Narrative:

Winds favored runway 33 so we requested 33 and I briefed for the visual backed up by the ILS. The autopilot was engaged and we were cleared to 2500 feet and vectored onto a right downwind. The ILS app for 33 was loaded in the FMC. We configured to flaps 5 and reported the field in sight. We were cleared for the visual and I requested 1800 feet (alt at FAF) be put in the MCP and called for gear down; flaps 20. At that point we were abeam the FAF and I began a right turn to intercept the final at the final approach course (facility) or just inside it. Looking back at that point I had not properly selected the lowest range on the HSI; so I was further displaced from the facility than I thought. I selected vs down 300 feet to begin a descent to 1800 feet and I called for flaps 30. The landing checklist was completed and I selected localizer and once on an intercept heading for the facility I armed app. It was at this point I identified the range error on the HSI. I looked down to adjust the range and about that time the GS captured and the aircraft began to descend. I still had the field in sight; but had lost a visual on the runway. We were inside the FAF on an intercept heading; but still to the right of the facility. The first officer (first officer) called 1000 feet and I began to feel as though I was not in a good position for the runway. We continued to descend for a little longer at which time I disengaged the autopilot and stopped the descent. Tower called and asked us if we had the runway. I had begun a climb when tower call and said that they had a low alt alert and we needed to climb; which we were already doing. I climbed to above 1000 feet AGL; intercepted the facility and PAPI GS and the landing was uneventful. There were a number of things I could have done better. First; I recognized a loss of situational awareness during a portion of the approach and I should have verbalized that to my first officer. I should have given myself more time to intercept the final outside of the FAF and should not have started my descent so quickly to 1800 feet. I should have verbalized to my first officer when I realized that I was further to the right of the facility than planned; and also that I had lost sight of the runway. I should not have armed app until closer or established on the facility. This would have prevented the GS capture and early descent inside the FAF.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 flight crew reported getting a low altitude alert from ATC after losing situational awareness on a night visual approach to BDL.

Narrative: Winds favored Runway 33 so we requested 33 and I briefed for the visual backed up by the ILS. The autopilot was engaged and we were cleared to 2500 feet and vectored onto a right downwind. The ILS app for 33 was loaded in the FMC. We configured to flaps 5 and reported the field in sight. We were cleared for the visual and I requested 1800 feet (alt at FAF) be put in the MCP and called for gear down; flaps 20. At that point we were abeam the FAF and I began a right turn to intercept the final at the Final Approach Course (FAC) or just inside it. Looking back at that point I had not properly selected the lowest range on the HSI; so I was further displaced from the FAC than I thought. I selected VS down 300 feet to begin a descent to 1800 feet and I called for flaps 30. The landing checklist was completed and I selected LOC and once on an intercept heading for the FAC I armed APP. It was at this point I identified the range error on the HSI. I looked down to adjust the range and about that time the GS captured and the aircraft began to descend. I still had the field in sight; but had lost a visual on the runway. We were inside the FAF on an intercept heading; but still to the right of the FAC. The First Officer (FO) called 1000 feet and I began to feel as though I was not in a good position for the runway. We continued to descend for a little longer at which time I disengaged the autopilot and stopped the descent. Tower called and asked us if we had the runway. I had begun a climb when tower call and said that they had a low alt alert and we needed to climb; which we were already doing. I climbed to above 1000 feet AGL; intercepted the FAC and PAPI GS and the landing was uneventful. There were a number of things I could have done better. First; I recognized a loss of Situational Awareness during a portion of the approach and I should have verbalized that to my FO. I should have given myself more time to intercept the final outside of the FAF and should not have started my descent so quickly to 1800 feet. I should have verbalized to my FO when I realized that I was further to the right of the FAC than planned; and also that I had lost sight of the runway. I should not have armed APP until closer or established on the FAC. This would have prevented the GS capture and early descent inside the FAF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.