Narrative:

Awaiting takeoff at ord runway 32L from the T1 intersection, the captain became impatient because the aircraft in front of us did not have his radio on. The captain ordered the copilot to tell the tower that we could takeoff from the T2 intersection. The tower immediately cleared us for a T2 intersection takeoff and I said that I thought we did not have weights for T2 and that I would check. Even before I had finished checking for weights the captain had already pushed the throttles up about 1/2-way while still on the taxiway (T2 is a high speed taxiway angling toward the runway). As we entered the runway I told the captain very concretely that we did not have weights for a T2 intersection takeoff. The captain replied 'don't worry, it will be ok,' and immediately applied takeoff power. The copilot at this pint would have had to physically take control from the captain to stop the takeoff. I felt we would make the takeoff uneventfully because we had a 30000# margin at the T1 intersection. However, had we aborted the takeoff near V1, the outcome would have been unknown. This captain, in the past, has become very impatient on the ground and in the air, and has a tendency to 'do things his own way.' he has a very strong personality and rarely listens to ideas or suggestions from his crew. In discussion after this incident he said, 'I've got to get rid of my can-do attitude,' realizing he had made a serious mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BECAUSE OF ACFT ON TXWY AHEAD NOT COMMUNICATING WITH TWR, ACR LGT REQUESTS AND RECEIVES TKOF CLRNC FROM ANOTHER TXWY THAT GIVES LESS AVAILABLE TKOF DISTANCE. WEIGHTS AND PERFORMANCE NOT CALCULATED FOR NEW DISTANCE AVAILABLE PRIOR TO DEP.

Narrative: AWAITING TKOF AT ORD RWY 32L FROM THE T1 INTXN, THE CAPT BECAME IMPATIENT BECAUSE THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US DID NOT HAVE HIS RADIO ON. THE CAPT ORDERED THE COPLT TO TELL THE TWR THAT WE COULD TKOF FROM THE T2 INTXN. THE TWR IMMEDIATELY CLRED US FOR A T2 INTXN TKOF AND I SAID THAT I THOUGHT WE DID NOT HAVE WEIGHTS FOR T2 AND THAT I WOULD CHK. EVEN BEFORE I HAD FINISHED CHKING FOR WTS THE CAPT HAD ALREADY PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP ABOUT 1/2-WAY WHILE STILL ON THE TXWY (T2 IS A HIGH SPD TXWY ANGLING TOWARD THE RWY). AS WE ENTERED THE RWY I TOLD THE CAPT VERY CONCRETELY THAT WE DID NOT HAVE WTS FOR A T2 INTXN TKOF. THE CAPT REPLIED 'DON'T WORRY, IT WILL BE OK,' AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED TKOF PWR. THE COPLT AT THIS PINT WOULD HAVE HAD TO PHYSICALLY TAKE CONTROL FROM THE CAPT TO STOP THE TKOF. I FELT WE WOULD MAKE THE TKOF UNEVENTFULLY BECAUSE WE HAD A 30000# MARGIN AT THE T1 INTXN. HOWEVER, HAD WE ABORTED THE TKOF NEAR V1, THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN UNKNOWN. THIS CAPT, IN THE PAST, HAS BECOME VERY IMPATIENT ON THE GND AND IN THE AIR, AND HAS A TENDENCY TO 'DO THINGS HIS OWN WAY.' HE HAS A VERY STRONG PERSONALITY AND RARELY LISTENS TO IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS FROM HIS CREW. IN DISCUSSION AFTER THIS INCIDENT HE SAID, 'I'VE GOT TO GET RID OF MY CAN-DO ATTITUDE,' REALIZING HE HAD MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.