Narrative:

Aircraft X departed [through] fat approach control's airspace handed off to me climbing to 10;000 (top of their airspace and LOA) [to their] destination via tph direct filed for high altitude. I was working sector 16/22 combined which goes up to FL230. Aircraft didn't check on in a timely manner and I saw that aircraft appeared to be climbing slow so I figured fat approach was holding on to them until they were closer to the top of fat's airspace.I went to other tasks and didn't continue to monitor aircraft X for a moment until I saw the MSAW warning flash. Aircraft was approaching edge of fat's airspace and an area where the mia is 10;500. I called fat sector and asked if they were still talking to aircraft X and told them to climb aircraft to 17;000 and turn 20 degrees to the right to avoid terrain. Fat responded saying they weren't talking to aircraft and they were NORDO. I tried to call aircraft X on my frequencies and guard frequencies and made a broadcast on both frequencies for aircraft X to climb to 17;000 and contact me on the better of the two frequencies for 16/22.I was just about to alert the supervisor to what seemed to be developing into an emergency situation and aircraft X checked on my frequency level at 10;000. My first transmission was to tell aircraft X to climb to 17;000 and to climb at a good rate because of terrain. Once aircraft X was above mia; I had the aircraft turn to a 130 heading to allow time to climb above the next higher area to the northeast.I ended up not alerting the supervisor because the situation was now under control and the aircraft was safe. The aircraft was below the mia for the area that is 10;500 for about 3-5 miles at 10;000 before I was talking to the aircraft and able to climb them. They didn't appear to enter another mia area until they were above the mia in that area.in this occurrence; I found 3 people/entities to be contributors in an unsafe situation. First I felt like fat approach may not have given the aircraft a frequency change in a timely manner and if they attempted to and realized they were NORDO; should have communicated this to me so we could work together to raise the aircraft and take action before too late. On my end I should have reached out to fat approach control sooner and asked them to put the aircraft on my frequency since their route of flight took them towards an area of high terrain and we would have been alerted to the fact that the aircraft was NORDO sooner. The pilot should have questioned why they hadn't received a frequency change for further climb or why they hadn't received a climb clearance above the approaching terrain and should have started a climb per lost com procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOA Controller reported of an aircraft that was in a lower Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) then it should have been. Controller called transferring facility; but they advised the aircraft was NORDO. Reporter tried to contact aircraft; eventually did and climbed aircraft to a safe altitude.

Narrative: Aircraft X departed [through] FAT approach control's airspace handed off to me climbing to 10;000 (top of their airspace and LOA) [to their] destination via TPH direct filed for high altitude. I was working sector 16/22 combined which goes up to FL230. Aircraft didn't check on in a timely manner and I saw that aircraft appeared to be climbing slow so I figured FAT approach was holding on to them until they were closer to the top of FAT's airspace.I went to other tasks and didn't continue to monitor Aircraft X for a moment until I saw the MSAW warning flash. Aircraft was approaching edge of FAT's airspace and an area where the MIA is 10;500. I called FAT sector and asked if they were still talking to Aircraft X and told them to climb aircraft to 17;000 and turn 20 degrees to the right to avoid terrain. FAT responded saying they weren't talking to aircraft and they were NORDO. I tried to call Aircraft X on my frequencies and Guard frequencies and made a broadcast on both frequencies for Aircraft X to climb to 17;000 and contact me on the better of the two frequencies for 16/22.I was just about to alert the supervisor to what seemed to be developing into an emergency situation and Aircraft X checked on my frequency level at 10;000. My first transmission was to tell Aircraft X to climb to 17;000 and to climb at a good rate because of terrain. Once Aircraft X was above MIA; I had the aircraft turn to a 130 heading to allow time to climb above the next higher area to the northeast.I ended up not alerting the supervisor because the situation was now under control and the aircraft was safe. The aircraft was below the MIA for the area that is 10;500 for about 3-5 miles at 10;000 before I was talking to the aircraft and able to climb them. They didn't appear to enter another MIA area until they were above the MIA in that area.In this occurrence; I found 3 people/entities to be contributors in an unsafe situation. First I felt like FAT approach may not have given the aircraft a frequency change in a timely manner and if they attempted to and realized they were NORDO; should have communicated this to me so we could work together to raise the aircraft and take action before too late. On my end I should have reached out to FAT approach control sooner and asked them to put the aircraft on my frequency since their route of flight took them towards an area of high terrain and we would have been alerted to the fact that the aircraft was NORDO sooner. The pilot should have questioned why they hadn't received a frequency change for further climb or why they hadn't received a climb clearance above the approaching terrain and should have started a climb per lost com procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.