Narrative:

Thunderstorms had moved into the local area during my break. I returned to the tower cab just after the field had been declared VMC after having been IMC. The ground control/FD/clearance delivery controller was 'waiting for ASOS to settle' (his words) before cutting a new ATIS. I relieved a certified professional controller (cpc) and her trainee from local control (local control). We had been on a ry 25 operation; but the wind was now out of the east steady at almost 20 KT with gusts to 34 KT. I told the ground control/FD/clearance delivery controller to cut an ATIS for ry 7 and then called the central florida TRACON (F11) to coordinate the runway change.the F11 watch supervisor wanted to hold off for a bit because they had 'worked real hard to get 2 jets over on the east side' (his words) of the airport for approaches to ry 25. I restated the wind and told him I doubted either aircraft would accept a landing clearance with such a strong tailwind. I told him I could give the aircraft circling approaches to land ry 7 if they spaced them far enough apart (currently about 10 NM in trail). He said they would.aircraft X checked on frequency on a 5 NM mile final to ry 25 and called the runway in sight. I gave the pilot the wind and the option to land ry 25 or circle to land ry 7. He chose the latter. I instructed him to once inside class D airspace circle north to land ry 7. He waited until ½ NM final to begin his circle; and only went ½ NM north of the runway. F11 called and asked if I could provide visual separation between aircraft X (1/2 NM north abeam midfield) and aircraft Y (on 5 NM final to ry 25). I told them unable due to visibility (about 4SM -RA).when aircraft X was abeam ry 7 numbers; he said he needed a 360 to set up to land. I told him to make a right 270 to base ry 7. F11 sent aircraft Y over to me despite my advising them of being unable to provide visual separation. If aircraft Y chose to land ry 25; one of the 2 aircraft would have to be broken out. Opposite direction ops rules had already been broken vis-a-vis the cut-off point in the F11/orl LOA (10 flying miles). I have never had back-to-back circling approaches; so I don't know the separation standard (if there even is one). I assumed that if aircraft Y opted for a circle to land ry 7 it would be okay because both aircraft would have the runway in sight.I became busy with aircraft Y checking in and making the same offer to that pilot (he also opted to circle to land ry 7); as well as talking to the ground control/FD/clearance delivery controller because he was behind the power curve cutting a new ATIS and disseminating weather. I didn't notice that aircraft X had continued westbound until he called 3 NM west asking if it was okay for him to turn inbound. I told him to make an immediate left turn to final ry 7; cleared to land.the light rain on the field suddenly increased in intensity. This was unexpected because neither the weather radar on the stars terminal doppler weather nor the view out the window suggested that precipitation was going to increase in the near future.when aircraft X was short final for ry 7; aircraft Y was about 2 NM north abeam midfield and stated he lost sight of the runway. I had no idea what procedure to apply in this situation; as I have never encountered it before nor discussed it in any training. I assigned heading 250 maintain 1500 feet to aircraft Y (essentially what he was already on) and called the departure controller to ask him what I should do. He assigned heading 270 maintain 2000 feet and told me to send aircraft Y back to him for vectors to ry 7. I had both aircraft in sight until I frequency changed aircraft Y back to approach control.aircraft Y rejected his next approach to ry 7 because there was still heavy rain on the field; but eventually landed.as a general aviation airport that mostly handles small aircraft; we at orl change the runway operation often with the wind. I understand this is not the case at commercial airports that mostly handle large and/or heavy aircraft. The TRACON associated with the large airport needs to be cognizant of this to provide a better service to its satellite airports.it is notoriously difficult to eke out a runway change with F11; and this situation was typical of the mindset we are up against. I cannot think of a more shining example of the dire need for serious culture change at F11!weather changes rapidly during the summer months in central florida. The ground control/FD/clearance delivery controller arrived not long ago and has not yet experienced this. The same holds true for the local control trainee. The local control cpc/OJT instructor has experienced 1 central florida summer; which should be plenty of experience to know how to deal with the weather situation that existed at the time of the event. My 10+ years' experience at this tower tells me the wind did not shift and pick up speed instantaneously. The runway change should have been anticipated and coordinated sooner; before I relieved the position.when I provide OJT on flight data (FD); I stress that the ASOS equipment cannot keep up with how quickly our summer weather changes. The FD controller must rely on his/her limited aviation weather reporting station training to amend ASOS and manually force observations to be transmitted. It appears the ground control/FD/clearance delivery received inadequate OJT.I got the strong impression when I entered the tower cab that all 3 controllers were far behind the power curve. The TRACON was inflexible and deaf to my input. I honestly have no idea if separation standards were violated; and if so which one(s).in hindsight; I should have been more forceful in coordinating with F11 and not let them paint me into a difficult corner.I remain open to suggestions for what procedures and/or rules I should study to be more aware of my responsibilities in this type of situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORL Tower Controller reported of an unfamiliar operation that led to an operational error. TRACON did not want to change runways but due to winds the Tower Controller took the aircraft and one ended up circling to the runway and then causing a loss of separation.

Narrative: Thunderstorms had moved into the local area during my break. I returned to the tower cab just after the field had been declared VMC after having been IMC. The GC/FD/CD Controller was 'waiting for ASOS to settle' (his words) before cutting a new ATIS. I relieved a Certified Professional Controller (CPC) and her trainee from Local Control (LC). We had been on a RY 25 operation; but the wind was now out of the East steady at almost 20 KT with gusts to 34 KT. I told the GC/FD/CD controller to cut an ATIS for RY 7 and then called the Central Florida TRACON (F11) to coordinate the runway change.The F11 Watch Supervisor wanted to hold off for a bit because they had 'worked real hard to get 2 jets over on the East side' (his words) of the airport for approaches to RY 25. I restated the wind and told him I doubted either aircraft would accept a landing clearance with such a strong tailwind. I told him I could give the aircraft circling approaches to land RY 7 if they spaced them far enough apart (currently about 10 NM in trail). He said they would.Aircraft X checked on frequency on a 5 NM mile final to RY 25 and called the runway in sight. I gave the pilot the wind and the option to land RY 25 or circle to land RY 7. He chose the latter. I instructed him to once inside Class D airspace circle North to land RY 7. He waited until ½ NM final to begin his circle; and only went ½ NM north of the runway. F11 called and asked if I could provide visual separation between Aircraft X (1/2 NM North abeam midfield) and Aircraft Y (on 5 NM final to RY 25). I told them unable due to visibility (about 4SM -RA).When Aircraft X was abeam RY 7 numbers; he said he needed a 360 to set up to land. I told him to make a right 270 to base RY 7. F11 sent Aircraft Y over to me despite my advising them of being unable to provide visual separation. If Aircraft Y chose to land RY 25; one of the 2 aircraft would have to be broken out. Opposite Direction Ops rules had already been broken vis-a-vis the cut-off point in the F11/ORL LOA (10 flying miles). I have never had back-to-back circling approaches; so I don't know the separation standard (if there even is one). I assumed that if Aircraft Y opted for a circle to land RY 7 it would be okay because both aircraft would have the runway in sight.I became busy with Aircraft Y checking in and making the same offer to that pilot (he also opted to circle to land RY 7); as well as talking to the GC/FD/CD controller because he was behind the power curve cutting a new ATIS and disseminating weather. I didn't notice that Aircraft X had continued westbound until he called 3 NM West asking if it was okay for him to turn inbound. I told him to make an immediate left turn to final RY 7; cleared to land.The light rain on the field suddenly increased in intensity. This was unexpected because neither the weather radar on the STARS Terminal Doppler Weather nor the view out the window suggested that precipitation was going to increase in the near future.When Aircraft X was short final for RY 7; Aircraft Y was about 2 NM North abeam midfield and stated he lost sight of the runway. I had no idea what procedure to apply in this situation; as I have never encountered it before nor discussed it in any training. I assigned heading 250 maintain 1500 feet to Aircraft Y (essentially what he was already on) and called the departure controller to ask him what I should do. He assigned heading 270 maintain 2000 feet and told me to send Aircraft Y back to him for vectors to RY 7. I had both aircraft in sight until I frequency changed Aircraft Y back to Approach Control.Aircraft Y rejected his next approach to RY 7 because there was still heavy rain on the field; but eventually landed.As a General Aviation airport that mostly handles small aircraft; we at ORL change the runway operation often with the wind. I understand this is not the case at Commercial airports that mostly handle large and/or heavy aircraft. The TRACON associated with the large airport needs to be cognizant of this to provide a better service to its satellite airports.It is notoriously difficult to eke out a runway change with F11; and this situation was typical of the mindset we are up against. I cannot think of a more shining example of the dire need for serious culture change at F11!Weather changes rapidly during the summer months in Central Florida. The GC/FD/CD controller arrived not long ago and has not yet experienced this. The same holds true for the LC trainee. The LC CPC/OJT Instructor has experienced 1 Central Florida summer; which should be plenty of experience to know how to deal with the weather situation that existed at the time of the event. My 10+ years' experience at this tower tells me the wind did not shift and pick up speed instantaneously. The runway change should have been anticipated and coordinated sooner; before I relieved the position.When I provide OJT on Flight Data (FD); I stress that the ASOS equipment cannot keep up with how quickly our summer weather changes. The FD controller must rely on his/her Limited Aviation Weather Reporting Station training to amend ASOS and manually force observations to be transmitted. It appears the GC/FD/CD received inadequate OJT.I got the strong impression when I entered the tower cab that all 3 controllers were far behind the power curve. The TRACON was inflexible and deaf to my input. I honestly have no idea if separation standards were violated; and if so which one(s).In hindsight; I should have been more forceful in coordinating with F11 and not let them paint me into a difficult corner.I remain open to suggestions for what procedures and/or rules I should study to be more aware of my responsibilities in this type of situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.