Ground Control. This we did and ground directed back into the queue and we accomplished our checklists again. We departed 20 minutes later with no other issues. Upon our arrival at our destination I called the Tower and explained the situation. I believe that a combination of factors contributed the this situation; number one being the very heavy radio traffic; with multiple communications being blocked by more than one aircraft attempting to transmit and blocking or garbling reception. Also; it would have been helpful as we taxied into position to have been given caution that another aircraft would be departing ahead of us on the crossing runway. In retrospect it seems that blocked radios may have interfered with us hearing of another aircraft readying to depart and identifying properly what we thought was our takeoff clearance. It also seems that our read back to the Tower that we were cleared for takeoff was blocked by the other aircraft reading back its clearance at the same time; hence no warning that there was a conflict. I do acknowledge that I should have had the non-flying pilot verify the clearance but again we thought we were the only aircraft ready to go. Being unfamiliar with some Teterboro procedures such as allowing aircraft to depart when under these circumstances also may have contributed to this situation. Had I realized this I would have been more vigilant.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.