Narrative:

We were descending into our final destination and told to expect the visual approach to runway xxr. Weather was VFR; albeit a bit hazy due to smoke from nearby fires; with a reported visibility of 9 SM. As we descended thru approximately 8;000; I inquired the captain if he would like me to load the RNAV to runway xxr for added situational awareness; and so we would be prepared in case we were unable to make a visual approach. He agreed; and I programmed the FMS as such. We picked up the field visually approximately 9 miles out and were cleared for the visual approach. ATC had left us a bit high and the captain was hustling down to enter the traffic pattern. He bugged 1;800 feet in the altitude preselector. I immediately found this odd; as the appropriate traffic pattern altitude is 2;500; and the final approach fix altitude is 2;700 on the RNAV. I did not query the captain at that time; as I have seen many techniques for setting the altitude preselect on the autopilot flown portion of the visual approach. In addition; this was complicated by the fact that the captain and I are based here; and likely conduct more visual approaches here than anywhere else in the system. In other words; I (regrettably) assumed that he set the altitude at 1;800 intentionally. Upon descending thru approximately 2;900 ft and a 5 mile base to final; we were still doing roughly 2;000 fpm; at 200 knots; with flaps 8 (I believe); and the captain showed no sign of arresting the descent rate. I immediately became concerned and asked him if he intended to descend all the way to 1;800; as that would take us below 1;000 AGL. The captain immediately realized his mistake and commanded the autopilot to level the aircraft. As the aircraft began to level we received a momentary egpws mode 2A 'terrain' caution. To the extent of my knowledge; the aircraft did not go below 2;300 ft. Since we knew the cause of the GPWS message; which was momentary; and were now level; the captain elected to continue the approach. He was a bit flustered; which led him to retract the spoilers later than intended; but managed to configure the aircraft by 1;000 AGL. At that point we were ref+5 to 10 and the vertical speed was slightly over 1;000 but correcting. He called 'stable' and we landed normally. We discussed the event after blocking in; and it became clear what had happened. He had somehow confused the final approach fix on the RNAV runway xxr; with a minimum altitude of 1840ft; for the 5 mile fix on the visual approach. In hindsight; I learned a lot from this event. While I did speak up about the captain's error in setting the altitude preselect; I should have done so when I first noticed the anomaly. In addition; I don't think the decision to continue the approach was prudent; and the escape maneuver should have been conducted. The poh is a bit contradictory about this stating that 'at night or in IMC; perform the above egpws escape maneuver'. (After receiving a 'terrain' or 'pull up' warning) the next line states 'when an aural warning other than 'pull up' occurs; initiate the corrective action to remove the cause of the warning'. I don't know if this contributed to the captain's decision to continue the approach; but I believe the line should be amended to read 'when an aural warning other than 'pull up' or 'terrain' occurs...' for consistency. This has certainly opened my eyes; and I am certain that; in the future; I will not let something like this progress as far as it did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ900 First Officer reported the Captain set the level off altitude below 1;000 feet AGL while descending for a night visual. The First Officer finally asked the Captain his intention at which time the EGPWS 'TERRAIN' alerted. The descent was arrested without the escape maneuver. The First Officer questioned the Pilot Handbook escape maneuver wording.

Narrative: We were descending into our final destination and told to expect the visual approach to Runway XXR. Weather was VFR; albeit a bit hazy due to smoke from nearby fires; with a reported visibility of 9 SM. As we descended thru approximately 8;000; I inquired the captain if he would like me to load the RNAV to Runway XXR for added situational awareness; and so we would be prepared in case we were unable to make a visual approach. He agreed; and I programmed the FMS as such. We picked up the field visually approximately 9 miles out and were cleared for the visual approach. ATC had left us a bit high and the captain was hustling down to enter the traffic pattern. He bugged 1;800 feet in the altitude preselector. I immediately found this odd; as the appropriate traffic pattern altitude is 2;500; and the final approach fix altitude is 2;700 on the RNAV. I did not query the captain at that time; as I have seen many techniques for setting the altitude preselect on the autopilot flown portion of the visual approach. In addition; this was complicated by the fact that the captain and I are based here; and likely conduct more visual approaches here than anywhere else in the system. In other words; I (regrettably) assumed that he set the altitude at 1;800 intentionally. Upon descending thru approximately 2;900 ft and a 5 mile base to final; we were still doing roughly 2;000 fpm; at 200 knots; with flaps 8 (I believe); and the captain showed no sign of arresting the descent rate. I immediately became concerned and asked him if he intended to descend all the way to 1;800; as that would take us below 1;000 AGL. The captain immediately realized his mistake and commanded the autopilot to level the aircraft. As the aircraft began to level we received a momentary EGPWS Mode 2A 'terrain' caution. To the extent of my knowledge; the aircraft did not go below 2;300 ft. Since we knew the cause of the GPWS message; which was momentary; and were now level; the captain elected to continue the approach. He was a bit flustered; which led him to retract the spoilers later than intended; but managed to configure the aircraft by 1;000 AGL. At that point we were Ref+5 to 10 and the vertical speed was slightly over 1;000 but correcting. He called 'stable' and we landed normally. We discussed the event after blocking in; and it became clear what had happened. He had somehow confused the final approach fix on the RNAV Runway XXR; with a minimum altitude of 1840ft; for the 5 mile fix on the visual approach. In hindsight; I learned a lot from this event. While I did speak up about the captain's error in setting the altitude preselect; I should have done so when I first noticed the anomaly. In addition; I don't think the decision to continue the approach was prudent; and the escape maneuver should have been conducted. The POH is a bit contradictory about this stating that 'At night or in IMC; perform the above EGPWS escape maneuver'. (After receiving a 'TERRAIN' or 'PULL UP' warning) The next line states 'When an aural warning other than 'PULL UP' occurs; initiate the corrective action to remove the cause of the warning'. I don't know if this contributed to the Captain's decision to continue the approach; but I believe the line should be amended to read 'When an aural warning other than 'PULL UP' or 'TERRAIN' occurs...' for consistency. This has certainly opened my eyes; and I am certain that; in the future; I will not let something like this progress as far as it did.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.