Narrative:

We boarded our passengers and contacted departure for our clearance as the local control tower was not yet open. We received our clearance and 'hold for release' instructions after several failed attempts due to bad radio reception.we then taxied the aircraft out to the departure end of runway while listening to local traffic advisory frequency. At the departure end we attempted to contact departure several times to obtain our departure clearance and were unable again due to bad reception.it was then that I told my co-pilot that we would and 'pick-it-up' on the go. This was a bad decision on my part as well as not communicating what that meant to my very new co-pilot. We departed VFR and my co-pilot checked in. I heard the confusion while flying yet was busy to avoid [an adjacent airport] as well as keeping eyes on sight of a departing or arriving aircraft and I was maneuvering to avoid any conflict. However the communication was confusion when the controller asked if we were VFR and my copilot was responding 'no we have an IFR'. I was telling my co-pilot 'no; we were hold for release' which just added more confusion as he did not understand. This was when I transmitted 'yes; we are VFR'. I was to find out later that there may have been a conflict with traffic on final with an aircraft on long final. I was aware of the long final aircraft and made an immediate right turn on departure.overall I should had made every effort to call TRACON on the ground first to receive my clearance as well as used better CRM to communicate with my co-pilot.in retrospect as well and in regards to this entire trip and having only 7 days home since its inception. I think there were chain of events relating to human performance affecting my bad decision making. I was generally feeling homesick and anxious to get home. I should have recognized this as a senior pilot early on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BD700 flight crew reported taking off without being released by ATC at an airport with a closed Tower.

Narrative: We boarded our passengers and contacted departure for our clearance as the local control tower was not yet open. We received our clearance and 'Hold For Release' instructions after several failed attempts due to bad radio reception.We then taxied the aircraft out to the departure end of runway while listening to local traffic advisory frequency. At the departure end we attempted to contact departure several times to obtain our departure clearance and were unable again due to bad reception.It was then that I told my co-pilot that we would and 'pick-it-up' on the go. This was a bad decision on my part as well as not communicating what that meant to my very new co-pilot. We departed VFR and my co-pilot checked in. I heard the confusion while flying yet was busy to avoid [an adjacent airport] as well as keeping eyes on sight of a departing or arriving aircraft and I was maneuvering to avoid any conflict. However the communication was confusion when the controller asked if we were VFR and my copilot was responding 'no we have an IFR'. I was telling my co-pilot 'No; we were Hold For Release' which just added more confusion as he did not understand. This was when I transmitted 'yes; we are VFR'. I was to find out later that there may have been a conflict with traffic on final with an aircraft on long final. I was aware of the long final aircraft and made an immediate right turn on departure.Overall I should had made every effort to call TRACON on the ground first to receive my clearance as well as used better CRM to communicate with my co-pilot.In retrospect as well and in regards to this entire trip and having only 7 days home since its inception. I think there were chain of events relating to Human Performance affecting my bad decision making. I was generally feeling homesick and anxious to get home. I should have recognized this as a senior Pilot early on.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.