Narrative:

Upon reaching the aircraft; a maintenance delay resulted in a departure delay that ultimately required an extension (duty time) by the captain and myself in order to operate. I was the international relief officer (relief pilot). The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the first officer was the pilot monitoring (pm). Upon reaching ewr; we were vectored for the visual/ILS to 4R. Weather was VFR with gusty winds from the northwest. We were following an rj for the same runway. We were advised by ewr tower that a company triple 7 would depart runway 4L (caution wake turbulence). When we were at approximately 200 ft; the tower advised the B777 to abort the takeoff on 4L (which had already commenced); and then immediately advised us to perform a go around. We visually saw the rj had not cleared the runway (4R) completely. The captain executed a go-around. At this time we received an EICAS message that the center primary hydraulic pump (2) had low pressure. There was also traffic moving right to left that we were asked to maintain visual separation with. Multiple (and redundant) instructions were given to maintain altitude and heading. I was instructed by the captain to give a PA to the passengers; therefore I left com 1 to accomplish that task. After completing the PA to the passengers; I returned to com 1 and heard ATC question why we had turned right instead of left to a heading of 270. I recall the aircraft being on a heading of approximately 180 degrees (in the turn). ATC then instructed us to expedite a turn to the right to a heading of 270. Once on a heading of 270; I read and completed the non-normal checklist (QRH) for the hydraulic pump failure. The first officer backed me up and we completed the checklist and required items. We then received vectors for a second approach to runway 4R from ATC. ATC also advised us that we may have breached other airspace due to the fact that the aircraft made a right turn to 270 instead of a left turn to 270.I was not on frequency during the miscommunication between ATC and our aircraft after the go-around from runway 4R due to the fact that I was completing a PA to the passengers regarding the go-around that we had completed. The workload was very high in the flight deck (go-around executed last minute; a hydraulic malfunction during the go-around; aircraft/traffic in the area; fatigue/long duty day; radio congestion; etc). Understanding where the other traffic was located; and being asked to provide visual separation with that traffic also increased workload.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported being directed to go-around due to insufficient spacing with aircraft on landing runway. Additionally a hydraulic pump low fluid quantity warning activated during the go-around.

Narrative: Upon reaching the aircraft; a maintenance delay resulted in a departure delay that ultimately required an extension (duty time) by the Captain and myself in order to operate. I was the IRO (Relief Pilot). The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the First Officer was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). Upon reaching EWR; we were vectored for the visual/ILS to 4R. Weather was VFR with gusty winds from the Northwest. We were following an RJ for the same runway. We were advised by EWR tower that a company triple 7 would depart runway 4L (caution wake turbulence). When we were at approximately 200 ft; the tower advised the B777 to abort the takeoff on 4L (which had already commenced); and then immediately advised us to perform a go around. We visually saw the RJ had not cleared the runway (4R) completely. The Captain executed a go-around. At this time we received an EICAS message that the Center Primary Hydraulic pump (2) had low pressure. There was also traffic moving right to left that we were asked to maintain visual separation with. Multiple (and redundant) instructions were given to maintain altitude and heading. I was instructed by the Captain to give a PA to the passengers; therefore I left Com 1 to accomplish that task. After completing the PA to the passengers; I returned to Com 1 and heard ATC question why we had turned right instead of left to a heading of 270. I recall the aircraft being on a heading of approximately 180 degrees (in the turn). ATC then instructed us to expedite a turn to the right to a heading of 270. Once on a heading of 270; I read and completed the Non-Normal checklist (QRH) for the Hydraulic pump failure. The First Officer backed me up and we completed the checklist and required items. We then received vectors for a second approach to runway 4R from ATC. ATC also advised us that we may have breached other airspace due to the fact that the aircraft made a right turn to 270 instead of a left turn to 270.I was not on frequency during the miscommunication between ATC and our aircraft after the Go-Around from runway 4R due to the fact that I was completing a PA to the passengers regarding the Go-Around that we had completed. The workload was very high in the flight deck (Go-Around executed last minute; a hydraulic malfunction during the go-around; aircraft/traffic in the area; fatigue/long duty day; radio congestion; etc). Understanding where the other traffic was located; and being asked to provide visual separation with that traffic also increased workload.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.