Narrative:

On arrival around FL190/250-240 KIAS; ATC informed [us] to reduce speed to 230 KIAS. First officer (first officer) who was pilot flying on this leg; selected speed brakes and then flaps 1 without stating what he was doing to me (pilot in command/pilot monitoring).I recognized first officer's erroneous non-standard selection of flaps 1 upon 'high speed' annunciation and red boxed speed indication. I took positive control of the airplane; used tcs (touch control steering) mode to initiate a momentary level-off to reduce airspeed; and called for flaps 0. I then transferred controls back to first officer.later; on vectors for approach for 27 and cleared to join localizer; first officer stated he had accidentally pushed a wrong button and was in green needles instead of pink needles.[several days later]; realizing this first officer's inability to operate the airplane properly and within SOP/normal operations; I once again elected to take the controls and land the airplane. Had my first officer not been reassigned upon landing; I would have not continued flight with this particular crewmember due to safety concerns.this was day 3 of a 4 day trip with this particular first officer. On multiple occasions I noticed a lack of situational awareness; a lack of ability to fly profiles or utilize automation properly; and a lack of awareness of what he or the airplane were doing.I have flown with plenty of first officer's fresh off of IOE (initial operating experience). I have a very wide tolerance for minor errors/minor mistakes given that level of experience/familiarity with the airplane/operation. For the first time in my roughly 1300 hours as a 121 captain; I am [reporting] this event to suggest retraining and additional IOE for this particular first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 Captain reported he was concerned about First Officers lack of proficiency.

Narrative: On arrival around FL190/250-240 KIAS; ATC informed [us] to reduce speed to 230 KIAS. FO (First Officer) who was Pilot Flying on this leg; selected speed brakes and then flaps 1 without stating what he was doing to me (Pilot in Command/Pilot Monitoring).I recognized FO's erroneous non-standard selection of flaps 1 upon 'High Speed' annunciation and red boxed speed indication. I took positive control of the airplane; used TCS (Touch Control Steering) mode to initiate a momentary level-off to reduce airspeed; and called for Flaps 0. I then transferred controls back to FO.Later; on vectors for approach for 27 and cleared to join localizer; FO stated he had accidentally pushed a wrong button and was in green needles instead of pink needles.[Several days later]; realizing this FO's inability to operate the airplane properly and within SOP/normal operations; I once again elected to take the controls and land the airplane. Had my FO not been reassigned upon landing; I would have not continued flight with this particular crewmember due to safety concerns.This was day 3 of a 4 day trip with this particular FO. On multiple occasions I noticed a lack of situational awareness; a lack of ability to fly profiles or utilize automation properly; and a lack of awareness of what he or the airplane were doing.I have flown with plenty of FO's fresh off of IOE (Initial Operating Experience). I have a very wide tolerance for minor errors/minor mistakes given that level of experience/familiarity with the airplane/operation. For the first time in my roughly 1300 hours as a 121 Captain; I am [reporting] this event to suggest retraining and additional IOE for this particular FO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.