Narrative:

We were being vectored for the visual approach to runway 28R from the bdega arrival 28R transition. As we were being vectored toward the traffic we were asked to confirm traffic for 28L that was slightly below our altitude. Once the traffic was in sight we were cleared for the visual 'maintain visual separation'. It appeared that the 28L traffic was possibly north of course. As we were slowing in the descent we received a TCAS RA and maintained the reduced descent rate according to the RA. The first officer called for configuration of the aircraft for landing as speed permitted. I was attempting to 'maintain visual separation' and use the TCAS to confirm position of the 28L traffic; configure the aircraft for landing and monitor the progress of the approach. As I recalled we were going to be close on the airspeed of the stabilized approach criteria at 1;000 feet. As I scanned just prior to 500 foot call we were at the plus 15 knot limit. Very shortly thereafter we went through 450 feet we picked up an approximately 8 knot increase in head wind that caused a temporary exceedance of the 15 knot max. We were in a normal vertical and lateral position to land and the airspeed had been immediately corrected. We continued on to a normal landing and turnoff.sfo's use of the visual approach to the 28's is not a new procedure. The use of the transition from the bdega is in my opinion less than optimum. The work load on all crew members can get rather high due to close quarters operation with other aircraft. I understand the desire for both aircraft on the 28 approaches to land at the same time so that departures can get off the 01's. However; the turning of aircraft toward each other and the difficulty of picking up aircraft against the buildings on the 28L approach may not be optimum for safety. I have had to go-around for this situation before at sfo and they were not a pleasant experience due to traffic flow and volume. As I look back on this approach; I regret not calling for a go-around at an early stage of the approach well before the callout windows and just forgo the attempt. I was monitoring our position and speed for landing but with traffic taking off on the 01's and the close traffic beside us this is an situational awareness drain even in visual conditions. I attempted to take a safe reasonable course of action under the circumstances. In retrospect the effort made to get to the stabilized approach with the other distractions caused a loss of situational awareness on my part that effectively split the cockpit. I do know that I will be moving my go-around parameters from 500 feet required to either 1;000 feet or 1;500 feet required depending on circumstances.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew noted problems with loss of situational awareness while dealing with traffic on parallel visual approaches to Runways 28L and 28R at SFO particularly when transitioning from the BDEGA Arrival.

Narrative: We were being vectored for the visual approach to Runway 28R from the BDEGA arrival 28R transition. As we were being vectored toward the traffic we were asked to confirm traffic for 28L that was slightly below our altitude. Once the traffic was in sight we were cleared for the visual 'maintain visual separation'. It appeared that the 28L traffic was possibly North of course. As we were slowing in the descent we received a TCAS RA and maintained the reduced descent rate according to the RA. The First Officer called for configuration of the aircraft for landing as speed permitted. I was attempting to 'maintain visual separation' and use the TCAS to confirm position of the 28L traffic; configure the aircraft for landing and monitor the progress of the approach. As I recalled we were going to be close on the airspeed of the stabilized approach criteria at 1;000 feet. As I scanned just prior to 500 foot call we were at the plus 15 knot limit. Very shortly thereafter we went through 450 feet we picked up an approximately 8 knot increase in head wind that caused a temporary exceedance of the 15 knot max. We were in a normal vertical and lateral position to land and the airspeed had been immediately corrected. We continued on to a normal landing and turnoff.SFO's use of the visual approach to the 28's is not a new procedure. The use of the transition from the BDEGA is in my opinion less than optimum. The work load on all crew members can get rather high due to close quarters operation with other aircraft. I understand the desire for both aircraft on the 28 approaches to land at the same time so that departures can get off the 01's. However; the turning of aircraft toward each other and the difficulty of picking up aircraft against the buildings on the 28L approach may not be optimum for safety. I have had to go-around for this situation before at SFO and they were not a pleasant experience due to traffic flow and volume. As I look back on this approach; I regret not calling for a go-around at an early stage of the approach well before the callout windows and just forgo the attempt. I was monitoring our position and speed for landing but with traffic taking off on the 01's and the close traffic beside us this is an situational awareness drain even in visual conditions. I attempted to take a safe reasonable course of action under the circumstances. In retrospect the effort made to get to the stabilized approach with the other distractions caused a loss of situational awareness on my part that effectively split the cockpit. I do know that I will be moving my go-around parameters from 500 feet required to either 1;000 feet or 1;500 feet required depending on circumstances.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.