Narrative:

I refused to sign the dispatch release because although the plane was legal to fly I did not feel that the proper preparations were made to provide critical safety features to operate the aircraft in the manner it was designed for. The issue of concern began with an originator. Upon reviewing the maintenance log book I noted several MEL items to include the FMS; ACARS. After reviewing the mels and supplements I became aware that the flight would need to operate without the aid of RNAV sid; RNAV arrival and RNAV enroute capabilities. Most concerning to me was the loss of RNAV GPS approaches. Navigation via GPS was unusable due to MEL. Also in meling the FMS was the loss of ACARS unlink communication as well as the ACARS printer. In my experience with prior diversions I have been unable to notify company dispatch via commercial radio which has left me with ACARS free text as my only means of company communication; which in the instance of meling the ACARS it takes away my ability to communicate with the company. During the time I received my clearance I had to make immediate amendments to the filed routing and aircraft equipment suffix to indicate negative RNAV. ZZZ approach was then helpful in giving us vectors to join a radial that would put us a course to intercept our first fix. Enroute navigation was uneventful and as I started preparing for the arrival and approach phase of the flight I was able to derive the information I needed without the use of ACARS by using the release. Planned approach in use was runway xy with winds of 300@15g20 by tower report. Planned runway was visual backed up by ILS runway xy. Last minute the tower changed the active runway to runway za to better accommodate crosswind conditions; however unlike runway xy; runway za did not have an ILS with vertical guidance. I then wanted to back up a visual approach with GPS however it was MEL'ed. The only type of approach left as a backup was a VOR approach with no vertical guidance. The plane was safely landed in VFR conditions by use of PAPI lighting for vertical guidance; however this scenario illustrated that by removing GPS capability and in the absence of an ILS the plane would needed to be flown in IMC using a dive and drive method that many pilots consider an unsafe approach in a jet aircraft. Upon landing in ZZZ1 I spoke to the captain about my concerns of accepting an aircraft with the handicaps mentioned and I stated that I was fine with flying it back to base for the purpose of maintenance. I stated that I was not fine with flying a plane around with these handicaps on regular passenger service until scheduled maintenance and I would refuse to fly continued service. Upon arrival in base my captain was then notified that we were to be extended past our normal scheduled flying to accommodate a flight out and back in the same aircraft. I refused to fly the aircraft on continued service due to the hazards I will further highlight in my recommendations for procedural changes.one of the pillars of safety of our corporate safety policy is to access and mitigate safety hazards and risks. The purpose of this report is to do just that. The current operational policy allows for FMS and ACARS equipment to be not working for a period of time until scheduled maintenance can occur. I would like to see this changed to ferry flight to maintenance upon loss of this equipment. Losing effective company communication via ACARS paired with the additional workload of flying conventional radio navigation as well as most importantly loosing vertical navigation is a handicap that should be treated at the same level as loss of autopilot or anti-ice equipment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 First Officer refused to continue flying an aircraft with both ACARS and the FMC on MEL after being told it would be taken out of service after return to base on the basis of safety of flight issues.

Narrative: I refused to sign the dispatch release because although the plane was legal to fly I did not feel that the proper preparations were made to provide critical safety features to operate the aircraft in the manner it was designed for. The issue of concern began with an originator. Upon reviewing the maintenance log book I noted several MEL items to include the FMS; ACARS. After reviewing the MELs and supplements I became aware that the flight would need to operate without the aid of RNAV Sid; RNAV arrival and RNAV enroute capabilities. Most concerning to me was the loss of RNAV GPS approaches. Navigation via GPS was unusable due to MEL. Also in MELing the FMS was the loss of ACARS unlink communication as well as the ACARS printer. In my experience with prior diversions I have been unable to notify company dispatch via Commercial Radio which has left me with ACARS free text as my only means of company communication; which in the instance of MELing the ACARS it takes away my ability to communicate with the company. During the time I received my clearance I had to make immediate amendments to the filed routing and aircraft equipment suffix to indicate negative RNAV. ZZZ Approach was then helpful in giving us vectors to join a radial that would put us a course to intercept our first fix. Enroute navigation was uneventful and as I started preparing for the arrival and approach phase of the flight I was able to derive the information I needed without the use of ACARS by using the release. Planned approach in use was runway XY with winds of 300@15g20 by tower report. Planned runway was visual backed up by ILS Runway XY. Last minute the tower changed the active runway to Runway ZA to better accommodate crosswind conditions; however unlike runway XY; runway ZA did not have an ILS with vertical guidance. I then wanted to back up a visual approach with GPS however it was MEL'ed. The only type of approach left as a backup was a VOR approach with no vertical guidance. The plane was safely landed in VFR conditions by use of PAPI lighting for vertical guidance; however this scenario illustrated that by removing GPS capability and in the absence of an ILS the plane would needed to be flown in IMC using a dive and drive method that many pilots consider an unsafe approach in a jet aircraft. Upon landing in ZZZ1 I spoke to the captain about my concerns of accepting an aircraft with the handicaps mentioned and I stated that I was fine with flying it back to base for the purpose of maintenance. I stated that I was not fine with flying a plane around with these handicaps on regular passenger service until scheduled maintenance and I would refuse to fly continued service. Upon arrival in base my captain was then notified that we were to be extended past our normal scheduled flying to accommodate a flight out and back in the same aircraft. I refused to fly the aircraft on continued service due to the hazards I will further highlight in my recommendations for procedural changes.One of the pillars of safety of our corporate safety policy is to access and mitigate safety hazards and risks. The purpose of this report is to do just that. The current operational policy allows for FMS and ACARS equipment to be not working for a period of time until scheduled maintenance can occur. I would like to see this changed to ferry flight to maintenance upon loss of this equipment. Losing effective company communication via ACARS paired with the additional workload of flying conventional radio navigation as well as most importantly loosing vertical navigation is a handicap that should be treated at the same level as loss of autopilot or anti-ice equipment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.