Narrative:

Our clearance was to cross 40 mi north of sju or 10000'. The captain put the 40 DME waypoint in the FMC and armed the profile descent. We descended down the FMS descent path. I had my navigation display tuned to the long range so it was difficult to see at a glance what our distance was to the waypoint. I adjusted to the shorter range when we were leaving FL270 to see that we were only 15 mi from the waypoint. From this position it would have been impossible to make the descent restriction so I informed the captain of this then I informed ATC that we would be unable to make the restriction. ATC gave us a right turn but never did amend our altitude clearance and we descended at maximum rate with numerous vectors. We arrived at 10000' about 25 north of sju. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. The captain and myself analyzed the event noting 2 main points: the FMC was properly programmed and appeared to be functioning normally, and the captain and myself should have been cross-checking VOR raw data with the FMS descent profile. This incident demonstrates the limitations of an 'electronic cockpit'. Basic flying skills should not be forgotten.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ADVANCED COCKPIT ACR WDB FAILS TO MEET CROSSING RESTRICTION IN DESCENT TO SJU, PR.

Narrative: OUR CLRNC WAS TO CROSS 40 MI N OF SJU OR 10000'. THE CAPT PUT THE 40 DME WAYPOINT IN THE FMC AND ARMED THE PROFILE DSNT. WE DESCENDED DOWN THE FMS DSNT PATH. I HAD MY NAVIGATION DISPLAY TUNED TO THE LONG RANGE SO IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE AT A GLANCE WHAT OUR DISTANCE WAS TO THE WAYPOINT. I ADJUSTED TO THE SHORTER RANGE WHEN WE WERE LEAVING FL270 TO SEE THAT WE WERE ONLY 15 MI FROM THE WAYPOINT. FROM THIS POSITION IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE THE DSNT RESTRICTION SO I INFORMED THE CAPT OF THIS THEN I INFORMED ATC THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION. ATC GAVE US A RIGHT TURN BUT NEVER DID AMEND OUR ALT CLRNC AND WE DESCENDED AT MAX RATE WITH NUMEROUS VECTORS. WE ARRIVED AT 10000' ABOUT 25 N OF SJU. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE CAPT AND MYSELF ANALYZED THE EVENT NOTING 2 MAIN POINTS: THE FMC WAS PROPERLY PROGRAMMED AND APPEARED TO BE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY, AND THE CAPT AND MYSELF SHOULD HAVE BEEN CROSS-CHECKING VOR RAW DATA WITH THE FMS DSNT PROFILE. THIS INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES THE LIMITATIONS OF AN 'ELECTRONIC COCKPIT'. BASIC FLYING SKILLS SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.