Narrative:

As our hold was cancelled and we were issued a vector to the final approach course, the following instructions were additionally issued. My recollection was that we were cleared to 'maintain 7000' to sexxy, cleared for the approach, contact the tower on ???.?? At the outer.' the first officer caught the same transmission as 'maintain 210 KTS to sexxy, (something missed), contact the tower on ???.?? At the outer.' the second officer was doing a checklist at that time and therefore didn't catch any of it. A cockpit verification discussion ensued. On checking the approach plate, I found that the normal crossing altitude of sexxy is 5000'. I therefore assumed that the first officer, not me, had correctly interpreted the clearance. Since there was a question, however, I asked that he 'verify.' the operating controller never let up for a breath. It was impossible to get a word in edgewise for at least a 2 min period. We therefore flew the clearance as: maintained 7000' to the glide slope, then as the first officer had caught it (5000' at sexxy and 210K), but without ATC verification. Apparently this was correct. Nothing was said. But we'll never know!!! We tried to verify, but we couldn't get 10 seconds on the frequency to do it! If the controllers don't knock off the constant stream of (legally required, no doubt) verbage -- generally signifying absolutely nothing -- an accident will occur at ord -- just as it did in atl. A mouth in motion does not a proficient controller make! Although the above occurred during the approach, the idea applies to all areas of operation.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REPORTER COMPLAINS ABOUT NOT HAVING ENOUGH FREQ TIME AVAILABLE TO QUESTION ATC CLRNC.

Narrative: AS OUR HOLD WAS CANCELLED AND WE WERE ISSUED A VECTOR TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE, THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WERE ADDITIONALLY ISSUED. MY RECOLLECTION WAS THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 'MAINTAIN 7000' TO SEXXY, CLRED FOR THE APCH, CONTACT THE TWR ON ???.?? AT THE OUTER.' THE F/O CAUGHT THE SAME XMISSION AS 'MAINTAIN 210 KTS TO SEXXY, (SOMETHING MISSED), CONTACT THE TWR ON ???.?? AT THE OUTER.' THE S/O WAS DOING A CHECKLIST AT THAT TIME AND THEREFORE DIDN'T CATCH ANY OF IT. A COCKPIT VERIFICATION DISCUSSION ENSUED. ON CHECKING THE APCH PLATE, I FOUND THAT THE NORMAL XING ALT OF SEXXY IS 5000'. I THEREFORE ASSUMED THAT THE F/O, NOT ME, HAD CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE CLRNC. SINCE THERE WAS A QUESTION, HOWEVER, I ASKED THAT HE 'VERIFY.' THE OPERATING CTLR NEVER LET UP FOR A BREATH. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET A WORD IN EDGEWISE FOR AT LEAST A 2 MIN PERIOD. WE THEREFORE FLEW THE CLRNC AS: MAINTAINED 7000' TO THE GLIDE SLOPE, THEN AS THE F/O HAD CAUGHT IT (5000' AT SEXXY AND 210K), BUT WITHOUT ATC VERIFICATION. APPARENTLY THIS WAS CORRECT. NOTHING WAS SAID. BUT WE'LL NEVER KNOW!!! WE TRIED TO VERIFY, BUT WE COULDN'T GET 10 SECONDS ON THE FREQ TO DO IT! IF THE CTLRS DON'T KNOCK OFF THE CONSTANT STREAM OF (LEGALLY REQUIRED, NO DOUBT) VERBAGE -- GENERALLY SIGNIFYING ABSOLUTELY NOTHING -- AN ACCIDENT WILL OCCUR AT ORD -- JUST AS IT DID IN ATL. A MOUTH IN MOTION DOES NOT A PROFICIENT CTLR MAKE! ALTHOUGH THE ABOVE OCCURRED DURING THE APCH, THE IDEA APPLIES TO ALL AREAS OF OPERATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.