Narrative:

During our takeoff roll; the lh flight splr light came on which also resulted in the takeoff configuration warning horn sounding. This occurred around the same time as the '80 knots' callout made by the pm. I called 'abort; abort; abort'; rejected the takeoff; and noted that the max speed we attained was a little less than 90 knots. We exited the runway and returned to the FBO to evaluate what had happened and what our options were. After extensive consultation with my crew; maintenance; dispatch; and the chief pilot; we determined that we could not MEL the flight spoiler given its type of the failure and therefore I elected to terminate the flight.a takeaway I have from this event is how we conduct our pre-takeoff briefing. My standard brief is that we abort for anything below 80 knots and between 80 and V1 we only abort for an engine failure; fire; loss of directional control; or thrust reverser deployment. I am going to consider revising that statement/plan after this event. In this particular instance; the warning horn came on long after I had set takeoff thrust; and because I am conditioned to associate that sound with the aircraft being unsafe to takeoff; I think an abort is appropriate up to V1 (this is contrary to my current brief). I plan to change my briefing slightly to include this sort of occurrence as an abort-able condition between 80 and V1.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Bombardier Challenger Captain reported a flight spoiler warning during takeoff roll at about 80 knots. He elected to abort the takeoff and return to the ramp for a Maintenance evaluation of the problem.

Narrative: During our takeoff roll; the LH FLT SPLR light came on which also resulted in the takeoff configuration warning horn sounding. This occurred around the same time as the '80 knots' callout made by the PM. I called 'Abort; Abort; Abort'; rejected the takeoff; and noted that the max speed we attained was a little less than 90 knots. We exited the runway and returned to the FBO to evaluate what had happened and what our options were. After extensive consultation with my crew; maintenance; dispatch; and the chief pilot; we determined that we could not MEL the flight spoiler given its type of the failure and therefore I elected to terminate the flight.A takeaway I have from this event is how we conduct our pre-takeoff briefing. My standard brief is that we abort for anything below 80 knots and between 80 and V1 we only abort for an engine failure; fire; loss of directional control; or thrust reverser deployment. I am going to consider revising that statement/plan after this event. In this particular instance; the warning horn came on long after I had set takeoff thrust; and because I am conditioned to associate that sound with the aircraft being unsafe to takeoff; I think an abort is appropriate up to V1 (this is contrary to my current brief). I plan to change my briefing slightly to include this sort of occurrence as an abort-able condition between 80 and V1.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.