Narrative:

[Our aircraft] had been in maintenance all day. I performed all of my preflight duties; reviewing the logbook and completing my flight deck prep flow. The log book was clear. Soon afterwards the first officer joined me; completed the walk around and we completed our pre departure procedures. All appropriate checklists were completed and we pushed off of the gate. I started both engines to give them sufficient time to warm up (5 minutes minimum-first flight of the day) and all parameters were normal. We planned a config. 1 departure (flaps 1) with an assumed takeoff power setting. We taxied out; completed the taxi checklist and waited to depart. Approximately 8 minutes after engine start we finished the taxi checklist 'below the line' and were cleared onto the runway with a 'line up and wait.'tower cleared us for takeoff with an initial heading after departure of 230 degrees. I applied initial power to 1.05 EPR and let the engines stabilize followed by advancement to the flex detent. I maintained my right hand on the thrust levers. Very shortly after the application of takeoff/flex power we received an ECAM amber message that stated on the lower ECAM: engine 2 compressor vane and immediately below it an ECAM action message: engine 2 thrust lever idle. The first officer called my attention to the ECAM. At this point I retarded both thrust levers and stated; 'reject; my aircraft' as per reject procedures. I selected maximum reverse and the rejected takeoff braking occurred and I noted a speed that was very close to 80 kts and rapidly decreasing. The first officer radioed the tower that we were rejecting the takeoff; again per policy. Almost as soon as the first officer finished his radio transmission the aircraft came to a stop; I noted a burnt rubber smell (I'm sure now it was a result of our rapid deceleration) and I wanted to assess if we had any additional engine issues including fire. We told the passengers to remain seated while I continued to assess the situation. There was nothing else new on the ECAM however; now that the engine 2 thrust lever was in idle the ECAM stated in amber: avoid rapid thrust changes on one line and below that thrust lever idle.I pressed the brake pedals to release the rejected takeoff brakes and taxied to the first available taxiway. The burnt rubber smell quickly dissipated. We cleared the runways. We stopped; reviewed; and completed all ECAM and QRH procedures; noted that the brakes were not even hot; spoke with our company to determine a gate; and once all procedures and protocols were completed; we taxied to our original departure gate. Once at the gate a customer service agent met the aircraft and informed the passengers that there was a new aircraft a few gates down. After writing up the engine situation and the rejected takeoff; completing all checklists; we left the aircraft and proceeded to the new airplane and gate. I can only surmise that the right engine had a problem with the correct configuration of its moveable compressor vanes. In speaking with a mechanic once we had arrived; I was told that the iae engines have had issues with this problem. It was the first actual rejected takeoff for me in my nearly 30 year career and was startling when I decided to reject the takeoff. Nevertheless; training and aircraft systems provided a rapid conclusion to the event. It was a low speed event as the first officer never stated '80 knots' during the takeoff roll and this ECAM would have been suppressed by airbus logic above 80 knots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff below 80 kts when they received an ECAM caution message 'ENG 2 COMPRESSOR VANE.'

Narrative: [Our aircraft] had been in maintenance all day. I performed all of my preflight duties; reviewing the logbook and completing my flight deck prep flow. The log book was clear. Soon afterwards the F/O joined me; completed the walk around and we completed our pre departure procedures. All appropriate checklists were completed and we pushed off of the gate. I started both engines to give them sufficient time to warm up (5 minutes minimum-first flight of the day) and all parameters were normal. We planned a Config. 1 departure (flaps 1) with an Assumed Takeoff power setting. We taxied out; completed the taxi checklist and waited to depart. Approximately 8 minutes after engine start we finished the taxi checklist 'below the line' and were cleared onto the runway with a 'line up and wait.'Tower cleared us for takeoff with an initial heading after departure of 230 degrees. I applied initial power to 1.05 EPR and let the engines stabilize followed by advancement to the FLEX detent. I maintained my right hand on the thrust levers. Very shortly after the application of takeoff/flex power we received an ECAM amber message that stated on the lower ECAM: ENG 2 COMPRESSOR VANE and immediately below it an ECAM action message: ENG 2 THRUST LEVER IDLE. The F/O called my attention to the ECAM. At this point I retarded both thrust levers and stated; 'Reject; My Aircraft' as per reject procedures. I selected maximum reverse and the RTO braking occurred and I noted a speed that was very close to 80 kts and rapidly decreasing. The First Officer radioed the tower that we were rejecting the takeoff; again per policy. Almost as soon as the F/O finished his radio transmission the aircraft came to a stop; I noted a burnt rubber smell (I'm sure now it was a result of our rapid deceleration) and I wanted to assess if we had any additional engine issues including fire. We told the passengers to remain seated while I continued to assess the situation. There was nothing else new on the ECAM however; now that the ENG 2 Thrust Lever was in IDLE the ECAM stated in Amber: AVOID RAPID THRUST CHANGES on one line and below that THRUST LEVER IDLE.I pressed the brake pedals to release the RTO brakes and taxied to the first available taxiway. The burnt rubber smell quickly dissipated. We cleared the runways. We stopped; reviewed; and completed all ECAM and QRH procedures; noted that the brakes were not even hot; spoke with our company to determine a gate; and once all procedures and protocols were completed; we taxied to our original departure gate. Once at the gate a Customer Service Agent met the aircraft and informed the passengers that there was a new aircraft a few gates down. After writing up the engine situation and the RTO; completing all checklists; we left the aircraft and proceeded to the new airplane and gate. I can only surmise that the right engine had a problem with the correct configuration of its moveable compressor vanes. In speaking with a mechanic once we had arrived; I was told that the IAE engines have had issues with this problem. It was the first actual RTO for me in my nearly 30 year career and was startling when I decided to reject the takeoff. Nevertheless; training and aircraft systems provided a rapid conclusion to the event. It was a low speed event as the F/O never stated '80 Knots' during the takeoff roll and this ECAM would have been suppressed by Airbus logic above 80 knots.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.