Narrative:

On taxi in to the gate in bwi; I taxied past our assigned gate towards the incorrect side of the concourse and required an amended taxi clearance to reverse back to our gate.we departed bwi from gate yy. Now; on the return leg to bwi we were assigned gate xx. I conducted a routine arrival briefing prior to the top of descent. At the time; I briefed that we would taxi F; T; to gate xx. Without referencing the chart; I misidentified the location of gate xx from 'memory'. It is on the same side as yy. I believe that I had an expectation bias of the even gates being [on one side] of the concourse because we had just operated out of an odd gate (yy) on the [other side]. The pilot monitoring (pm) did not catch my error in the briefing.after landing on runway 33L; we told ground control that we were assigned gate xx. We were cleared to taxi F; T; to the gate. After receiving the clearance; the first officer (pm) went off frequency to contact operations. He was distracted receiving aircraft swap information as I taxied past gate xx.another additive condition was another carrier wide body aircraft was being towed on the parallel taxiway; surrounded by emergency vehicles with lights flashing. As we taxied past the other aircraft; I wanted to make sure we had wingtip clearance as I was not sure if he was off his taxiway (it was difficult to see clearly at night with the emergency vehicle lights).when we got to the end of the concourse and I began a turn [towards the gate]; I first realized that the gate numbers were odd. I stopped the aircraft and advised ground control that I had 'screwed up' our taxi and needed clearance to go back to gate xx. The pm was just finishing communications with operations and now realized; as I; [where] gate xx was. Ground control approved us for a 180 degree turn and clearance to taxi back to gate xx. We taxied to gate xx without further incident and no conflicts.the error chain started when I did not do a thorough briefing by referencing the chart. The pm had an opportunity to trap my error; but fell into the same expectation bias. After landing; I should have caught what the taxi clearance was. The bright lights of the emergency vehicles were a distraction as was the extended ground call to operations for the pm. These were additive conditions that should have been recognized and identified. Normally; at that point I may have caught that we were taxiing past gate xx and the even gates.the briefing and taxi error were my fault due to complacency and lack of thoroughness. We were fortunate that there were no traffic conflicts at this time of the evening. Had the same error occurred during peak operations; it could have caused significant congestion and potential safety conflicts.to prevent future occurrences; I need to be more thorough with my briefings. Even when I think 'I know;' I need to reference and view the ramp charts just as I do the jeppesen charts. I also should have paid closer attention to our taxi clearance and not assumed. Lastly; I need to do a better job of engaging the pm during briefings and avoid the rote regurgitation of information that leads to pm missing errors on my part.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported assuming that he knew the basic location of his gate assignment when in fact he did not. This resulted in the requirement for 180 degree turn to get back to the assigned gate.

Narrative: On taxi in to the gate in BWI; I taxied past our assigned gate towards the incorrect side of the concourse and required an amended taxi clearance to reverse back to our gate.We departed BWI from Gate YY. Now; on the return leg to BWI we were assigned Gate XX. I conducted a routine arrival briefing prior to the top of descent. At the time; I briefed that we would taxi F; T; to Gate XX. Without referencing the chart; I misidentified the location of Gate XX from 'memory'. It is on the same side as YY. I believe that I had an expectation bias of the even gates being [on one side] of the concourse because we had just operated out of an odd gate (YY) on the [other side]. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) did not catch my error in the briefing.After landing on Runway 33L; we told Ground Control that we were assigned Gate XX. We were cleared to taxi F; T; to the gate. After receiving the clearance; the First Officer (PM) went off frequency to contact Operations. He was distracted receiving aircraft swap information as I taxied past Gate XX.Another additive condition was another carrier wide body aircraft was being towed on the parallel taxiway; surrounded by emergency vehicles with lights flashing. As we taxied past the other aircraft; I wanted to make sure we had wingtip clearance as I was not sure if he was off his taxiway (it was difficult to see clearly at night with the emergency vehicle lights).When we got to the end of the concourse and I began a turn [towards the gate]; I first realized that the gate numbers were odd. I stopped the aircraft and advised Ground Control that I had 'screwed up' our taxi and needed clearance to go back to Gate XX. The PM was just finishing communications with Operations and now realized; as I; [where] Gate XX was. Ground Control approved us for a 180 degree turn and clearance to taxi back to Gate XX. We taxied to Gate XX without further incident and no conflicts.The error chain started when I did not do a thorough briefing by referencing the chart. The PM had an opportunity to trap my error; but fell into the same expectation bias. After landing; I should have caught what the taxi clearance was. The bright lights of the emergency vehicles were a distraction as was the extended ground call to Operations for the PM. These were additive conditions that should have been recognized and identified. Normally; at that point I may have caught that we were taxiing past Gate XX and the even gates.The briefing and taxi error were my fault due to complacency and lack of thoroughness. We were fortunate that there were no traffic conflicts at this time of the evening. Had the same error occurred during peak operations; it could have caused significant congestion and potential safety conflicts.To prevent future occurrences; I need to be more thorough with my briefings. Even when I think 'I know;' I need to reference and view the ramp charts just as I do the Jeppesen charts. I also should have paid closer attention to our taxi clearance and not assumed. Lastly; I need to do a better job of engaging the PM during briefings and avoid the rote regurgitation of information that leads to PM missing errors on my part.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.