Narrative:

I was pilot monitoring (pm). We were vectored onto and joined localizer for 22R. We were offered and accepted side step and cleared to land on runway 22L. First officer (first officer) was fast and struggled to reduce speed to comply with standard profile. ATC knew we were fast and advised that there was no other traffic so we could land long if needed.first officer landed in touchdown zone and we taxied off runway 22L without incident with a typical rollout and taxied to the gate.the issues I have are with my own performance as pm and captain. I should have called a go around and had another attempt. We were not configured at 1;000 feet; flaps 45 went in around 500 feet and we were not on speed until the flare.the circumstances that led to my poor decision are as follows. I believe that I was suffering from food poisoning. In lansing I spent most of the turn feeling uncomfortable in the rest room. At boarding having taken some medication I felt fit for the return leg. I did not mention this to the crew as I felt that I was ok. On arrival into dtw I felt nausea and strong stomach cramps; I felt I was not an effective pm for my first officer.the first officer had demonstrated his ability to fly the aircraft and I had been impressed by his work and I felt confident in his ability to get back on profile. As we descended I was very concerned that in the need for a go around and vector for another approach that I would be incapacitated and have to leave the cockpit at a critical time; so I elected to let [my first officer] land .I did take into consideration runway length; current aircraft configuration and made the decision in the interest of safety to continue the landing even though we were not on speed at 500 feet. I knew that if he could not land in a safe distance we would of course have to go around; and I would have to deal with the consequences of my illness. However; my thoughts and decisions however maybe compromised were always with regard to the safest outcome for the flight.after the flight had finished I contacted crew scheduling and advised them that I was not well enough to continue my last leg of the day.I am very angry with myself that I allowed us to continue to land .I know better than that. I feel that I was sick and did not make the right decision even though at the time I felt it was the safest decision. Considering the potential alternative was leaving the first officer single pilot and alarming the passengers as the pilot rushes back into the passenger cabin.in future if I feel that I have food poisoning or any other intermittent ailment that I should call out sick and not push on with the flight. Also I needed to communicate with the first officer; I did not let him know about my distress or the fact that my ability to function as an alert contributing crew member had been compromised to some degree. We were below 10;000 feet and I wasn't in a position to discuss how I was feeling due to the high workload.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The crew did not meet the stabilized approach criteria at 500 feet; but the Captain elected to land as the safer course of action due to illness.

Narrative: I was Pilot Monitoring (PM). We were vectored onto and joined LOC for 22R. We were offered and accepted side step and cleared to land on runway 22L. First Officer (FO) was fast and struggled to reduce speed to comply with standard profile. ATC knew we were fast and advised that there was no other traffic so we could land long if needed.FO landed in touchdown zone and we taxied off Runway 22L without incident with a typical rollout and taxied to the gate.The issues I have are with my own performance as PM and Captain. I should have called a go around and had another attempt. We were not configured at 1;000 feet; flaps 45 went in around 500 feet and we were not on speed until the flare.The circumstances that led to my poor decision are as follows. I believe that I was suffering from food poisoning. In Lansing I spent most of the turn feeling uncomfortable in the rest room. At boarding having taken some medication I felt fit for the return leg. I did not mention this to the crew as I felt that I was OK. On arrival into DTW I felt nausea and strong stomach cramps; I felt I was not an effective PM for my FO.The FO had demonstrated his ability to fly the aircraft and I had been impressed by his work and I felt confident in his ability to get back on profile. As we descended I was very concerned that in the need for a go around and vector for another approach that I would be incapacitated and have to leave the cockpit at a critical time; so I elected to let [my FO] land .I did take into consideration runway length; current aircraft configuration and made the decision in the interest of safety to continue the landing even though we were not on speed at 500 feet. I knew that if he could not land in a safe distance we would of course have to go around; and I would have to deal with the consequences of my illness. However; my thoughts and decisions however maybe compromised were always with regard to the safest outcome for the flight.After the flight had finished I contacted crew scheduling and advised them that I was not well enough to continue my last leg of the day.I am very angry with myself that I allowed us to continue to land .I know better than that. I feel that I was sick and did not make the RIGHT decision even though at the time I felt it was the SAFEST decision. Considering the potential alternative was leaving the FO single pilot and alarming the passengers as the pilot rushes back into the passenger cabin.In future if I feel that I have food poisoning or any other intermittent ailment that I should call out sick and not push on with the flight. Also I needed to communicate with the First Officer; I did not let him know about my distress or the fact that my ability to function as an alert contributing crew member had been compromised to some degree. We were below 10;000 feet and I wasn't in a position to discuss how I was feeling due to the high workload.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.