Narrative:

The captain and I reported for flight and briefed on desired fuel. Using a dipstick, I determined the fuel in the tanks to be 586 pounds. The captain asked me to subtract 586 pounds from 1255# (desired fuel) and divided the result by 13.1. I told the captain the answer was 51 gals, and asked if a split of 25 + 26 gals would do the job. He said that would be fine. I filled out a fuel request slip accordingly. The captain then signed it and it was given to the fueler. This error left us short of our desired fuel by 51 gals or 334.05#. The most easily read fuel gauge from the left seat was MEL'd inoperative. The other gauge pointer was hidden by a post light. The captain discovered the error in-flight. He then determined that it would be safer to make a fueling stop at pbi than to cut it close on the fuel by continuing to fll. I then requested radar vectors direct to pbi from ZMA. At shutdown after an uneventful landing we had 413.8 pounds of fuel (375# is reserve). Recommendations: 1) a standardized fuel computation method or form, 2) amend checklist to require a takeoff fuel callout and response, and 3) better ergonomics in cockpit design.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER SMT FLT CREW COMPUTED FUEL REQUIRED, THEN ADDED THE REQUIRED FUEL LOAD FOR EACH WING AS THE TOTAL LOAD. ERROR DISCOVERED ENROUTE. DIVERTED TO ALTERNATE.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I RPTED FOR FLT AND BRIEFED ON DESIRED FUEL. USING A DIPSTICK, I DETERMINED THE FUEL IN THE TANKS TO BE 586 LBS. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO SUBTRACT 586 LBS FROM 1255# (DESIRED FUEL) AND DIVIDED THE RESULT BY 13.1. I TOLD THE CAPT THE ANSWER WAS 51 GALS, AND ASKED IF A SPLIT OF 25 + 26 GALS WOULD DO THE JOB. HE SAID THAT WOULD BE FINE. I FILLED OUT A FUEL REQUEST SLIP ACCORDINGLY. THE CAPT THEN SIGNED IT AND IT WAS GIVEN TO THE FUELER. THIS ERROR LEFT US SHORT OF OUR DESIRED FUEL BY 51 GALS OR 334.05#. THE MOST EASILY READ FUEL GAUGE FROM THE LEFT SEAT WAS MEL'D INOP. THE OTHER GAUGE POINTER WAS HIDDEN BY A POST LIGHT. THE CAPT DISCOVERED THE ERROR INFLT. HE THEN DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO MAKE A FUELING STOP AT PBI THAN TO CUT IT CLOSE ON THE FUEL BY CONTINUING TO FLL. I THEN REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS DIRECT TO PBI FROM ZMA. AT SHUTDOWN AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WE HAD 413.8 LBS OF FUEL (375# IS RESERVE). RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) A STANDARDIZED FUEL COMPUTATION METHOD OR FORM, 2) AMEND CHKLIST TO REQUIRE A TKOF FUEL CALLOUT AND RESPONSE, AND 3) BETTER ERGONOMICS IN COCKPIT DESIGN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.