Narrative:

While conducting capt IOE (initial operating experience) on climb out; we were cleared direct to an intersection; sometime after passing FL180 the capt pfd displayed airspeed; altitude; and FD (flight director) flags with nd (navigational display) map flag; loss of left CDU and loss of upper EICAS. Lower EICAS now operated in compressed mode displaying 9 caution messages including TCAS system; transponder left; no land 3; EFIS control left; ground proximity system; altitude callouts; GPS left; stby power off; yaw damper upper. I assume due to the lower EICAS operating in compressed mode there was no display of status messages. There were 15 status messages; stab auto trim; stall warn system; VOR left; alt alert sys; mawea (modular avionics warning electronic assembly) power supply; rudder ratio; stdby inverter; air data computer (air data computer) left; ILS left; transponder left; idu; flap control left; EFIS control left; eiu left; EFIS control left; elec stby power; yaw damper upper. I took control of the aircraft and radios while IOE capt now referred to the QRH for the various messages. ATC was advised while we continued to climb on course. ATC advised loss of mode C; right transponder was selected; ATC requested various altitude reports.company was contacted and advised of situation; IOE capt spoke with maintenance control for possible solution to restoring the stby bus. Mx control requested we check cbs which had been done; with no other suggestions as we were reaching the coast out point concerns were that we had lost the left FMS; the left CDU; were down to one altimeter; were not sure as to why we had lost the stby bus if there was an underlying problem with gen bus 3 and or 1; we would have to get burns for operating below rvsm and the deferral of the left HF radio. The decision was made that the safest course would be to return.ATC was advised and we were assigned a lower altitude and heading. Initially we were planning for landing 4R as we were configuring for landing we received a flaps primary message. We then requested 8L. After blocking in I only wrote up the loss of stby power as all other EICAS messages were related to the loss of stby bus.suggestions for the use and change in the QRH. Of the ecias messages received not a single QRH procedure of guidance. While the introduction states that messages may not offer guidance as the course of action is obvious; it may not be obvious at that point in time. I would suggest that if further action is allowed 'select operable system' be added to the procedure.there needs to be clarification as due the crews strictly follow the QRH and if there is no procedure written then nothing is allowed to be done or do we want crews to think and correct issues with their system knowledge. There are crewman that have been corrected for moving a switch that was specified in the QRH which goes against the introduction that states we don't write a procedure for everything. Also there is no procedure or guidance for flags on the pfd; such as selecting an operable air data computer or FD computer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 Captain experienced an electrical failure that triggered multiple EICAS messages for failed systems. The QRH and the EICAS display offered no suggestions to restore power to what appeared to be the standby bus and the crew elected to return to the departure airport.

Narrative: While conducting Capt IOE (Initial Operating Experience) on climb out; we were cleared direct to an intersection; sometime after passing FL180 the Capt PFD displayed airspeed; altitude; and FD (Flight Director) flags with ND (Navigational Display) map flag; loss of L CDU and loss of upper EICAS. Lower EICAS now operated in compressed mode displaying 9 caution messages including TCAS SYSTEM; TRANSPONDER L; NO LAND 3; EFIS CONTROL L; GND PROX SYS; ALT CALLOUTS; GPS L; STBY POWER OFF; YAW DAMPER UPPER. I assume due to the lower EICAS operating in compressed mode there was no display of status messages. There were 15 STATUS messages; stab auto trim; stall warn system; VOR L; alt alert sys; MAWEA (Modular Avionics Warning Electronic Assembly) PWR supply; rudder ratio; stdby inverter; ADC (Air Data Computer) L; ILS L; Transponder L; IDU; Flap Control L; EFIS Control L; EIU L; EFIS Control L; elec stby power; yaw damper upper. I took control of the aircraft and radios while IOE Capt now referred to the QRH for the various messages. ATC was advised while we continued to climb on course. ATC advised loss of Mode C; R transponder was selected; ATC requested various altitude reports.Company was contacted and advised of situation; IOE Capt spoke with maintenance control for possible solution to restoring the stby bus. MX control requested we check CBs which had been done; with no other suggestions as we were reaching the coast out point concerns were that we had lost the left FMS; the left CDU; were down to one altimeter; were not sure as to why we had lost the stby bus if there was an underlying problem with gen bus 3 and or 1; we would have to get burns for operating below RVSM and the deferral of the L HF radio. The decision was made that the safest course would be to return.ATC was advised and we were assigned a lower altitude and heading. Initially we were planning for landing 4R as we were configuring for landing we received a flaps primary message. We then requested 8L. After blocking in I only wrote up the loss of stby power as all other EICAS messages were related to the loss of stby bus.Suggestions for the use and change in the QRH. Of the ECIAS messages received not a single QRH procedure of guidance. While the introduction states that messages may not offer guidance as the course of action is obvious; it may not be obvious at that point in time. I would suggest that if further action is allowed 'select operable system' be added to the procedure.There needs to be clarification as due the crews strictly follow the QRH and if there is no procedure written then nothing is allowed to be done or do we want crews to think and correct issues with their system knowledge. There are crewman that have been corrected for moving a switch that was specified in the QRH which goes against the introduction that states we don't write a procedure for everything. Also there is no procedure or guidance for flags on the PFD; such as selecting an operable ADC or FD computer.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.