Narrative:

We took off after all operations were normal during preflight; pushback; and de-ice. I was the pm; and we had [another] carrier's captain jumpseating. On the taxi out; I noticed that the ramp appeared to be contaminated with snow; and the captain had trouble steering. We reported braking action as poor; and asked to back taxi on the runway to confirm the reported braking action of good was true. It was; we had good braking action on the runway. The plane didn't turn quite as well as usual when turning into position for takeoff; and the captain stated it was probably slush picked up from the contaminated ramp. The visibility was roughly 2 miles; with 400 ft. Overcast. After back taxiing; turning around; and taking off; I selected the landing gear up; and we received a triple chime; with gear disagree and nose gear door messages. After maintaining positive control of the airplane; we brought out the QRH and ran the associated procedures. On ED1; the landing gear status showed both main gear up; and the nose gear down. The captain stated early into the situation that he didn't like the idea of going back to the departure airport; as there was low visibility and ceilings; snow piled on the edge of the runway; and we weren't guaranteed controllability when we landed. The tops were roughly 13;000 feet; and we climbed to 15;000 feet. We thought the proximity sensors might have frozen slush on them; and our hope was to stay in warmer air to melt it and have operational control of the gear. Our attention then turned to where to go. I checked with ATC for airports in VMC; with little crosswind and was given a few. There was a solid overcast below us that was reported to clear the further south we went. After discussing each; we decided we had enough fuel to reach our filed destination with an hour of fuel remaining; and that was an appropriate airport due to the long; wide runways; weighing less upon landing; and better rescue services; if needed. Our jumpseater said; while he had no operational control over the flight; he agreed with the decision. We flew to our filed destination with no changes in situation; and held to complete all QRH procedures; got three green landing gear indications; and proceeded to land.the landing and rollout were normal; until we slowed. After slowing to approximately 60 knots; the plane started to vibrate; and nose wheel steering was not possible. We were able to taxi off the runway and stop; at which point the passengers were deplaned and bussed to the terminal; and we were towed to a gate. When we had stopped; maintenance came to tow us in; and reported that our torque links were not connected. Their estimation was that when the weight came off the nose strut; it extended and caused the pseu to fail. The maintenance personnel said that sometimes the connection of the torque links will appear to be connected; but aren't fully locked. While performing the preflight; I looked at the torque links; and they appeared to be connected. If what the maintenance personnel in the destination stated was true; that the torque links can look locked; but aren't; a suggestion to keep this from happening again is to paint the pin part of the lock a neon color; so it's easily visible if it isn't locked all the way. Another suggestion is to stress to flight crews to not be complacent in preflight/post flight inspections. If the torque links were the cause of this situation; it is a good example of not catching a problem on the ground; and having it turn into a larger problem in flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 flight crew reported nose wheel steering difficulties during taxi out. The crew associated the control issues to ice on the ground. After takeoff the gear disagree alerted with the nose wheel extended. The nose scissor link was found disconnected after landing.

Narrative: We took off after all operations were normal during preflight; pushback; and de-ice. I was the PM; and we had [another] carrier's captain jumpseating. On the taxi out; I noticed that the ramp appeared to be contaminated with snow; and the captain had trouble steering. We reported braking action as poor; and asked to back taxi on the runway to confirm the reported braking action of good was true. It was; we had good braking action on the runway. The plane didn't turn quite as well as usual when turning into position for takeoff; and the captain stated it was probably slush picked up from the contaminated ramp. The visibility was roughly 2 miles; with 400 ft. overcast. After back taxiing; turning around; and taking off; I selected the landing gear up; and we received a triple chime; with GEAR DISAGREE and NOSE GEAR DOOR messages. After maintaining positive control of the airplane; we brought out the QRH and ran the associated procedures. On ED1; the landing gear status showed both main gear up; and the nose gear down. The captain stated early into the situation that he didn't like the idea of going back to the departure airport; as there was low visibility and ceilings; snow piled on the edge of the runway; and we weren't guaranteed controllability when we landed. The tops were roughly 13;000 feet; and we climbed to 15;000 feet. We thought the proximity sensors might have frozen slush on them; and our hope was to stay in warmer air to melt it and have operational control of the gear. Our attention then turned to where to go. I checked with ATC for airports in VMC; with little crosswind and was given a few. There was a solid overcast below us that was reported to clear the further south we went. After discussing each; we decided we had enough fuel to reach our filed destination with an hour of fuel remaining; and that was an appropriate airport due to the long; wide runways; weighing less upon landing; and better rescue services; if needed. Our jumpseater said; while he had no operational control over the flight; he agreed with the decision. We flew to our filed destination with no changes in situation; and held to complete all QRH procedures; got three green landing gear indications; and proceeded to land.The landing and rollout were normal; until we slowed. After slowing to approximately 60 knots; the plane started to vibrate; and nose wheel steering was not possible. We were able to taxi off the runway and stop; at which point the passengers were deplaned and bussed to the terminal; and we were towed to a gate. When we had stopped; maintenance came to tow us in; and reported that our torque links were not connected. Their estimation was that when the weight came off the nose strut; it extended and caused the PSEU to fail. The maintenance personnel said that sometimes the connection of the torque links will appear to be connected; but aren't fully locked. While performing the preflight; I looked at the torque links; and they appeared to be connected. If what the maintenance personnel in the destination stated was true; that the torque links can look locked; but aren't; a suggestion to keep this from happening again is to paint the pin part of the lock a neon color; so it's easily visible if it isn't locked all the way. Another suggestion is to stress to flight crews to not be complacent in preflight/post flight inspections. If the torque links were the cause of this situation; it is a good example of not catching a problem on the ground; and having it turn into a larger problem in flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.