Air carrier widebody transport at okinawa overshoots altitude in climb due misunderstanding of clear...

Attributes
ACN	143030
Time
Date	199004
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : oka
State Reference	FO
Altitude	msl bound lower : 1000 msl bound upper : 4000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : oka tower : oka tracon : acy
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude ground : preflight
Route In Use	departure other departure sid : sid
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 145 flight time total : 18435 flight time type : 6970
ASRS Report	143030
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : commercial pilot : instrument
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other
Situations
ATC Facility	procedure or policy : unspecified

Narrative:

Had extreme difficulty understanding naha ground controls issuance of ATC clearance. Naha to narita airport, japan. All three crew members were involved in trying to understand clearance. We were expecting a SID departure (naha north departure SID calls for maintaining 1000' after takeoff until 15 mi northwest naha). We asked ground for at least 3 clearance readbacks and possibly 5. We established it was not a SID departure and our final understanding and readback was 'cleared to nrt airport, radar vectors amami (VOR) direct pomas, flight plan route, maintain FL410'. Naha acknowledged our readback. At no time were we advised to maintain 1000' after takeoff. After takeoff, at approximately 500' we switched to naha departure control 119.1. Departure control then advised us to switch to 126.85(?) which was done. 126.85(?) advised us we were on the wrong frequency and to switch to 119.1 again. 119.1 said 'sorry about the wrong frequency'. As we were climbing through approximately 4000', departure control asked if naha told us to maintain 1000'. We advised negative. We were then advised 'for future reference' to maintain 1000' after takeoff; we rogered. If we had simply been given a 'naha north' SID or our clearance had included 'maintain 1000' after takeoff ' etc, there should have been no problem. I most certainly understand the serious consequences of misunderstood clrncs. I believe my crew and I made a dedicated effort to make sure naha clearance and we were in agreement on the clearance. Some factors involved: difficulty in understanding naha controller's accent. Frustration levels on both sides with initial inability to understand. We specifically asked clearance to read slowly...he did not. On my part, probably a familiarity with the SID restriction should have sparked a curiosity as to why we were not given a 1000' restriction. Can't be alert or inquisitive enough!

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB AT OKINAWA OVERSHOOTS ALT IN CLIMB DUE MISUNDERSTANDING OF CLRNC, OR INCORRECT CLRNC BY CLRNC DELIVERY. LANGUAGE BARRIER DIFFICULTY CITED BY REPORTER AS PRIME CAUSE.

Narrative: HAD EXTREME DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING NAHA GND CTLS ISSUANCE OF ATC CLRNC. NAHA TO NARITA ARPT, JAPAN. ALL THREE CREW MEMBERS WERE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO UNDERSTAND CLRNC. WE WERE EXPECTING A SID DEP (NAHA N DEP SID CALLS FOR MAINTAINING 1000' AFTER TKOF UNTIL 15 MI NW NAHA). WE ASKED GND FOR AT LEAST 3 CLRNC READBACKS AND POSSIBLY 5. WE ESTABLISHED IT WAS NOT A SID DEP AND OUR FINAL UNDERSTANDING AND READBACK WAS 'CLRED TO NRT ARPT, RADAR VECTORS AMAMI (VOR) DIRECT POMAS, FLT PLAN RTE, MAINTAIN FL410'. NAHA ACKNOWLEDGED OUR READBACK. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED TO MAINTAIN 1000' AFTER TKOF. AFTER TKOF, AT APPROX 500' WE SWITCHED TO NAHA DEP CTL 119.1. DEP CTL THEN ADVISED US TO SWITCH TO 126.85(?) WHICH WAS DONE. 126.85(?) ADVISED US WE WERE ON THE WRONG FREQ AND TO SWITCH TO 119.1 AGAIN. 119.1 SAID 'SORRY ABOUT THE WRONG FREQ'. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH APPROX 4000', DEP CTL ASKED IF NAHA TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 1000'. WE ADVISED NEGATIVE. WE WERE THEN ADVISED 'FOR FUTURE REFERENCE' TO MAINTAIN 1000' AFTER TKOF; WE ROGERED. IF WE HAD SIMPLY BEEN GIVEN A 'NAHA N' SID OR OUR CLRNC HAD INCLUDED 'MAINTAIN 1000' AFTER TKOF ' ETC, THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO PROB. I MOST CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF MISUNDERSTOOD CLRNCS. I BELIEVE MY CREW AND I MADE A DEDICATED EFFORT TO MAKE SURE NAHA CLRNC AND WE WERE IN AGREEMENT ON THE CLRNC. SOME FACTORS INVOLVED: DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING NAHA CTLR'S ACCENT. FRUSTRATION LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES WITH INITIAL INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND. WE SPECIFICALLY ASKED CLRNC TO READ SLOWLY...HE DID NOT. ON MY PART, PROBABLY A FAMILIARITY WITH THE SID RESTRICTION SHOULD HAVE SPARKED A CURIOSITY AS TO WHY WE WERE NOT GIVEN A 1000' RESTRICTION. CAN'T BE ALERT OR INQUISITIVE ENOUGH!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Air carrier widebody transport at okinawa overshoots altitude in climb due misunderstanding of clearance, or incorrect clearance by clearance delivery. Language barrier difficulty cited by reporter as prime cause.