Narrative:

During after landing checklist first officer inadvertently shut off both firewall shut off fuel valves instead of fuel boost pumps. Both switches are in close proximity to each other. I allowed the engines to stop and then opened the firewall shutoff valves. I was going to start the left engine to taxi to the gate but first I needed to put the propeller on the locks. I used the left unfeaturing pump and pulled the left power lever back to reverse. Before starting the engine I looked at the egt gauges for both engines. The left engine showed 600 degree and the right engine showed full scale high. At this time I decided to clear both engines to try and cool them down. There was a great deal of smoke and fire from the exhaust stacks and the passengers became concerned. I decided that we should call the fire trucks and as a precaution evacuate the aircraft. As I attempted to open the main cabin door it appeared jammed so I opened the left overwing emergency exit because the fire fighters were there to assist the passenger. Everyone made it out unhurt and when I went forward to see why the cabin door was jammed I found it locked from the outside with a key. The situation with the fuel shutoff valves is two fold. One, the switches should be guarded and they should not be close to the boost pump switches. Two, our company checklist should be changed so that you do not put your hands near those switches until the engines are ready to be shut down. The situation with the door demands that the FAA require door locks such as those on the light transport be disabled so as to preclude a possible disaster. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. On post-flight inspection the right engine had been damaged and was replaced. The cabin door lock and key is the same as the lock and key for all aircraft exterior doors and all company ramp personnel must have a key so they can lock the cargo company door. The action by the ground crew of locking this door could have been triggered by the first officer's request to have the ground crew help her lock the cabin door meaning help me secure the cabin door because these doors are some times difficult to close and latch. The company is considering changing the keying of the cabin door or going to some other method of locking the cabin door that could involve just a hasp and separate paddle lock that would be used only for aircraft security when parked. The after landing checklist has been changed and the 'boost pump off' challenge has been put on the secure checklist. A restart procedure has been developed for inadvertent engine shutdown by activation of the firewall shutoff switches. The new procedure should prevent flooding the hot engine with fuel and the associated fire danger and overheat damage. The FAA has taken flight crew statement and issued a letter of intent to investigate but so far their interest seems to lean toward why did the engine fire occur but showing little interest in the locked cabin door and what should be done to prevent this from happening again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT ENG OVERHEAT OCCURRED WHILE TRYING TO RESTART ENGINE AFTER INADVERTENT ENGINE SHUT DOWN AFTER LNDG. CABIN DOOR DISCOVERED LOCKED FROM OUTSIDE WHEN FLT CREW ELECTED TO EVACUATE ACFT. SMOKE AND FLAME OBSERVED BY PASSENGERS ON RESTART INFLUENCED FLT CREW TO EVACUATE THE ACFT.

Narrative: DURING AFTER LNDG CHKLIST F/O INADVERTENTLY SHUT OFF BOTH FIREWALL SHUT OFF FUEL VALVES INSTEAD OF FUEL BOOST PUMPS. BOTH SWITCHES ARE IN CLOSE PROX TO EACH OTHER. I ALLOWED THE ENGS TO STOP AND THEN OPENED THE FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVES. I WAS GOING TO START THE LEFT ENG TO TAXI TO THE GATE BUT FIRST I NEEDED TO PUT THE PROP ON THE LOCKS. I USED THE LEFT UNFEATURING PUMP AND PULLED THE LEFT PWR LEVER BACK TO REVERSE. BEFORE STARTING THE ENG I LOOKED AT THE EGT GAUGES FOR BOTH ENGS. THE LEFT ENG SHOWED 600 DEG AND THE RIGHT ENG SHOWED FULL SCALE HIGH. AT THIS TIME I DECIDED TO CLR BOTH ENGS TO TRY AND COOL THEM DOWN. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF SMOKE AND FIRE FROM THE EXHAUST STACKS AND THE PAXS BECAME CONCERNED. I DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD CALL THE FIRE TRUCKS AND AS A PRECAUTION EVACUATE THE ACFT. AS I ATTEMPTED TO OPEN THE MAIN CABIN DOOR IT APPEARED JAMMED SO I OPENED THE LEFT OVERWING EMER EXIT BECAUSE THE FIRE FIGHTERS WERE THERE TO ASSIST THE PAX. EVERYONE MADE IT OUT UNHURT AND WHEN I WENT FORWARD TO SEE WHY THE CABIN DOOR WAS JAMMED I FOUND IT LOCKED FROM THE OUTSIDE WITH A KEY. THE SITUATION WITH THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVES IS TWO FOLD. ONE, THE SWITCHES SHOULD BE GUARDED AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE CLOSE TO THE BOOST PUMP SWITCHES. TWO, OUR COMPANY CHKLIST SHOULD BE CHANGED SO THAT YOU DO NOT PUT YOUR HANDS NEAR THOSE SWITCHES UNTIL THE ENGS ARE READY TO BE SHUT DOWN. THE SITUATION WITH THE DOOR DEMANDS THAT THE FAA REQUIRE DOOR LOCKS SUCH AS THOSE ON THE LTT BE DISABLED SO AS TO PRECLUDE A POSSIBLE DISASTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. ON POST-FLT INSPECTION THE RIGHT ENG HAD BEEN DAMAGED AND WAS REPLACED. THE CABIN DOOR LOCK AND KEY IS THE SAME AS THE LOCK AND KEY FOR ALL ACFT EXTERIOR DOORS AND ALL COMPANY RAMP PERSONNEL MUST HAVE A KEY SO THEY CAN LOCK THE CARGO COMPANY DOOR. THE ACTION BY THE GND CREW OF LOCKING THIS DOOR COULD HAVE BEEN TRIGGERED BY THE F/O'S REQUEST TO HAVE THE GND CREW HELP HER LOCK THE CABIN DOOR MEANING HELP ME SECURE THE CABIN DOOR BECAUSE THESE DOORS ARE SOME TIMES DIFFICULT TO CLOSE AND LATCH. THE COMPANY IS CONSIDERING CHANGING THE KEYING OF THE CABIN DOOR OR GOING TO SOME OTHER METHOD OF LOCKING THE CABIN DOOR THAT COULD INVOLVE JUST A HASP AND SEPARATE PADDLE LOCK THAT WOULD BE USED ONLY FOR ACFT SECURITY WHEN PARKED. THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST HAS BEEN CHANGED AND THE 'BOOST PUMP OFF' CHALLENGE HAS BEEN PUT ON THE SECURE CHKLIST. A RESTART PROC HAS BEEN DEVELOPED FOR INADVERTENT ENG SHUTDOWN BY ACTIVATION OF THE FIREWALL SHUTOFF SWITCHES. THE NEW PROC SHOULD PREVENT FLOODING THE HOT ENG WITH FUEL AND THE ASSOCIATED FIRE DANGER AND OVERHEAT DAMAGE. THE FAA HAS TAKEN FLT CREW STATEMENT AND ISSUED A LETTER OF INTENT TO INVESTIGATE BUT SO FAR THEIR INTEREST SEEMS TO LEAN TOWARD WHY DID THE ENG FIRE OCCUR BUT SHOWING LITTLE INTEREST IN THE LOCKED CABIN DOOR AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.