Narrative:

Inbound flight arrived lga with a maintenance writeup. The #2 engine would not develop proper takeoff and climb power. The outbnd flight was given advise time while maintenance analyzed the #2 engine power problem. At the same time, the captain was told by 2 lga maintenance supervisors that the #2 engine's fuel flow regulator was being adjusted for maximum takeoff power. The engine would then be runup and checked for the flight. Captain then suggested to the lga maintenance that they need not take the time or delay for a runup check of the engine and urged the passenger be boarded as soon as possible. He told maintenance supervisors that he would do the necessary #2 engine power check on takeoff roll and if the power indication was not adequate, he would abort takeoff and return to the gate. The passenger boarded flight, parked at gate. Lga maintenance signed off on the #2 engine writeup (i.e., inbound flight sam aircraft) by stating the adjustment of #2 engine's fuel flow regulator. Engine runup and power checked ok. At this point, first officer (I) advised captain that a takeoff attempt west/O prior engine runup and check by maintenance would be an unsafe maneuver and poor judgement on the part of the crew. Captain then told me he was willing to take a 50/50 chance so as not to incur further delay. I then expressed my concern to captain about any false statements or statement in the aircraft log book by lga maintenance. That is, the statement referring to #2 engine being runup and checked for proper takeoff power indications by maintenance. I advised the captain that in making such statement of fact, and yet not following specified procedure was a felonious action and one that could put us all at risk for prosecution. He then told me not to worry; he had talked with lga maintenance supervisor and was assured that if the FAA showed up they would indeed say that the #2 engine was run up and checked prior to takeoff as per signoff on the log book. After my several attempts to dissuade captain from acting on an improper procedure, I acquiesced to his decision and flight departed gate with crew and passenger. Flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 31 lga. On initial takeoff roll, all 3 power levers were advanced for maximum takeoff power (see attached takeoff power card). The #2 engine failed to reach the required takeoff power and the decision was to abort takeoff. Lga tower was advised of aborted takeoff and informed of exact cause, that being inadequate power of the #2 engine. No emergency assistance was requested or determined to be needed. We proceeded back to the gate where it was met by lga maintenance and appropriate log book entry was made. #2 engine's maximum takeoff indications were approximately EPR 1.410 N1 85%. Passenger of flight were deplaned and the flight was cancelled as a revenue flight. Supplemental information from acn 138574: it has been alleged that I accepted aircraft knowing there was an improper log book entry. I emphatically deny the allegation. The item in question concerned the #2 engine's ability to provide full takeoff thrust on the previous takeoff. The corrective action by maintenance was to adjust the fuel control. It has been alleged that maintenance should have confirmed the fix by a full power runup of the engine. This was not important to me, since I was assured by maintenance personnel that the engine would now perform up to specifications. Furthermore, I would make the decision (as I do on every takeoff) to accept or not to accept the engine's performance. My decision would be based on the engine's performance on that takeoff regardless of maintenance's evaluation. The engine, in fact, did not perform as required and the takeoff was aborted at about 65 KTS. This was hardly a panic stop. In fact, I had to add power to get to the turnoff. My major concern with this event was and is my pilot second-in-command's constant second-guessing my decisions. While I am always open to my other crew members' suggestions, there can only be 1 PIC. The current emphasis on CRM has been misinterpreted by some to mean that everyone has equal authority in the cockpit. This entire event would not even be worthy of mention if the pilot second-in-command had performed his duties as a proper copilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF OUTBOUND ACR WDB FLT GETS MAINTENANCE TO COOK THE BOOKS ON ENGINE MAINTENANCE SNAG ENCOUNTERED ON INBOUND FLT.

Narrative: INBND FLT ARRIVED LGA WITH A MAINT WRITEUP. THE #2 ENG WOULD NOT DEVELOP PROPER TKOF AND CLB PWR. THE OUTBND FLT WAS GIVEN ADVISE TIME WHILE MAINT ANALYZED THE #2 ENG PWR PROB. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT WAS TOLD BY 2 LGA MAINT SUPVRS THAT THE #2 ENG'S FUEL FLOW REGULATOR WAS BEING ADJUSTED FOR MAX TKOF PWR. THE ENG WOULD THEN BE RUNUP AND CHKED FOR THE FLT. CAPT THEN SUGGESTED TO THE LGA MAINT THAT THEY NEED NOT TAKE THE TIME OR DELAY FOR A RUNUP CHK OF THE ENG AND URGED THE PAX BE BOARDED ASAP. HE TOLD MAINT SUPVRS THAT HE WOULD DO THE NECESSARY #2 ENG PWR CHK ON TKOF ROLL AND IF THE PWR INDICATION WAS NOT ADEQUATE, HE WOULD ABORT TKOF AND RETURN TO THE GATE. THE PAX BOARDED FLT, PARKED AT GATE. LGA MAINT SIGNED OFF ON THE #2 ENG WRITEUP (I.E., INBND FLT SAM ACFT) BY STATING THE ADJUSTMENT OF #2 ENG'S FUEL FLOW REGULATOR. ENG RUNUP AND PWR CHKED OK. AT THIS POINT, F/O (I) ADVISED CAPT THAT A TKOF ATTEMPT W/O PRIOR ENG RUNUP AND CHK BY MAINT WOULD BE AN UNSAFE MANEUVER AND POOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PART OF THE CREW. CAPT THEN TOLD ME HE WAS WILLING TO TAKE A 50/50 CHANCE SO AS NOT TO INCUR FURTHER DELAY. I THEN EXPRESSED MY CONCERN TO CAPT ABOUT ANY FALSE STATEMENTS OR STATEMENT IN THE ACFT LOG BOOK BY LGA MAINT. THAT IS, THE STATEMENT REFERRING TO #2 ENG BEING RUNUP AND CHKED FOR PROPER TKOF PWR INDICATIONS BY MAINT. I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT IN MAKING SUCH STATEMENT OF FACT, AND YET NOT FOLLOWING SPECIFIED PROC WAS A FELONIOUS ACTION AND ONE THAT COULD PUT US ALL AT RISK FOR PROSECUTION. HE THEN TOLD ME NOT TO WORRY; HE HAD TALKED WITH LGA MAINT SUPVR AND WAS ASSURED THAT IF THE FAA SHOWED UP THEY WOULD INDEED SAY THAT THE #2 ENG WAS RUN UP AND CHKED PRIOR TO TKOF AS PER SIGNOFF ON THE LOG BOOK. AFTER MY SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO DISSUADE CAPT FROM ACTING ON AN IMPROPER PROC, I ACQUIESCED TO HIS DECISION AND FLT DEPARTED GATE WITH CREW AND PAX. FLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 31 LGA. ON INITIAL TKOF ROLL, ALL 3 PWR LEVERS WERE ADVANCED FOR MAX TKOF PWR (SEE ATTACHED TKOF PWR CARD). THE #2 ENG FAILED TO REACH THE REQUIRED TKOF PWR AND THE DECISION WAS TO ABORT TKOF. LGA TWR WAS ADVISED OF ABORTED TKOF AND INFORMED OF EXACT CAUSE, THAT BEING INADEQUATE PWR OF THE #2 ENG. NO EMER ASSISTANCE WAS REQUESTED OR DETERMINED TO BE NEEDED. WE PROCEEDED BACK TO THE GATE WHERE IT WAS MET BY LGA MAINT AND APPROPRIATE LOG BOOK ENTRY WAS MADE. #2 ENG'S MAX TKOF INDICATIONS WERE APPROX EPR 1.410 N1 85%. PAX OF FLT WERE DEPLANED AND THE FLT WAS CANCELLED AS A REVENUE FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 138574: IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT I ACCEPTED ACFT KNOWING THERE WAS AN IMPROPER LOG BOOK ENTRY. I EMPHATICALLY DENY THE ALLEGATION. THE ITEM IN QUESTION CONCERNED THE #2 ENG'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE FULL TKOF THRUST ON THE PREVIOUS TKOF. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION BY MAINT WAS TO ADJUST THE FUEL CONTROL. IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT MAINT SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED THE FIX BY A FULL PWR RUNUP OF THE ENG. THIS WAS NOT IMPORTANT TO ME, SINCE I WAS ASSURED BY MAINT PERSONNEL THAT THE ENG WOULD NOW PERFORM UP TO SPECS. FURTHERMORE, I WOULD MAKE THE DECISION (AS I DO ON EVERY TKOF) TO ACCEPT OR NOT TO ACCEPT THE ENG'S PERFORMANCE. MY DECISION WOULD BE BASED ON THE ENG'S PERFORMANCE ON THAT TKOF REGARDLESS OF MAINT'S EVALUATION. THE ENG, IN FACT, DID NOT PERFORM AS REQUIRED AND THE TKOF WAS ABORTED AT ABOUT 65 KTS. THIS WAS HARDLY A PANIC STOP. IN FACT, I HAD TO ADD PWR TO GET TO THE TURNOFF. MY MAJOR CONCERN WITH THIS EVENT WAS AND IS MY PLT SECOND-IN-COMMAND'S CONSTANT SECOND-GUESSING MY DECISIONS. WHILE I AM ALWAYS OPEN TO MY OTHER CREW MEMBERS' SUGGESTIONS, THERE CAN ONLY BE 1 PIC. THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON CRM HAS BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY SOME TO MEAN THAT EVERYONE HAS EQUAL AUTHORITY IN THE COCKPIT. THIS ENTIRE EVENT WOULD NOT EVEN BE WORTHY OF MENTION IF THE PLT SECOND-IN-COMMAND HAD PERFORMED HIS DUTIES AS A PROPER COPLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.