Narrative:

The tower supervisor called the TRACON controller in charge (controller in charge) to coordinate a runway change from 15/25 to 7/33. They coordinated [a heavy aircraft] as the last arrival to runway 15; and [a different heavy] as the last departure off before the switch. I took aircraft X (VFR) to runway 7L and directed [another aircraft] to runway 7R. When aircraft X was about 5 miles (estimated) away from the field; I noticed an aircraft holding short of runway 25L and appeared to be an uncoordinated departure. I told the controller in charge and she immediately called the local controller (local control) to inquire about this mystery aircraft. When we were told the aircraft was a departing [a large twin engine turbojet aircract]; I immediately asked aircraft X to make a 360 to avoid the aircraft. I didn't have the departure strip for aircraft Y so I had no information on if he was on a heading or where he was going. I issued the traffic to aircraft X and turned aircraft Z [the heavy] to the north to re-sequence him to the field. Aircraft Y and aircraft X had 001 feet vertical at 1.64 miles; 003 feet vertical at 1.28 miles; and 500 feet was achieved at 0.86 miles. The cics do the coordination for the runway swaps. The coordination includes the last departures/arrivals for the current configuration and/or the first departures/arrivals for the new configuration. The same coordination is done between A11 and zan as the arrival gates ellam and yeska swap depending on the configuration. The tower supervisor told the TRACON controller in charge that he had not coordinated the last aircraft with local control which is absolutely unacceptable. Local control did not use the tools available to him in the tower (radar scope) or he would have clearly seen two aircraft inbound (and very close) on the runway 7R/7L finals and questioned what was happening. The TRACON controllers are taught to monitor the airport surface detection equipment we have; and without that equipment; this could have been disastrous. I highly recommend this equipment is not removed from the TRACON; we are being told they're getting rid of them. If we cannot keep what we have; I recommend we obtain the upgraded version. Additionally; cross training is important; but the recent cross training failed between the facilities and was incredibly rushed. I recommend more intensive cross training; but if I could really be bold; I would recommend re-combining anc and A11 above that. If all controllers worked both facilities regularly; we would all have an understanding of what goes on in each facility and we would see things in a more overall picture.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A11 TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation during a runway change.

Narrative: The tower supervisor called the TRACON CIC (Controller In Charge) to coordinate a runway change from 15/25 to 7/33. They coordinated [a Heavy aircraft] as the last arrival to runway 15; and [a different Heavy] as the last departure off before the switch. I took Aircraft X (VFR) to runway 7L and directed [another aircraft] to runway 7R. When Aircraft X was about 5 miles (estimated) away from the field; I noticed an aircraft holding short of Runway 25L and appeared to be an uncoordinated departure. I told the CIC and she immediately called the Local Controller (LC) to inquire about this mystery aircraft. When we were told the aircraft was a departing [a large twin engine turbojet aircract]; I immediately asked Aircraft X to make a 360 to avoid the aircraft. I didn't have the departure strip for Aircraft Y so I had no information on if he was on a heading or where he was going. I issued the traffic to Aircraft X and turned Aircraft Z [the Heavy] to the North to re-sequence him to the field. Aircraft Y and Aircraft X had 001 feet vertical at 1.64 miles; 003 feet vertical at 1.28 miles; and 500 feet was achieved at 0.86 miles. The CICs do the coordination for the runway swaps. The coordination includes the last departures/arrivals for the current configuration and/or the first departures/arrivals for the new configuration. The same coordination is done between A11 and ZAN as the arrival gates ELLAM and YESKA swap depending on the configuration. The Tower supervisor told the TRACON CIC that he had not coordinated the last aircraft with LC which is absolutely unacceptable. LC did not use the tools available to him in the tower (radar scope) or he would have clearly seen two aircraft inbound (and very close) on the runway 7R/7L finals and questioned what was happening. The TRACON controllers are taught to monitor the Airport Surface Detection Equipment we have; and without that equipment; this could have been disastrous. I highly recommend this equipment is not removed from the TRACON; we are being told they're getting rid of them. If we cannot keep what we have; I recommend we obtain the upgraded version. Additionally; cross training is important; but the recent cross training failed between the facilities and was incredibly rushed. I recommend more intensive cross training; but if I could really be bold; I would recommend re-combining ANC and A11 above that. If all controllers worked both facilities regularly; we would all have an understanding of what goes on in each facility and we would see things in a more overall picture.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.