Narrative:

I attempted the ferry flight of a twin engine aircraft; and a student to the santa fe municipal airport. I was acting as PIC for the mission while the student was restricted to co-pilot duties having not yet passed his commercial multi-engine check ride. The student had logged 23.7 hours of training time in the twin at the time of the ferry flight. The flight was conducted under VFR with flight following. The first leg of the flight was completed with a landing without incident. The FBO was closed so the only service was fuel. No food was available. I refueled and proceeded to the northwest my next stop. The intent was to proceed directly to santa fe prior to the expected buildup of thunderstorms in the vicinity of albuquerque and santa fe. As we approached; the co-pilot complained of great discomfort from hunger and asked me several times to stop for something to eat. I elected to land at an intermediate airport rather than continue with a student co-pilot who was hungry and stressed. By the time we returned to the FBO; the weather had deteriorated over albuquerque and santa fe to the point that I decided to wait to see of conditions improved later in the day. Before sunset the weather conditions appeared to improve and I elected to depart for santa fe. We encountered bands of rain and clouds between there and albuquerque but easily maneuvered around them. However; a large cell was encountered over the corona VOR forcing me to deviate west and then northwest toward albuquerque. At that time the largest cell was to our east. I chose to climb to 12;500 to ensure terrain clearance in the event of severe down drafts. About 12 miles east of abq we picked up flight following from approach. I chose to fly northeast; just east of interstate 25. At that point the cell I had earlier avoided had moved directly over santa fe. We were in moderate turbulence and struggling to maintain altitude. Radio communications were becoming difficult with ATC being very busy and our contact sporadic. In addition; the student was exhibiting great stress because of the deteriorating weather. He was also exhibiting a decreasing ability to communicate or function effectively in english. I elected to [descend] and land as soon as possible and told ATC of my intentions to land at los alamos. I was advised that a tfr was in effect at that airport. At this time I became aware that I was becoming hypoxic with deteriorating vision and increased fatigue. I was aware that center had tried to communicate with us but the transmission was garbled. I used my ipad sectional to locate another airport nearby and found E14 just north of espanola. I could see the vicinity of E14 was clear of thunderstorm and decided to turn directly toward the airfield to avoid both terrain and thunderstorm activity. I elected not to declare an emergency with the airfield in sight and calm winds. Also; my vision improved and extreme fatigue dissipated as we descended in preparation for landing. The landing was uneventful and I was advised that I should call abq center. The aircraft was recovered the following day. I made a call to albuquerque center and was advised that a possible deviation had occurred. I was also advised that a report would be generated and that flight standards would be contacting me. I notified my superiors and was interviewed at length by the santa fe site manager. My interviewer covered the entire flight from tasking to final landing. He then asked me to identify where my decision-making had led me into a situation where I felt forced to land as soon as possible in mountainous terrain; in bad weather; risking a violation of restricted airspace while possibly suffering from hypoxia. I was able to identify two primary points in the flight. The first point was the decision to proceed to santa fe without a solid idea of developing weather conditions. I launched with a tired and nervous student co-pilot and was also experiencing fatigue. These factors combined tocloud my judgment and caused me to make poor decisions in ever-deteriorating conditions. In retrospect; I should have elected to stay at roswell or; at the very least; contacted my superiors for guidance. I now know I would have been advised to stay at roswell for the night and proceed in the morning. My interviewer also made clear to me that I could have elected to turn to roswell or land at albuquerque at any time prior to becoming trapped north of santa fe. The second point was to fail to simply turn around and proceed back to albuquerque and request vectors for an approach for landing; upon finding santa fe weather unacceptable. My interviewer asked me about my decision to proceed to E14 rather than toward albuquerque. My only response is that I did not know what was behind me and I had a visual on a clear airfield. The stress of the flying situation; the perceived difficulty with communications; and the lack of support by the stressed student caused me to focus on the nearest possible out. My interviewer pointed out that the decision to proceed to los alamos; after finding santa fe unusable; was an error in judgment. I could have turned toward albuquerque and requested vectors for an approach or made a visual approach to double eagle had that airfield been clear.my interviewer's immediate response was to advise that he was recommending me for remedial training in weather; restricted airspace; crew resource management; inadvertent-flight-into IMC; aeromedical factors and aeronautical decision-making. He also stated that I would be restricted from ferry operations until that training was completed as well as being closely monitored on all cross-country student flights. Conclusion: the ferry flight and possible deviation R-5101 is a vivid personal lesson on the dangers of flying under stress while experiencing a great desire to get to the destination. I also learned that the combination of deteriorating weather; possible hypoxia; fatigue; and decreased crew resource management might occur quickly and without clear indication. I understand my responsibilities and readily accept the requirement for additional training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An instructor pilot ferrying a light twin to SAF unexpectedly encountered thunderstorms and; while deviating; climbed to 12;500 ft; entered restricted airspace; and inadvertently entered IMC flight.

Narrative: I attempted the ferry flight of a twin engine aircraft; and a student to the Santa Fe Municipal Airport. I was acting as PIC for the mission while the student was restricted to co-pilot duties having not yet passed his commercial multi-engine check ride. The student had logged 23.7 hours of training time in the twin at the time of the ferry flight. The flight was conducted under VFR with flight following. The first leg of the flight was completed with a landing without incident. The FBO was closed so the only service was fuel. No food was available. I refueled and proceeded to the Northwest my next stop. The intent was to proceed directly to Santa Fe prior to the expected buildup of thunderstorms in the vicinity of Albuquerque and Santa Fe. As we approached; the co-pilot complained of great discomfort from hunger and asked me several times to stop for something to eat. I elected to land at an intermediate airport rather than continue with a student co-pilot who was hungry and stressed. By the time we returned to the FBO; the weather had deteriorated over Albuquerque and Santa Fe to the point that I decided to wait to see of conditions improved later in the day. Before sunset the weather conditions appeared to improve and I elected to depart for Santa Fe. We encountered bands of rain and clouds between there and Albuquerque but easily maneuvered around them. However; a large cell was encountered over the Corona VOR forcing me to deviate west and then northwest toward Albuquerque. At that time the largest cell was to our east. I chose to climb to 12;500 to ensure terrain clearance in the event of severe down drafts. About 12 Miles east of ABQ we picked up flight following from approach. I chose to fly northeast; just east of Interstate 25. At that point the cell I had earlier avoided had moved directly over Santa Fe. We were in moderate turbulence and struggling to maintain altitude. Radio communications were becoming difficult with ATC being very busy and our contact sporadic. In addition; the student was exhibiting great stress because of the deteriorating weather. He was also exhibiting a decreasing ability to communicate or function effectively in English. I elected to [descend] and land as soon as possible and told ATC of my intentions to land at Los Alamos. I was advised that a TFR was in effect at that airport. At this time I became aware that I was becoming hypoxic with deteriorating vision and increased fatigue. I was aware that Center had tried to communicate with us but the transmission was garbled. I used my iPad sectional to locate another airport nearby and found E14 just north of Espanola. I could see the vicinity of E14 was clear of thunderstorm and decided to turn directly toward the airfield to avoid both terrain and thunderstorm activity. I elected not to declare an emergency with the airfield in sight and calm winds. Also; my vision improved and extreme fatigue dissipated as we descended in preparation for landing. The landing was uneventful and I was advised that I should call ABQ center. The aircraft was recovered the following day. I made a call to Albuquerque Center and was advised that a possible deviation had occurred. I was also advised that a report would be generated and that Flight Standards would be contacting me. I notified my superiors and was interviewed at length by the Santa Fe Site Manager. My interviewer covered the entire flight from tasking to final landing. He then asked me to identify where my decision-making had led me into a situation where I felt forced to land as soon as possible in mountainous terrain; in bad weather; risking a violation of restricted airspace while possibly suffering from hypoxia. I was able to identify two primary points in the flight. The first point was the decision to proceed to Santa Fe without a solid idea of developing weather conditions. I launched with a tired and nervous student co-pilot and was also experiencing fatigue. These factors combined tocloud my judgment and caused me to make poor decisions in ever-deteriorating conditions. In retrospect; I should have elected to stay at Roswell or; at the very least; contacted my superiors for guidance. I now know I would have been advised to stay at Roswell for the night and proceed in the morning. My interviewer also made clear to me that I could have elected to turn to Roswell or land at Albuquerque at any time prior to becoming trapped North of Santa Fe. The second point was to fail to simply turn around and proceed back to Albuquerque and request vectors for an approach for landing; upon finding Santa Fe weather unacceptable. My interviewer asked me about my decision to proceed to E14 rather than toward Albuquerque. My only response is that I did not know what was behind me and I had a visual on a clear airfield. The stress of the flying situation; the perceived difficulty with communications; and the lack of support by the stressed student caused me to focus on the nearest possible out. My interviewer pointed out that the decision to proceed to Los Alamos; after finding Santa Fe unusable; was an error in judgment. I could have turned toward Albuquerque and requested vectors for an approach or made a visual approach to Double Eagle had that airfield been clear.My interviewer's immediate response was to advise that he was recommending me for remedial training in Weather; Restricted Airspace; Crew Resource Management; inadvertent-flight-into IMC; aeromedical factors and aeronautical decision-making. He also stated that I would be restricted from ferry operations until that training was completed as well as being closely monitored on all cross-country student flights. Conclusion: The ferry flight and possible deviation R-5101 is a vivid personal lesson on the dangers of flying under stress while experiencing a great desire to get to the destination. I also learned that the combination of deteriorating weather; possible hypoxia; fatigue; and decreased crew resource management might occur quickly and without clear indication. I understand my responsibilities and readily accept the requirement for additional training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.