Narrative:

Following an otherwise normal preflight and pushback; we got a plethora of ECAM messages and aural warnings regarding hydraulic pressure during the second engine start. A quick glance at the ECAM hydraulic page revealed that all three hydraulic pumps were pressurized to 3000 psi; yet each hydraulic system was unpowered. There is no QRH procedure for what we had. There were no hydraulic fault lights nor open circuit breakers in the overhead panel; but a thorough inspection did reveal that the three guarded black 'hydraulic leak measurement valves' switches (one for each hydraulic systems) had been left lifted and tripped. Having done a parking brake check during the preflight; then reset them a second time following the pushback; I didn't have much accumulator pressure left with two engines running. I directed first officer to reset the three tripped switches.prior to moving the aircraft; with normal brake pressure recovered; I asked the first officer to call maintenance and explain what had occurred. (There were no entries in the book regarding hydraulic problems on the overnight). We had them verify we were safe to proceed with three; now normal; hydraulic systems; and that they did not need us to return to the gate. The remainder of the flight was normal except for a passenger medical issue (with no declared emergency) that is the subject of a separate report. Having previously missed the incorrect switchology; I was a quite concerned about sitting in the dark alley; un-chocked; with low parking brake pressure; no hydraulic pressure on any system; and two engines running. I was also uncertain how long it would take to get the tug back out to tow us to the gate. In the interest of safety; I elected to reset the three hydraulic switches to recover normal hydraulics. It may have been better to shut down the engines and wait for a tug... But I didn't trust parking brakes set with less than normal pressure with a full aircraft. Perhaps a mindset of looking for what might be wrong during the preflight might be better than looking to see that the switches are set in their normal position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew reported unusual hydraulic pressure indications after second engine start. Careful inspection of the overhead panel revealed that the hydraulic leak detection push buttons had been closed on the maintenance panel.

Narrative: Following an otherwise normal preflight and pushback; we got a plethora of ECAM messages and aural warnings regarding hydraulic pressure during the second engine start. A quick glance at the ECAM hydraulic page revealed that all three hydraulic pumps were pressurized to 3000 psi; yet each hydraulic system was unpowered. There is no QRH procedure for what we had. There were no hydraulic fault lights nor open circuit breakers in the overhead panel; but a thorough inspection did reveal that the three guarded black 'HYD Leak Measurement Valves' switches (one for each hydraulic systems) had been left lifted and tripped. Having done a parking brake check during the preflight; then reset them a second time following the pushback; I didn't have much accumulator pressure left with two engines running. I directed FO to reset the three tripped switches.Prior to moving the aircraft; with normal brake pressure recovered; I asked the FO to call maintenance and explain what had occurred. (There were no entries in the book regarding hydraulic problems on the overnight). We had them verify we were safe to proceed with three; now normal; hydraulic systems; and that they did not need us to return to the gate. The remainder of the flight was normal except for a passenger medical issue (with NO declared emergency) that is the subject of a separate report. Having previously missed the incorrect switchology; I was a quite concerned about sitting in the dark alley; un-chocked; with low parking brake pressure; no hydraulic pressure on any system; and two engines running. I was also uncertain how long it would take to get the tug back out to tow us to the gate. In The Interest Of Safety; I elected to reset the three hydraulic switches to recover normal hydraulics. It may have been better to shut down the engines and wait for a tug... but I didn't trust parking brakes set with less than normal pressure with a full aircraft. Perhaps a mindset of looking for what might be wrong during the preflight might be better than looking to see that the switches are set in their normal position.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.