Narrative:

Flaps 9 was selected and we were outbound (away from the airport) on the arrival. We started receiving vectors from approach. We were intermittently getting aural warnings regarding our landing gear as a result of disabling the GPWS/egpws per an MEL we had accomplished at our departure airport. Turning a base; I selected flaps 22 for the captain (pilot flying) and when we were about 6.5 miles from the runway; we selected gear down and slowed to our flaps 45 approach speed. I performed the before landing checklist and we performed a stabilized landing; no issue. Upon landing; while performing my walk-around; I noticed that the outboard speed brakes were still deployed and brought it to the attention of my captain. We then both confirmed that the speed brake was selected open. We turned the hydraulic pumps back on and closed the speed brake. While preparing to land; the gear warning aural alert began sounding off. During this time; it is possible that the captain selected the speed brakes; but due to the loudness of the aural warning I did not hear him. While performing my before landing checklist scan I recall reading and looking at every item on the list but do not recall looking at the actual speed brake; rather trying to silence the gear warming horn so that the captain could concentrate on landing and I could listen to the radios as simultaneous approaches were in use. I do recall checking the EICAS and did not note any abnormal messages associated with the speed brake. Because neither of us had noticed the brakes on approach and upon landing received no EICAS message for the speed brakes; we believe that they were accidentally deployed on the ground. We can back this up further by noting that engine power and the approach profile did not differ from other approaches that day suggesting that we did not have any additional drag to compensate for. It was incredibly distracting to deal with the faulty logic of the system in a task-saturated environment. This plane had been meled the previous day according to the logbook for the same issue. When these issues aren't actually resolved they put pilots at risk for these types of errors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 First Officer reported finding the outboard speed brakes deployed during post-flight inspection.

Narrative: Flaps 9 was selected and we were outbound (away from the airport) on the Arrival. We started receiving vectors from approach. We were intermittently getting aural warnings regarding our landing gear as a result of disabling the GPWS/EGPWS per an MEL we had accomplished at our departure airport. Turning a base; I selected Flaps 22 for the Captain (pilot flying) and when we were about 6.5 miles from the runway; we selected gear down and slowed to our flaps 45 approach speed. I performed the Before Landing checklist and we performed a stabilized landing; no issue. Upon landing; while performing my walk-around; I noticed that the outboard speed brakes were still deployed and brought it to the attention of my Captain. We then both confirmed that the speed brake was selected open. We turned the hydraulic pumps back on and closed the speed brake. While preparing to land; the gear warning aural alert began sounding off. During this time; it is possible that the Captain selected the speed brakes; but due to the loudness of the aural warning I did not hear him. While performing my before landing checklist scan I recall reading and looking at every item on the list but do not recall looking at the actual speed brake; rather trying to silence the gear warming horn so that the Captain could concentrate on landing and I could listen to the radios as simultaneous approaches were in use. I do recall checking the EICAS and did not note any abnormal messages associated with the speed brake. Because neither of us had noticed the brakes on approach and upon landing received no EICAS message for the Speed brakes; we believe that they were accidentally deployed on the ground. We can back this up further by noting that engine power and the approach profile did not differ from other approaches that day suggesting that we did not have any additional drag to compensate for. It was incredibly distracting to deal with the faulty logic of the system in a task-saturated environment. This plane had been MELed the previous day according to the logbook for the same issue. When these issues aren't actually resolved they put pilots at risk for these types of errors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.