Narrative:

I was performing duties as a first officer on flight from cle to msy. Cleared to taxi to runway 36. Asked for 23L, but received a discouraging tone from the controller about delays. Discussed with the captain if our data (weight, flap setting, speed) was ok with runway 36. Our load planner was asked again, and confirmed '#'south for runway 36 ok,' taxi checklist was performed. Our slats were extended. Flaps were extended to 5 degrees. Upon completion of the takeoff briefing from the captain, were cleared for takeoff, runway 36. As the captain advanced the throttle, the takeoff warning horn sounded, indicating that flaps, slats are not properly positioned, or that brakes may be on at the time takeoff thrust is applied. Upon hearing the warning horn, the captain retarded the throttles and coasted to the first taxiway exit off runway 36 to the right (approximately 1200-1500' from the off position). During the rollout to the taxiway, the tower asked for the reason for the abort. I prematurely, but honestly, answered about the takeoff warning horn and that we were clearing the runway to determine the cause. He asked again what the horn meant. I told him that something was wrong with slats/flaps. We reset our slats and flaps when I noticed the speed brake handle appeared to be slightly out of position 1/16'. I tapped the handle down. The captain exercised the throttle again. No warning horn. After some analysis, we determined that the speed brake handle did not completely reset itself after disarming from the previous flight. After disarming, a spring below the control pedestal is supposed to hold the lever completely down. I'd say that the captain exercised proper judgement in rectifying the problem and further explaining same to ATC. This equipment is old, the cockpits are dirty--things wear out. I've been operating an medium large transport for about 4 yrs (not a lot of time in the scheme of things), and this is the first time this type of situation occurred with me. We proceeded normally and uneventfully until reaching msy. It was there we received a message that the captain call cle operations. We were also met by msy maintenance who, after a write-up on the speed brake handle, proceeded to make the necessary inspections. After lubing the speed brake handle track and checking the spring below the pedestal, they signed it off as ok. During the captain's call back to cle, we found out by the load planner's admission, that she gave us incorrect data to operate off runway 36 cle. Even after checking we were wrong. One day I will learn to trust no machine or person. In today's aviation environment, you are the PIC only when something goes wrong.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG FLT CREW GIVEN CONFIRMATION REGARDING WEIGHT AFTER NEGATIVE ON REQUEST FOR DIFFERENT RWY. TKOF OVERWEIGHT. ALSO ABORTED TKOF DUE WARNING HORN.

Narrative: I WAS PERFORMING DUTIES AS A F/O ON FLT FROM CLE TO MSY. CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 36. ASKED FOR 23L, BUT RECEIVED A DISCOURAGING TONE FROM THE CTLR ABOUT DELAYS. DISCUSSED WITH THE CAPT IF OUR DATA (WT, FLAP SETTING, SPD) WAS OK WITH RWY 36. OUR LOAD PLANNER WAS ASKED AGAIN, AND CONFIRMED '#'S FOR RWY 36 OK,' TAXI CHKLIST WAS PERFORMED. OUR SLATS WERE EXTENDED. FLAPS WERE EXTENDED TO 5 DEGS. UPON COMPLETION OF THE TKOF BRIEFING FROM THE CAPT, WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, RWY 36. AS THE CAPT ADVANCED THE THROTTLE, THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED, INDICATING THAT FLAPS, SLATS ARE NOT PROPERLY POSITIONED, OR THAT BRAKES MAY BE ON AT THE TIME TKOF THRUST IS APPLIED. UPON HEARING THE WARNING HORN, THE CAPT RETARDED THE THROTTLES AND COASTED TO THE FIRST TXWY EXIT OFF RWY 36 TO THE RIGHT (APPROX 1200-1500' FROM THE OFF POS). DURING THE ROLLOUT TO THE TXWY, THE TWR ASKED FOR THE REASON FOR THE ABORT. I PREMATURELY, BUT HONESTLY, ANSWERED ABOUT THE TKOF WARNING HORN AND THAT WE WERE CLRING THE RWY TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE. HE ASKED AGAIN WHAT THE HORN MEANT. I TOLD HIM THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH SLATS/FLAPS. WE RESET OUR SLATS AND FLAPS WHEN I NOTICED THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE APPEARED TO BE SLIGHTLY OUT OF POS 1/16'. I TAPPED THE HANDLE DOWN. THE CAPT EXERCISED THE THROTTLE AGAIN. NO WARNING HORN. AFTER SOME ANALYSIS, WE DETERMINED THAT THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE DID NOT COMPLETELY RESET ITSELF AFTER DISARMING FROM THE PREVIOUS FLT. AFTER DISARMING, A SPRING BELOW THE CONTROL PEDESTAL IS SUPPOSED TO HOLD THE LEVER COMPLETELY DOWN. I'D SAY THAT THE CAPT EXERCISED PROPER JUDGEMENT IN RECTIFYING THE PROB AND FURTHER EXPLAINING SAME TO ATC. THIS EQUIP IS OLD, THE COCKPITS ARE DIRTY--THINGS WEAR OUT. I'VE BEEN OPERATING AN MLG FOR ABOUT 4 YRS (NOT A LOT OF TIME IN THE SCHEME OF THINGS), AND THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS TYPE OF SITUATION OCCURRED WITH ME. WE PROCEEDED NORMALLY AND UNEVENTFULLY UNTIL REACHING MSY. IT WAS THERE WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT THE CAPT CALL CLE OPS. WE WERE ALSO MET BY MSY MAINT WHO, AFTER A WRITE-UP ON THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE, PROCEEDED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY INSPECTIONS. AFTER LUBING THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE TRACK AND CHKING THE SPRING BELOW THE PEDESTAL, THEY SIGNED IT OFF AS OK. DURING THE CAPT'S CALL BACK TO CLE, WE FOUND OUT BY THE LOAD PLANNER'S ADMISSION, THAT SHE GAVE US INCORRECT DATA TO OPERATE OFF RWY 36 CLE. EVEN AFTER CHKING WE WERE WRONG. ONE DAY I WILL LEARN TO TRUST NO MACHINE OR PERSON. IN TODAY'S AVIATION ENVIRONMENT, YOU ARE THE PIC ONLY WHEN SOMETHING GOES WRONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.