Narrative:

Just prior to taxi my captain called for RVR information because it wasn't present in the ATIS. Ground control at sbn replied with RVR reported 1600'. 1600 RVR meets our company operations specifications. My captain and I carefully reviewed our operations specifications and the approach plate, and both came to the same conclusion that we were able to depart sbn with 1600 RVR. During taxiing to the active, tower did report RVR 800, and my captain and I both stated that we needed 1600 RVR and not 800 RVR, because 800 RVR we couldn't meet per operations spcs and equipment available at sbn. When reaching the hold short line at runway 27, tower reported RVR 1600 and cleared us into position. He also asked us to report when on the roll and airborne, once when takeoff clearance was received, and he also came back with an RVR 1600. Once we were airborne and reached our final altitude, we heard sbn tower tell another aircraft that the RVR just dropped to 800 RVR, and asked him about missing the approach and what he wanted to do. Later we (captain and first officer) talked to our chief pilot about the situation, and it appears that the information needed wasn't published on plates (commercial), but were on nos charts--and that the change in minimums were due to obstacle clearance and sep. If information was available to us and the other 4 air carrier's, this investigation would not have materialized (there should be a bulletin made about the takeoff minimums to all air carrier's and to the companies and publishers of the nos and commercial charts).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REPORTER QUESTIONS TKOF MINIMUMS PUBLISHED IN COMMERCIAL APCH CHARTS. NOAA TKOF PAGE DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ACR REDUCTION BELOW RVR 2400.

Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO TAXI MY CAPT CALLED FOR RVR INFO BECAUSE IT WASN'T PRESENT IN THE ATIS. GND CTL AT SBN REPLIED WITH RVR RPTED 1600'. 1600 RVR MEETS OUR COMPANY OPS SPECS. MY CAPT AND I CAREFULLY REVIEWED OUR OPS SPECS AND THE APCH PLATE, AND BOTH CAME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE ABLE TO DEPART SBN WITH 1600 RVR. DURING TAXIING TO THE ACTIVE, TWR DID RPT RVR 800, AND MY CAPT AND I BOTH STATED THAT WE NEEDED 1600 RVR AND NOT 800 RVR, BECAUSE 800 RVR WE COULDN'T MEET PER OPS SPCS AND EQUIP AVAILABLE AT SBN. WHEN REACHING THE HOLD SHORT LINE AT RWY 27, TWR RPTED RVR 1600 AND CLRED US INTO POS. HE ALSO ASKED US TO RPT WHEN ON THE ROLL AND AIRBORNE, ONCE WHEN TKOF CLRNC WAS RECEIVED, AND HE ALSO CAME BACK WITH AN RVR 1600. ONCE WE WERE AIRBORNE AND REACHED OUR FINAL ALT, WE HEARD SBN TWR TELL ANOTHER ACFT THAT THE RVR JUST DROPPED TO 800 RVR, AND ASKED HIM ABOUT MISSING THE APCH AND WHAT HE WANTED TO DO. LATER WE (CAPT AND F/O) TALKED TO OUR CHIEF PLT ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE INFO NEEDED WASN'T PUBLISHED ON PLATES (COMMERCIAL), BUT WERE ON NOS CHARTS--AND THAT THE CHANGE IN MINIMUMS WERE DUE TO OBSTACLE CLRNC AND SEP. IF INFO WAS AVAILABLE TO US AND THE OTHER 4 ACR'S, THIS INVESTIGATION WOULD NOT HAVE MATERIALIZED (THERE SHOULD BE A BULLETIN MADE ABOUT THE TKOF MINIMUMS TO ALL ACR'S AND TO THE COMPANIES AND PUBLISHERS OF THE NOS AND COMMERCIAL CHARTS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.