Narrative:

At cruise; before top of descent; the captain briefed the ILS DME 07 at sjo. We were not able to receive the ATIS; so cenamer control was asked for the weather. Cenamer control took some time getting back to us because he had to call coco approach. The reported weather was: winds 24010; vis >10 KM; sky conditions sct 3000 broken 8000. We asked which approach and runway was in use. Again; we had to wait while cenamer checked with approach control. By this time we were very near top of descent. We both thought we heard cenamer tell us to expect the ILS DME 07. As we began the descent into sjo; and were handed over to el coco approach; we began to encounter several thunderstorm cells that we needed to deviate around. We completed the approach checklist. At some point; after we had done the approach checklist; approach advised us to expect the VOR DME 07 with the cyrus visual circle to land 25.the VOR DME 07 approach is in the database; but the cyrus visual; and the associated waypoints; is not. The captain asked me to load the waypoints for the cyrus visual while he talked to approach and deviated around the cells. While not difficult; it took me some time to enter and double check the waypoints by point/bearing/distance. We were getting task saturated at this point. I loaded the cyrus; belen; and epabe waypoint and the mandatory 4000 ft altitudes for the cyrus visual; and showed the captain the approach plate. He confirmed the waypoints on the plan view. I mentioned that we had briefed the ILS DME 07; but had not yet briefed the VOR DME 07. I later realized; that during this time; I had lost my positional awareness; having left it to the captain to avoid the thunderstorm cells; and navigate toward the airport. I did have the el coco VOR tuned and identified in navigation 2; and had VOR mode selected. I don't recall exactly when I was able to 'get back into the loop;' but I think it was between the carba and monte fixes on the VOR DME 07 approach. Prior to cyrus we broke out of the bases of the clouds; but we did not acquire the sjo airport. The weather was much lower than we had been given. I think it was closer to broken 2000 ft; with a lower scattered cloud layer. As we turned right toward belen; we still had ground contact; but still did not have the sjo airport in sight. Approaching belen; I said something like 'we should be able to see the airport. (Paraphrasing)' the captain pointed straight ahead; and indicated that he had the airport in sight.the el coco tower controller was monitoring us very closely; and immediately questioned if we were making the left turn at belen for the downwind. This is when we both became very confused; because what we were seeing didn't match what the tower controller was telling us. We proceeded directly from belen toward the tobias bolanos airport; and into the pavas atz restricted airspace. We confirmed with the tower that we were on a left downwind. It was at this time that the el coco tower controller told us that we were looking at the wrong airport. We over flew the tobias bolanos airport; and made an extended left base to final turn for runway 25 at sjo. While on the base leg; I realized that we hadn't done the before landing checklist; and asked the captain if he wanted it. He called for the 'gear down; before landing checklist' the remainder of the approach and landing was without incident. With the luxury of being able to think this over again and again; the simplest thing to do would have been to accept a tailwind; and land on runway 07. At our landing weight; I do not think this would have been a problem.we should have realized how time compressed and task saturated we had become. At that point; we could have asked to go hold somewhere; and taken time to build and fully brief the approach. This wasn't a great option because of the thunderstorms all around the area; but in retrospect would have been a much better way to handle this. In addition to the thunderstorms in the area; we were expecting 3000 ft scattered and an 8000 ft broken ceiling; so we expected to break out much earlier than we did.regardless; it's obvious now that delaying the approach would have been a safer option.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier crew; deviating for weather while descending and preparing for the MROC Cypress Visual Approach Runway 25; was advised the arrival was now VOR DME 7 with the visual to Runway 25. They became disoriented and lined up on Tobias Bolanos airport and violated the PAVAS ATZ before ATC advised them about their error.

Narrative: At cruise; before top of descent; the captain briefed the ILS DME 07 at SJO. We were not able to receive the ATIS; so Cenamer Control was asked for the weather. Cenamer control took some time getting back to us because he had to call Coco approach. The reported weather was: winds 24010; vis >10 KM; sky conditions SCT 3000 BKN 8000. We asked which approach and runway was in use. Again; we had to wait while Cenamer checked with approach control. By this time we were very near top of descent. We both thought we heard Cenamer tell us to expect the ILS DME 07. As we began the descent into SJO; and were handed over to EL Coco approach; we began to encounter several thunderstorm cells that we needed to deviate around. We completed the approach checklist. At some point; after we had done the approach checklist; approach advised us to expect the VOR DME 07 with the Cyrus Visual circle to land 25.The VOR DME 07 approach is in the database; but the Cyrus Visual; and the associated waypoints; is not. The captain asked me to load the waypoints for the Cyrus Visual while he talked to approach and deviated around the cells. While not difficult; it took me some time to enter and double check the waypoints by point/bearing/distance. We were getting task saturated at this point. I loaded the CYRUS; BELEN; and EPABE waypoint and the mandatory 4000 FT altitudes for the Cyrus Visual; and showed the captain the approach plate. He confirmed the waypoints on the plan view. I mentioned that we had briefed the ILS DME 07; but had not yet briefed the VOR DME 07. I later realized; that during this time; I had lost my positional awareness; having left it to the captain to avoid the thunderstorm cells; and navigate toward the airport. I did have the El Coco VOR tuned and identified in NAV 2; and had VOR mode selected. I don't recall exactly when I was able to 'get back into the loop;' but I think it was between the CARBA and MONTE fixes on the VOR DME 07 approach. Prior to CYRUS we broke out of the bases of the clouds; but we did not acquire the SJO airport. The weather was much lower than we had been given. I think it was closer to BKN 2000 FT; with a lower scattered cloud layer. As we turned right toward BELEN; we still had ground contact; but still did not have the SJO airport in sight. Approaching BELEN; I said something like 'We should be able to see the airport. (paraphrasing)' The captain pointed straight ahead; and indicated that he had the airport in sight.The El Coco tower controller was monitoring us very closely; and immediately questioned if we were making the left turn at BELEN for the downwind. This is when we both became very confused; because what we were seeing didn't match what the tower controller was telling us. We proceeded directly from BELEN toward the Tobias Bolanos airport; and into the PAVAS ATZ restricted airspace. We confirmed with the tower that we were on a left downwind. It was at this time that the El Coco tower controller told us that we were looking at the wrong airport. We over flew the Tobias Bolanos airport; and made an extended left base to final turn for runway 25 at SJO. While on the base leg; I realized that we hadn't done the before landing checklist; and asked the captain if he wanted it. He called for the 'gear down; before landing checklist' The remainder of the approach and landing was without incident. With the luxury of being able to think this over again and again; the simplest thing to do would have been to accept a tailwind; and land on runway 07. At our landing weight; I do not think this would have been a problem.We should have realized how time compressed and task saturated we had become. At that point; we could have asked to go hold somewhere; and taken time to build and fully brief the approach. This wasn't a great option because of the thunderstorms all around the area; but in retrospect would have been a much better way to handle this. In addition to the thunderstorms in the area; we were expecting 3000 FT scattered and an 8000 FT BKN ceiling; so we expected to break out much earlier than we did.Regardless; it's obvious now that delaying the approach would have been a safer option.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.