Narrative:

The flight started as a normal turn. We had just landed in ZZZ and we're getting ready for the flight to ZZZ1. I proceeded with my normal pre-flight duties; getting the weather; clearance; looking over the departure and such. From my view; nothing abnormal is going on; it's just a typical flight that we do every day. Everything is loaded up; 'clear to close;' I input the to perf/weight and balance into the ACARS and the door is shut and brake is released. Here is where the first issue started. The to data is taking an abnormally long time to come back. During this time the jet bridge is pulled away and the gate agent leaves as usual. Finally; the data come back and I input the new zero fuel weight and scroll to page 3/4 on the to data. There's a message saying that the mrtw is exceeded by around 800 pounds. I grab the captain's attention and he starts looking at it too. Finally he pulls out the dispatch paperwork and sees a remark that says 'weight critical flight - ensure takeoff data is received prior to door close' (something along the lines of that). That was the first 'oh crap' moment. As the captain is calling dispatch; I called ops to get a gate agent back to the gate. It took about 15 minutes to get the door back open. It's decided that the four nonrevs and their bags would be removed from the plane. At the current ATIS temperature of 29 degrees; we luckily get to numbers for the assigned runway. We close the door and push as normal now. On taxi from the ramp begins the second issue. The new ATIS comes out; I pick it up and the temperature is now 32 degrees. Knowing that we barely had numbers for 29 degrees; I decided it was in the interest of safety to resend for to numbers. The data comes back saying that we are now 1200 pounds over mrtw. At this point the captain looks and sounds annoyed that I sent for the numbers and that we are too heavy again. I voice my concerns and say that I am in no way comfortable with the situation; nor did I want to take off without receiving new numbers with the updated temperature. We all know what could happen taking off too heavy at a high density altitude; especially if something else went wrong. After coordination with ground; we taxi to a holding pad and run numerous different runway/wind combinations to see if anything works. Dispatch sent an ACARS saying that a gate was opening shortly and that we should make our way to it. We finally got to the gate; opened the door; had the [gate agent] deal with getting roughly 15 more passengers off. After that long ordeal; we get new numbers that work. Here is where my third issue begins. Now the captain is on the phone with dispatch discussing fuel. We are roughly 900 pounds over min fuel at the gate with the APU running because of the heat outside. The dispatcher says that we would land in ZZZ2 with around 3500 pounds of fuel remaining and asks if we are ok with that. I ask about the weather between ZZZ and ZZZ2 and am told there is no weather at all. I put my trust in the dispatcher and said I was ok going as long as there was no weather en route. My big mistake was taking the dispatcher at his word and failed to look at the weather and the radar myself. We taxi out for the second time now and get to the end of the runway. Never being in a low fuel situation; and the captain normally being the one who checks the minimum fuel at takeoff; I failed to double check before the takeoff clearance. For some reason; during the takeoff roll; I decide to look at the fuel and see it around 100 pounds under min fuel. We are already over 80 knots so I didn't say anything. Once in the air; I mention the fuel status and we decide to ask for a more direct route and we also change the cruise speed to long range cruise (lrc.) departure informs us that they have to keep us on a 010 heading for storms that no one has decided to go through. We inform dispatch and they tell us to go to lrc and that the storms 'just popped up.' after getting around the storms we received the clearance to go direct ZZZ VOR from our current position of roughly 75-100 miles nne of ZZZ. We ask for direct further down the line to try and save as much fuel as possible and we get direct ZZZ1 VOR. The captain activates direct to ZZZ1 VOR after I say I like it but before I could ask for abeam points. We remain in contact with dispatch about the situation and they request to update them with fuel on board (fob). The entire time; we are watching the progress on the multifunction display and it starts off saying we will land in ZZZ2 with 3300 pounds. I decided to do my own fuel burn calculations with abeam points from 'fix info.' abeam ZZZ VOR our fob was 6200 and min fuel was 6900. I mention it and the captain dismisses it saying that the progress still shows 3300 at ZZZ2. Abeam ZZZ2 VOR our fob was 4730 and min fuel was 5500. Same thing again; except now the progress page shows 3100 at ZZZ2. More discussion is done about the situation; as each abeam point continually showed 600-700 pounds below min fuel (ZZZ1 VOR fob was 3100 vs 3750 min fuel; and now 2800 on the progress page for arriving at ZZZ2). We talk about a possible diversion and how we would time out wherever we landed. I mentioned that I was ok with landing 100-200 below the min fuel of 3140 if we could safely make it to ZZZ2. My concerns are now much more serious; I ACARS dispatch and ask their opinion and just get back 'copy;' and no help from them. Then center asks us to speed up for mach .79 for spacing. I reply with unable due to being at min fuel. The controlled comes back 'are you declaring minimum fuel?' I respond 'affirmative; aircraft X declaring minimum fuel and requesting priority handling to ZZZ2.' each consecutive check in now begins with 'minimum fuel.'upon switching to the final approach frequency; I stated we were at minimum fuel. We start getting vectored for the final approach course. We end up at 5;000 ft and a heading of 270. Approach is calling out traffic for the parallel runway; neither of us have it in sight. Despite multiple requests for lower; approach keeps us at 5;000. We finally get the traffic in sight but we are now roughly 10 miles from the runway. We go gear down and flaps 5 from 5;000 in an attempt to lose enough altitude to get stabilized. By 2;000 ft; it's apparent that we will not be close to stabilized and I call for a go-around. During the go-around procedure both fuel tanks are now amber and I declare [minimum] fuel with tower. All traffic is stopped at ZZZ2 and within 5 minutes we land with 2100 pounds of fuel remaining. My guess is that we would've landed with 2500-2600 pounds remaining had approach not left us high in a minimum fuel status. Everything from missing the remarks on the dispatch until landing had snowballed into a much worse situation than it ever should have been. Inexperience in both seats and the captain not taking some of my concerns more seriously were factors in a routine flight becoming a [minimum] fuel situation. Knowing how our pilot base is increasingly becoming younger; and ZZZ being a new airport; both dispatchers and pilots should be more cognizant and proactive about hot summer days and high altitude airports. Whether the pilots get a read file about using caution with hot; and high altitude ops; dispatchers acarsing flights at the gate to make sure weight and balance/performance is good prior to blocking out (not just a one line note in the dispatch remarks); or both. I'm incredibly grateful that we have a safe ending and hopefully this incident can be used to help educate our crews and prevent a similar situation; or worse; from happening again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 flight crew got themselves into a low fuel situation due to un-forecasted weather and weight and balance issues on the ground.

Narrative: The flight started as a normal turn. We had just landed in ZZZ and we're getting ready for the flight to ZZZ1. I proceeded with my normal pre-flight duties; getting the weather; clearance; looking over the departure and such. From my view; nothing abnormal is going on; it's just a typical flight that we do every day. Everything is loaded up; 'clear to close;' I input the TO Perf/Weight and balance into the ACARS and the door is shut and brake is released. Here is where the first issue started. The TO data is taking an abnormally long time to come back. During this time the jet bridge is pulled away and the gate agent leaves as usual. Finally; the data come back and I input the new Zero Fuel Weight and scroll to page 3/4 on the TO Data. There's a message saying that the MRTW is exceeded by around 800 pounds. I grab the captain's attention and he starts looking at it too. Finally he pulls out the dispatch paperwork and sees a remark that says 'weight critical flight - ensure takeoff data is received prior to door close' (something along the lines of that). That was the first 'oh crap' moment. As the captain is calling dispatch; I called Ops to get a gate agent back to the gate. It took about 15 minutes to get the door back open. It's decided that the four nonrevs and their bags would be removed from the plane. At the current ATIS temperature of 29 degrees; we luckily get TO numbers for the assigned runway. We close the door and push as normal now. On taxi from the ramp begins the second issue. The new ATIS comes out; I pick it up and the temperature is now 32 degrees. Knowing that we barely had numbers for 29 degrees; I decided it was in the interest of safety to resend for TO numbers. The data comes back saying that we are now 1200 pounds over MRTW. At this point the captain looks and sounds annoyed that I sent for the numbers and that we are too heavy again. I voice my concerns and say that I am in no way comfortable with the situation; nor did I want to take off without receiving new numbers with the updated temperature. We all know what could happen taking off too heavy at a high density altitude; especially if something else went wrong. After coordination with ground; we taxi to a holding pad and run numerous different runway/wind combinations to see if anything works. Dispatch sent an ACARS saying that a gate was opening shortly and that we should make our way to it. We finally got to the gate; opened the door; had the [gate agent] deal with getting roughly 15 more passengers off. After that long ordeal; we get new numbers that work. Here is where my third issue begins. Now the captain is on the phone with dispatch discussing fuel. We are roughly 900 pounds over min fuel at the gate with the APU running because of the heat outside. The dispatcher says that we would land in ZZZ2 with around 3500 pounds of fuel remaining and asks if we are OK with that. I ask about the weather between ZZZ and ZZZ2 and am told there is no weather at all. I put my trust in the dispatcher and said I was OK going as long as there was NO WEATHER en route. My big mistake was taking the dispatcher at his word and failed to look at the weather and the radar myself. We taxi out for the second time now and get to the end of the runway. Never being in a low fuel situation; and the captain normally being the one who checks the minimum fuel at takeoff; I failed to double check before the takeoff clearance. For some reason; during the takeoff roll; I decide to look at the fuel and see it around 100 pounds under min fuel. We are already over 80 knots so I didn't say anything. Once in the air; I mention the fuel status and we decide to ask for a more direct route and we also change the cruise speed to Long Range Cruise (LRC.) Departure informs us that they have to keep us on a 010 heading for storms that no one has decided to go through. We inform dispatch and they tell us to go to LRC and that the storms 'just popped up.' After getting around the storms we received the clearance to go direct ZZZ VOR from our current position of roughly 75-100 miles NNE of ZZZ. We ask for direct further down the line to try and save as much fuel as possible and we get direct ZZZ1 VOR. The captain activates direct to ZZZ1 VOR after I say I like it but before I could ask for abeam points. We remain in contact with dispatch about the situation and they request to update them with Fuel On Board (FOB). The entire time; we are watching the progress on the Multifunction Display and it starts off saying we will land in ZZZ2 with 3300 pounds. I decided to do my own fuel burn calculations with abeam points from 'fix info.' Abeam ZZZ VOR our FOB was 6200 and min fuel was 6900. I mention it and the Captain dismisses it saying that the progress still shows 3300 at ZZZ2. Abeam ZZZ2 VOR our FOB was 4730 and min fuel was 5500. Same thing again; except now the progress page shows 3100 at ZZZ2. More discussion is done about the situation; as each abeam point continually showed 600-700 pounds below min fuel (ZZZ1 VOR FOB was 3100 vs 3750 min fuel; and now 2800 on the progress page for arriving at ZZZ2). We talk about a possible diversion and how we would time out wherever we landed. I mentioned that I was OK with landing 100-200 below the min fuel of 3140 if we could safely make it to ZZZ2. My concerns are now much more serious; I ACARS dispatch and ask their opinion and just get back 'copy;' and no help from them. Then Center asks us to speed up for Mach .79 for spacing. I reply with unable due to being at min fuel. The controlled comes back 'are you declaring minimum fuel?' I respond 'Affirmative; Aircraft X declaring minimum fuel and requesting priority handling to ZZZ2.' Each consecutive check in now begins with 'minimum fuel.'Upon switching to the final Approach frequency; I stated we were at minimum fuel. We start getting vectored for the final approach course. We end up at 5;000 ft and a heading of 270. Approach is calling out traffic for the parallel runway; neither of us have it in sight. Despite multiple requests for lower; approach keeps us at 5;000. We finally get the traffic in sight but we are now roughly 10 miles from the runway. We go gear down and flaps 5 from 5;000 in an attempt to lose enough altitude to get stabilized. By 2;000 ft; it's apparent that we will not be close to stabilized and I call for a go-around. During the go-around procedure both fuel tanks are now amber and I declare [minimum] fuel with Tower. All traffic is stopped at ZZZ2 and within 5 minutes we land with 2100 pounds of fuel remaining. My guess is that we would've landed with 2500-2600 pounds remaining had Approach not left us high in a minimum fuel status. Everything from missing the remarks on the dispatch until landing had snowballed into a much worse situation than it ever should have been. Inexperience in both seats and the captain not taking some of my concerns more seriously were factors in a routine flight becoming a [minimum] fuel situation. Knowing how our pilot base is increasingly becoming younger; and ZZZ being a new airport; both dispatchers and pilots should be more cognizant and proactive about hot summer days and high altitude airports. Whether the pilots get a read file about using caution with hot; and high altitude ops; dispatchers ACARSing flights at the gate to make sure Weight and Balance/Performance is good prior to blocking out (not just a one line note in the dispatch remarks); or both. I'm incredibly grateful that we have a safe ending and hopefully this incident can be used to help educate our crews and prevent a similar situation; or worse; from happening again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.