Narrative:

The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and I was the pilot monitoring (pm). We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 10L in fll. As we started the base to final turn; it became evident that we were too high and would be unable to complete a stabilized approach so the captain initiated a go-around at about 1;200 feet AGL. As we were in the climb to 3;000 feet as assigned by ATC; I realized the thrust levers were still in mct or toga detent and our speed was accelerating. At the same time; ATC was continuing to give us climb; turn and frequency change instructions. This distracted me and I did not immediately announce to the captain that he neeeded to set the thrust levers to the climb detent. I set the flap lever to zero as he made the flaps up call; but as the flaps were in transit from flaps 1 to up; we received an ECAM warning indicating a flap overspeed due to the exceeding the 235 KIAS limitation for flaps 1. This ECAM lasted for 2-3 seconds as the flaps were in transit to the fully retracted position.at this time; we were leveling at 3;000 feet and I saw the airspeed reach about 260-265 KIAS because the thrust levers had yet to be put in the climb detent. This was a momentary violation of the 250 KIAS speed limit below 10;000 feet. ATC did not say anything to us regarding this. Their only query was the reason for our go around. During the level off and subsequent acceleration beyond 250 KIAS; the captain said he was not sure what was happening so I told him to pull the thrust levers to idle to disconnect autothrust and to stop further acceleration. He did and we quickly slowed below 250 KIAS and he was able to re-engage autothrust and place the thrust levers into the climb detent. We proceeded back to fll and elected to fly the ILS 10L instead of a visual approach to ensure a stabilized approach. We landed without further incident and the flap overspeed was entered in the aml and maintenance was notified.the go around was likely due to ATC turning us in too tight for the base leg on the visual approach. The flap overspeed was likely caused by the high workload of the go-around; the distractions caused by ATC giving us multiple climb; turn; and frequency change instructions; and possible crew fatigue due the the captain having a fdp of close to 15 hours and the first officer having been on an fdp of 11.5 hours. The captain thought he had already placed the thrust levers in the climb detent when the flap overspeed occurred when it was more likely they had only been moved from toga detent to mct.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew report a go-around at above 1;000 feet AGL due to being high on the visual approach. The Captain uses TOGA thrust for the go-around; but does not retard the thrust levers to the Climb Detent in a timely manner. A flap overspeed occurs and 250 knots is exceeded. Fatigue may have been a factor.

Narrative: The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF) and I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 10L in FLL. As we started the base to final turn; it became evident that we were too high and would be unable to complete a stabilized approach so the Captain initiated a go-around at about 1;200 feet AGL. As we were in the climb to 3;000 feet as assigned by ATC; I realized the thrust levers were still in MCT or TOGA detent and our speed was accelerating. At the same time; ATC was continuing to give us climb; turn and frequency change instructions. This distracted me and I did not immediately announce to the Captain that he neeeded to set the thrust levers to the climb detent. I set the flap lever to zero as he made the flaps up call; but as the flaps were in transit from Flaps 1 to up; we received an ECAM warning indicating a flap overspeed due to the exceeding the 235 KIAS limitation for flaps 1. This ECAM lasted for 2-3 seconds as the flaps were in transit to the fully retracted position.At this time; we were leveling at 3;000 feet and I saw the airspeed reach about 260-265 KIAS because the thrust levers had yet to be put in the climb detent. This was a momentary violation of the 250 KIAS speed limit below 10;000 feet. ATC did not say anything to us regarding this. Their only query was the reason for our go around. During the level off and subsequent acceleration beyond 250 KIAS; the Captain said he was not sure what was happening so I told him to pull the thrust levers to idle to disconnect autothrust and to stop further acceleration. He did and we quickly slowed below 250 KIAS and he was able to re-engage autothrust and place the thrust levers into the climb detent. We proceeded back to FLL and elected to fly the ILS 10L instead of a visual approach to ensure a stabilized approach. We landed without further incident and the flap overspeed was entered in the AML and maintenance was notified.The go around was likely due to ATC turning us in too tight for the base leg on the visual approach. The flap overspeed was likely caused by the high workload of the go-around; the distractions caused by ATC giving us multiple climb; turn; and frequency change instructions; and possible crew fatigue due the the Captain having a FDP of close to 15 hours and the FO having been on an FDP of 11.5 hours. The Captain thought he had already placed the thrust levers in the climb detent when the flap overspeed occurred when it was more likely they had only been moved from TOGA detent to MCT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.