Narrative:

I was working the R41; 40 sector. I cleared aircraft X for an approach at srb descending to 040. I called the hch sector at ZTL to have them block for the approach. They initiated a hand off on aircraft Y out of about 048 descending to 040. I ask them for control of the aircraft. Aircraft Y checked in with me descending to 040; I instructed him to climb to 050 for traffic; with no acknowledgment. I tried several times and then tried him on standby and buec (back up emergency communications). I then informed aircraft X of the situation and instructed him to climb to 050. This was still not positive separation because I didn't know if aircraft Y received his clearance to 050. I watched his data block to see if he was still descending or was climbing. I was prepared to climb aircraft X to 060 to ensure separation. About 1-2 minutes later aircraft X said that aircraft Y could hear me but apparently I couldn't hear him now. I ask aircraft X to relay a clearance to aircraft Y to climb to 050 for traffic. When I saw him start his climb I then cleared aircraft X back to 040 and gave him the approach clearance again. About 30-45 seconds later I established communication with aircraft Y.we changed this frequency several years ago on sector 40. Since that time we have had very poor coms at low altitudes in the srb area. It's not a radio blind spot so to speak. Some days it's not too bad; others it's a safety hazard. We have logged this hundreds of times; giving specifics on when; where; what altitude and type aircraft is involved. Often we are trying to write this down on a detailed sheet and not devoting our total attention to the sector. When the controllers stop reporting this because it seems to not be corrected it gets logged back in as fixed. Then the process starts all over again. There is little airspace in that area and has to fairly busy airports in that area. With approaches going in there regularly and numerous low altitude aircraft westbound to bna it creates situations that are not safe and totally un-acceptable. If I had switched aircraft X to unicom frequency a minute earlier; I could be writing this report with a different ending. There have been many briefings about controllers not being the missing link in a chain of events that causes a disaster; and I agree. On the other side it's time for someone above the first line of defense to make these type of things a priority and not be the missing link themselves.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZME Center Controller reported a radio problem that is ongoing and has not been corrected.

Narrative: I was working the R41; 40 sector. I cleared Aircraft X for an approach at SRB descending to 040. I called the HCH Sector at ZTL to have them block for the approach. They initiated a hand off on Aircraft Y out of about 048 descending to 040. I ask them for control of the aircraft. Aircraft Y checked in with me descending to 040; I instructed him to climb to 050 for traffic; with no acknowledgment. I tried several times and then tried him on standby and BUEC (Back Up Emergency Communications). I then informed Aircraft X of the situation and instructed him to climb to 050. This was still not positive separation because I didn't know if Aircraft Y received his clearance to 050. I watched his data block to see if he was still descending or was climbing. I was prepared to climb Aircraft X to 060 to ensure separation. About 1-2 minutes later Aircraft X said that Aircraft Y could hear me but apparently I couldn't hear him now. I ask Aircraft X to relay a clearance to Aircraft Y to climb to 050 for traffic. When I saw him start his climb I then cleared Aircraft X back to 040 and gave him the approach clearance again. About 30-45 seconds later I established communication with Aircraft Y.We changed this frequency several years ago on sector 40. Since that time we have had very poor coms at low altitudes in the SRB area. It's not a radio blind spot so to speak. Some days it's not too bad; others it's a safety hazard. We have logged this hundreds of times; giving specifics on when; where; what altitude and type aircraft is involved. Often we are trying to write this down on a detailed sheet and not devoting our total attention to the sector. When the controllers stop reporting this because it seems to not be corrected it gets logged back in as fixed. Then the process starts all over again. There is little airspace in that area and has to fairly busy airports in that area. With approaches going in there regularly and numerous low altitude aircraft westbound to BNA it creates situations that are not safe and totally un-acceptable. If I had switched Aircraft X to unicom frequency a minute earlier; I could be writing this report with a different ending. There have been many briefings about controllers not being the missing link in a chain of events that causes a disaster; and I agree. On the other side it's time for someone above the first line of defense to make these type of things a priority and not be the missing link themselves.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.