Narrative:

On takeoff departure; [our] flight experienced a simultaneous (dual) bleed 1 and 2 overpressure as indicated by the aircrafts EICAS. Myself and the captain (ca) finished the rest of the takeoff procedures; and per the [company] procedure; as the pilot monitoring; I referred to the appropriate QRH action.since there was no procedure for a dual bleed overpressure; myself and the captain agreed on running the procedures for bleed 1 and 2 separately and respectively. After running the procedures for the engine 1 bleed system; the EICAS message for the overpressure indication of the said bleed system did not extinguish; and so we continued to the last part of the QRH action which ultimately called to idle the engine.after taking into consideration that a single bleed source overpressure was serious enough for the QRH to call to idle the respective engine we had again brought up the fact that we had two and not one bleed source overpressure. In so saying; I had suggested to the ca that it is best to return to the airport; we discussed and he agreed.in this regard; we had brought up that returning to base would require an overweight landing including the pros and cons of the said scenario; and when the ca ultimately decided that it would be best to return to the field immediately despite being overweight; I supported his decision; agreed and assisted him.upon turning final; we asked for the field to roll the fire trucks; and the ca touched the aircraft down gently and on the rollout applied max brakes; causing a dual brake overtemp EICAS indication. The decision to select high autobrakes was jointly made; and I also supported the ca's decision to arrest the aircraft rollout expeditiously following the overgross landing.on the ground; we ran the checklist for brake overtemp; and per the QRH had remained stationary until the brake temperatures had cause the EICAS message to go away.thereafter the flight taxied to the gate and had deplaned with no further incident. The flight attendants performed their duties respectably and professionally throughout the whole event and had conducted their duties in a manner that had caused no unnecessary panic or stress or worry to the passengers.moments later; the ca and I had been instructed by contract maintenance to taxi to the taxiway adjacent to an unused runway area in; and myself and the ca were able to duplicate all the malfunctions that had occurred inflight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 First Officer reported experiencing a dual bleed over pressure on takeoff which could not be corrected by QRH procedures. The crew elected to return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.

Narrative: On takeoff departure; [our] flight experienced a simultaneous (dual) bleed 1 and 2 overpressure as indicated by the aircrafts EICAS. Myself and the Captain (CA) finished the rest of the takeoff procedures; and per the [Company] procedure; as the Pilot monitoring; I referred to the appropriate QRH action.Since there was no procedure for a dual bleed overpressure; myself and the captain agreed on running the procedures for bleed 1 and 2 separately and respectively. After running the procedures for the Engine 1 Bleed System; the EICAS message for the overpressure indication of the said bleed system did not extinguish; and so we continued to the last part of the QRH action which ultimately called to IDLE the engine.After taking into consideration that a single bleed source overpressure was serious enough for the QRH to call to idle the respective engine we had again brought up the fact that we had two and not one bleed source overpressure. In so saying; I had suggested to the CA that it is best to return to the airport; we discussed and he agreed.In this regard; we had brought up that returning to base would require an overweight landing including the pros and cons of the said scenario; and when the CA ultimately decided that it would be best to return to the field immediately despite being overweight; I supported his decision; agreed and assisted him.Upon turning final; we asked for the field to roll the fire trucks; and the CA touched the aircraft down gently and on the rollout applied max brakes; causing a dual brake overtemp EICAS indication. The decision to select high autobrakes was jointly made; and I also supported the CA's decision to arrest the aircraft rollout expeditiously following the overgross landing.On the ground; we ran the checklist for brake overtemp; and per the QRH had remained stationary until the brake temperatures had cause the EICAS message to go away.Thereafter the flight taxied to the gate and had deplaned with no further incident. The flight attendants performed their duties respectably and professionally throughout the whole event and had conducted their duties in a manner that had caused no unnecessary panic or stress or worry to the passengers.Moments later; the CA and I had been instructed by contract maintenance to taxi to the taxiway adjacent to an unused runway area in; and myself and the CA were able to duplicate all the malfunctions that had occurred inflight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.