Narrative:

We were cleared to an intercept heading for the localizer 23 and to descend and maintain 3000' until established on the approach. I descended through 3000' about 15 seconds prior to localizer alive on the approach. I stopped descent at 2650' and recovered to 2850 prior to becoming established on the approach. We are well trained and always fly with 2 pilots. All our pilots are very experienced. The other pilot (the captain) should have stopped me sooner (although I take responsibility) but he wasn't even sure of what the clearance was. I was confused about what heading we were cleared to and while I was preoccupied with that I went through the altitude. I was probably close enough to the final approach course that it was ok, but it was very sloppy flying on my part. Also, this particular day, the other pilot was preoccupied all day, forgetting checklists, and missing clrncs. This is one reason I am reporting this. Although I believe in 2 pilot cockpits, when one pilot is not doing his/her job, it creates, I believe, a more dangerous situation than a single pilot operation. We were dealing with IFR and severe WX in the area all day and a typical multi-leg schedule, the completion of which was in doubt. I should have adjusted more quickly and completely to the lack of presence by the other pilot. Also, I should have relied more on the autoplt rather than hand flying.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF A CORP TURBOPROP DESCENDS PRIOR TO INTERCEPTING THE LOCALIZER AT BHM. HE ATTRIBUTES PART OF THE PROBLEM TO THE CAPT'S LACK OF PARTICIPATION IN COCKPIT DUTIES.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO AN INTERCEPT HDG FOR THE LOC 23 AND TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 3000' UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH. I DESCENDED THROUGH 3000' ABOUT 15 SECONDS PRIOR TO LOC ALIVE ON THE APCH. I STOPPED DSCNT AT 2650' AND RECOVERED TO 2850 PRIOR TO BECOMING ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH. WE ARE WELL TRAINED AND ALWAYS FLY WITH 2 PLTS. ALL OUR PLTS ARE VERY EXPERIENCED. THE OTHER PLT (THE CAPT) SHOULD HAVE STOPPED ME SOONER (ALTHOUGH I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY) BUT HE WASN'T EVEN SURE OF WHAT THE CLRNC WAS. I WAS CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT HDG WE WERE CLRED TO AND WHILE I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THAT I WENT THROUGH THE ALT. I WAS PROBABLY CLOSE ENOUGH TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE THAT IT WAS OK, BUT IT WAS VERY SLOPPY FLYING ON MY PART. ALSO, THIS PARTICULAR DAY, THE OTHER PLT WAS PREOCCUPIED ALL DAY, FORGETTING CHECKLISTS, AND MISSING CLRNCS. THIS IS ONE REASON I AM REPORTING THIS. ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IN 2 PLT COCKPITS, WHEN ONE PLT IS NOT DOING HIS/HER JOB, IT CREATES, I BELIEVE, A MORE DANGEROUS SITUATION THAN A SINGLE PLT OPERATION. WE WERE DEALING WITH IFR AND SEVERE WX IN THE AREA ALL DAY AND A TYPICAL MULTI-LEG SCHEDULE, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WAS IN DOUBT. I SHOULD HAVE ADJUSTED MORE QUICKLY AND COMPLETELY TO THE LACK OF PRESENCE BY THE OTHER PLT. ALSO, I SHOULD HAVE RELIED MORE ON THE AUTOPLT RATHER THAN HAND FLYING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.