Narrative:

After pushback we accomplished the after start and performance checks. We called ramp for taxi instructions and taxied to the top of the alley on the west line. I contacted metering and advised them that [company XXX2] is number 1 at the top of the alley on the west line. She responded and queried if we were number one. We said yes then she told us to monitor ground. Ground control was busy and said [company XXX1] in the alley; cross alpha now and follow the E-170 off your nose to 10L\dd; go now! Runway 9R was closed per the ATIS so going to 10L was not the norm for a north departure fix but was what we were expecting. There was no break in his next instructions to other aircraft. Well; we knew the controller was talking to us; but he used [company XXX1] instead of [company XXX2] and elected to follow the 170 like he wanted us to. We made it to the hold short line of 32L on november. I called ground to verify [company XXX2] was cleared across. Ground said yes; follow the 170 cleared across 32L; monitor tower 132.7 [company XXX1]. Well we were already crossing the hold short line (the runway was closed and not in use) when we realized he called us [company XXX1] again. We thought he was just confused and got in the line on november for 10L/dd. Holding short of 10L/dd tower instructed [company XXX1] to line up and wait. Before entering an active runway I wanted tower to call us the right call sign so I asked if she meant [company XXX2]. She said no then came back and told us we were supposed to go to 9R. I said we were instructed to follow a 170 to 10L. She told us to cross the runway and she would figure out what the issue is. Tower informed us that they were doing training in the tower and our paperwork got confused with another aircraft. Tower taxied us back across the runway to get in line for a departure off of 10L. We departed without issue. When we were instructed to contact departure the captain apologized for the confusion back on the ground. The tower controller responded 'don't worry about it; it wasn't your fault'. We continued without incident I should have made the initial ground controller verify our call sign. Even though we knew he was talking to the right aircraft; he thought we were a different flight. I should have not worried about keeping the flow of the airport moving and made the controller verify the call sign before moving. The frequent use of long multiple taxi instructions to multiple aircraft without the opportunity to read back a clearance is a big threat at ord. Many times this leads to confusion and promotes aircraft to keep moving to keep the operation moving. Another significant threat are the flight numbers being assigned to our flights. There are many flights operating at the same time that have very similar numbers. This is becoming something I have been seeing more and more frequently in the last couple of years. I will make a point to not assume the controller just messed up the call sign when they miss it by one number. Even if the situation is obvious that the controller is speaking to the correct aircraft; they may not be speaking to the correct flight. The company really should try and avoid the use of multiple flight numbers that are only one number apart. The closer the numbers get together the greater the opportunity for accepting the wrong clearance becomes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 First Officer reported ORD Ground Control kept mistaking them for a different aircraft with similar call sign numbers. The issue was not resolved until the crew queried the Local Controller before entering the runway.

Narrative: After pushback we accomplished the after start and performance checks. We called ramp for taxi instructions and taxied to the top of the alley on the west line. I contacted metering and advised them that [Company XXX2] is number 1 at the top of the alley on the west line. She responded and queried if we were number one. We said yes then she told us to monitor ground. Ground control was busy and said [Company XXX1] in the alley; cross Alpha now and follow the E-170 off your nose to 10L\DD; GO NOW! Runway 9R was closed per the ATIS so going to 10L was not the norm for a north departure fix but was what we were expecting. There was no break in his next instructions to other aircraft. Well; we knew the controller was talking to us; but he used [Company XXX1] instead of [Company XXX2] and elected to follow the 170 like he wanted us to. We made it to the hold short line of 32L on November. I called ground to verify [Company XXX2] was cleared across. Ground said yes; follow the 170 cleared across 32L; monitor tower 132.7 [Company XXX1]. Well we were already crossing the hold short line (the runway was closed and not in use) when we realized he called us [Company XXX1] again. We thought he was just confused and got in the line on November for 10L/DD. Holding short of 10L/DD tower instructed [Company XXX1] to line up and wait. Before entering an active runway I wanted tower to call us the right call sign so I asked if she meant [Company XXX2]. She said no then came back and told us we were supposed to go to 9R. I said we were instructed to follow a 170 to 10L. She told us to cross the runway and she would figure out what the issue is. Tower informed us that they were doing training in the tower and our paperwork got confused with another aircraft. Tower taxied us back across the runway to get in line for a departure off of 10L. We departed without issue. When we were instructed to contact departure the captain apologized for the confusion back on the ground. The tower controller responded 'don't worry about it; it wasn't your fault'. We continued without incident I should have made the initial ground controller verify our call sign. Even though we knew he was talking to the right aircraft; he thought we were a different flight. I should have not worried about keeping the flow of the airport moving and made the controller verify the call sign before moving. The frequent use of long multiple taxi instructions to multiple aircraft without the opportunity to read back a clearance is a big threat at ORD. Many times this leads to confusion and promotes aircraft to keep moving to keep the operation moving. Another significant threat are the flight numbers being assigned to our flights. There are many flights operating at the same time that have very similar numbers. This is becoming something I have been seeing more and more frequently in the last couple of years. I will make a point to not assume the controller just messed up the call sign when they miss it by one number. Even if the situation is obvious that the controller is speaking to the correct aircraft; they may not be speaking to the correct flight. The company really should try and avoid the use of multiple flight numbers that are only one number apart. The closer the numbers get together the greater the opportunity for accepting the wrong clearance becomes.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.