|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||atc facility : drk|
|Altitude||msl bound lower : 28000|
msl bound upper : 31000
|Controlling Facilities||artcc : zab|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||climbout : intermediate altitude|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 150|
flight time total : 15000
flight time type : 3000
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||controller : radar|
|Qualification||controller : radar|
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
other flight crewa
|Consequence||faa : reviewed incident with flight crew|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
Air carrier X, after having descended to FL280 in the previous ATC sector because of moderate turbulence at FL310, ZAB (frequency 132.9) instructed us to climb to FL310 because of a traffic conflict. I asked, as we started the climb, what the flight conditions were like at FL310. We were advised that light to moderate chop existed. I then asked for a descent back to FL280 and a vector to avoid the traffic and the location of the traffic. The reply from the controller was that the climb was not negotiable, that we must climb to FL310. Then I spoke with the controller's supervisor, he told me I should have been given an expedited climb to FL310. The traffic location was omitted on that reply. I insisted on being told the position of the conflicting traffic and the controller's reply was that he would tell me once we reached FL310. He then ignored my repeated calls for traffic location until we reached FL310. By that time it no longer was a factor. The controller was somewhat busy with routine frequency change calls, but was somewhat busy with routine frequency change calls, but there were many substantial breaks in xmissions that it was evident that we were being ignored. I believe that the situation was much graver than the controller advised us of by treating his instructions to climb as a routine traffic conflict. I believe he was covering up a much more serious problem. The final safety of an aircraft rests with the captain of that aircraft. The flight is conducted with the help and cooperation of many people. When one of these people makes a unilateral judgement that information he/she has concerning the safe conduct of a flight is nobody else's business and refuses to share this information with the captain of a flight, that person is guilty of dereliction of duty and should be relieved of his/her duties.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT CREW, ARTCC RADAR CTLR BEHAVIOR AGGRESSION.
Narrative: ACR X, AFTER HAVING DSNDED TO FL280 IN THE PREVIOUS ATC SECTOR BECAUSE OF MODERATE TURB AT FL310, ZAB (FREQ 132.9) INSTRUCTED US TO CLB TO FL310 BECAUSE OF A TFC CONFLICT. I ASKED, AS WE STARTED THE CLB, WHAT THE FLT CONDITIONS WERE LIKE AT FL310. WE WERE ADVISED THAT LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP EXISTED. I THEN ASKED FOR A DSNT BACK TO FL280 AND A VECTOR TO AVOID THE TFC AND THE LOCATION OF THE TFC. THE REPLY FROM THE CTLR WAS THAT THE CLB WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE, THAT WE MUST CLB TO FL310. THEN I SPOKE WITH THE CTLR'S SUPVR, HE TOLD ME I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN EXPEDITED CLB TO FL310. THE TFC LOCATION WAS OMITTED ON THAT REPLY. I INSISTED ON BEING TOLD THE POS OF THE CONFLICTING TFC AND THE CTLR'S REPLY WAS THAT HE WOULD TELL ME ONCE WE REACHED FL310. HE THEN IGNORED MY REPEATED CALLS FOR TFC LOCATION UNTIL WE REACHED FL310. BY THAT TIME IT NO LONGER WAS A FACTOR. THE CTLR WAS SOMEWHAT BUSY WITH ROUTINE FREQ CHANGE CALLS, BUT WAS SOMEWHAT BUSY WITH ROUTINE FREQ CHANGE CALLS, BUT THERE WERE MANY SUBSTANTIAL BREAKS IN XMISSIONS THAT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT WE WERE BEING IGNORED. I BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION WAS MUCH GRAVER THAN THE CTLR ADVISED US OF BY TREATING HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO CLB AS A ROUTINE TFC CONFLICT. I BELIEVE HE WAS COVERING UP A MUCH MORE SERIOUS PROB. THE FINAL SAFETY OF AN ACFT RESTS WITH THE CAPT OF THAT ACFT. THE FLT IS CONDUCTED WITH THE HELP AND COOPERATION OF MANY PEOPLE. WHEN ONE OF THESE PEOPLE MAKES A UNILATERAL JUDGEMENT THAT INFO HE/SHE HAS CONCERNING THE SAFE CONDUCT OF A FLT IS NOBODY ELSE'S BUSINESS AND REFUSES TO SHARE THIS INFO WITH THE CAPT OF A FLT, THAT PERSON IS GUILTY OF DERELICTION OF DUTY AND SHOULD BE RELIEVED OF HIS/HER DUTIES.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.