Narrative:

At :50 pm I called isp clearance for our isp-mtn IFR flight. After receiving it as filed, I contacted ground control. She asked me if I needed a run-up and I said yes. She instructed me to taxi via the south taxiway to echo, cross 33L and do my run-up on 33R. Upon arriving at 33R I stopped and asked her if that is where she wanted me. She said turn right onto 33R and proceed with run-up. After the run-up was complete, I let her know. She said taxi to runway 24 and contact tower. I switched to tower, did not contact them (as I would have waited until I was ready for takeoff) and proceeded northwest on taxiway echo to runway 24, except I didn't stop at the hold line, I proceeded toward the active. I realized immediately upon reaching 25' within the active that I busted the hold line. Almost immediately, the tower asked me (I believe--it is somewhat vague) whether I was ready. The first thing I said was, 'I'm sorry for the slip; I'm turning around (for the hold line).' after I went back to the hold line, he said 'hold short--traffic landing runway 24.' about 1-2 mins later traffic landed on 24. I was told position and hold shortly after he cleared the active. (At no time during my incursion was traffic on a visible final for the runway.) I again apologized for the mishap. All other communications went normally. I was not reprimanded nor told to call the tower. However, I felt so badly about this incursion that when I arrived in bwi, I did call the tower and explain to them that I was going over the before departure final checklist at the time and that I wasn't paying close enough attention to the approaching hold line. The gentleman thanked me for calling and said he would pass it on to the ground controller. My observations re: the factors leading up to the incident: 1) tired - this was the final leg of 3 and 2 business meetings (mtn-teb-isp-mtn same day), and was the fourth travel day in a row (day 1 - mtn-ind-ord, day 2 - ord-cmh-mtn, day 3 - mtn-teb-bos-mtn). 2) new cockpit routine - I was traveling with my wife's uncle, a retired air force colonel and non current pilot and was trying crew coordination by having him call out the checklist items. 3) non standard run-up routine - at a point not located at the hold line, which has been my experienced 95% of the time; may have been a factor as I would have definitely stopped at the hold line and proceeded with run-up and preflight hcks as a part of the pre-departure routine. My conclusions: I learned a lot from this incident. The foremost is to always be aware of your place in the environment and what to expect next. Equally important is to slow down thought process, especially when I'm tired and have a greater tendency to miss something. (I must add here that I wasn't too tired to make this 90+ min trip.) I have filed this report with you because I feel it is an important and worthwhile method of helping to improve ourselves as pilots (from the introspection that goes into putting this report together as well as benefitting from others' mistakes as read in 'call back.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH RWY ENTRY BY SMA PLT.

Narrative: AT :50 PM I CALLED ISP CLRNC FOR OUR ISP-MTN IFR FLT. AFTER RECEIVING IT AS FILED, I CONTACTED GND CTL. SHE ASKED ME IF I NEEDED A RUN-UP AND I SAID YES. SHE INSTRUCTED ME TO TAXI VIA THE S TXWY TO ECHO, CROSS 33L AND DO MY RUN-UP ON 33R. UPON ARRIVING AT 33R I STOPPED AND ASKED HER IF THAT IS WHERE SHE WANTED ME. SHE SAID TURN RIGHT ONTO 33R AND PROCEED WITH RUN-UP. AFTER THE RUN-UP WAS COMPLETE, I LET HER KNOW. SHE SAID TAXI TO RWY 24 AND CONTACT TWR. I SWITCHED TO TWR, DID NOT CONTACT THEM (AS I WOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL I WAS READY FOR TKOF) AND PROCEEDED NW ON TXWY ECHO TO RWY 24, EXCEPT I DIDN'T STOP AT THE HOLD LINE, I PROCEEDED TOWARD THE ACTIVE. I REALIZED IMMEDIATELY UPON REACHING 25' WITHIN THE ACTIVE THAT I BUSTED THE HOLD LINE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, THE TWR ASKED ME (I BELIEVE--IT IS SOMEWHAT VAGUE) WHETHER I WAS READY. THE FIRST THING I SAID WAS, 'I'M SORRY FOR THE SLIP; I'M TURNING AROUND (FOR THE HOLD LINE).' AFTER I WENT BACK TO THE HOLD LINE, HE SAID 'HOLD SHORT--TFC LNDG RWY 24.' ABOUT 1-2 MINS LATER TFC LANDED ON 24. I WAS TOLD POS AND HOLD SHORTLY AFTER HE CLRED THE ACTIVE. (AT NO TIME DURING MY INCURSION WAS TFC ON A VISIBLE FINAL FOR THE RWY.) I AGAIN APOLOGIZED FOR THE MISHAP. ALL OTHER COMS WENT NORMALLY. I WAS NOT REPRIMANDED NOR TOLD TO CALL THE TWR. HOWEVER, I FELT SO BADLY ABOUT THIS INCURSION THAT WHEN I ARRIVED IN BWI, I DID CALL THE TWR AND EXPLAIN TO THEM THAT I WAS GOING OVER THE BEFORE DEP FINAL CHKLIST AT THE TIME AND THAT I WASN'T PAYING CLOSE ENOUGH ATTN TO THE APCHING HOLD LINE. THE GENTLEMAN THANKED ME FOR CALLING AND SAID HE WOULD PASS IT ON TO THE GND CTLR. MY OBSERVATIONS RE: THE FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT: 1) TIRED - THIS WAS THE FINAL LEG OF 3 AND 2 BUSINESS MEETINGS (MTN-TEB-ISP-MTN SAME DAY), AND WAS THE FOURTH TRAVEL DAY IN A ROW (DAY 1 - MTN-IND-ORD, DAY 2 - ORD-CMH-MTN, DAY 3 - MTN-TEB-BOS-MTN). 2) NEW COCKPIT ROUTINE - I WAS TRAVELING WITH MY WIFE'S UNCLE, A RETIRED AIR FORCE COLONEL AND NON CURRENT PLT AND WAS TRYING CREW COORD BY HAVING HIM CALL OUT THE CHKLIST ITEMS. 3) NON STANDARD RUN-UP ROUTINE - AT A POINT NOT LOCATED AT THE HOLD LINE, WHICH HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCED 95% OF THE TIME; MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR AS I WOULD HAVE DEFINITELY STOPPED AT THE HOLD LINE AND PROCEEDED WITH RUN-UP AND PREFLT HCKS AS A PART OF THE PRE-DEP ROUTINE. MY CONCLUSIONS: I LEARNED A LOT FROM THIS INCIDENT. THE FOREMOST IS TO ALWAYS BE AWARE OF YOUR PLACE IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND WHAT TO EXPECT NEXT. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS TO SLOW DOWN THOUGHT PROCESS, ESPECIALLY WHEN I'M TIRED AND HAVE A GREATER TENDENCY TO MISS SOMETHING. (I MUST ADD HERE THAT I WASN'T TOO TIRED TO MAKE THIS 90+ MIN TRIP.) I HAVE FILED THIS RPT WITH YOU BECAUSE I FEEL IT IS AN IMPORTANT AND WORTHWHILE METHOD OF HELPING TO IMPROVE OURSELVES AS PLTS (FROM THE INTROSPECTION THAT GOES INTO PUTTING THIS RPT TOGETHER AS WELL AS BENEFITTING FROM OTHERS' MISTAKES AS READ IN 'CALL BACK.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.