Narrative:

We had begun a climb from 5000' to 7000'. The first officer was flying the aircraft at the time. I had requested, and received, direct orlando when able. I thought I would program a waypoint off of palm beach that would allow us to monitor our ground speed. As he began issuing me the coordinates he noticed that our altitude was past 7000'. The level off came as 7250' was showing on my altimeter. Without consulting me my first officer turned the mode C off and then back on when he leveled at 7000'. I let him know that I was not happy with his actions. He must have had this problem before because it seemed more of a reflex action than a thought out response. I should have monitored the progress of the flight. Some of contributing factors to this problem were as follows: 1) complacency and fatigue. We were on our 7TH leg and 13TH hour of duty for the day. 2) 'get homeitis'. I should not have bothered with RNAV when we would have been getting DME within minutes anyway. 3) poor use of cockpit procedures, especially altitude callouts. 4) no interaction between the crew to solve the problem at hand. The immediate solution for me is a stricter cockpit and adherence to proper callouts and procedures.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER SMT ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING CLIMB. FO PF TURNED MODE C OFF UNTIL BACK ON CLRNC ALT.

Narrative: WE HAD BEGUN A CLIMB FROM 5000' TO 7000'. THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT AT THE TIME. I HAD REQUESTED, AND RECEIVED, DIRECT ORLANDO WHEN ABLE. I THOUGHT I WOULD PROGRAM A WAYPOINT OFF OF PALM BEACH THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO MONITOR OUR GND SPEED. AS HE BEGAN ISSUING ME THE COORDINATES HE NOTICED THAT OUR ALT WAS PAST 7000'. THE LEVEL OFF CAME AS 7250' WAS SHOWING ON MY ALTIMETER. WITHOUT CONSULTING ME MY F/O TURNED THE MODE C OFF AND THEN BACK ON WHEN HE LEVELED AT 7000'. I LET HIM KNOW THAT I WAS NOT HAPPY WITH HIS ACTIONS. HE MUST HAVE HAD THIS PROBLEM BEFORE BECAUSE IT SEEMED MORE OF A REFLEX ACTION THAN A THOUGHT OUT RESPONSE. I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE PROGRESS OF THE FLT. SOME OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS PROBLEM WERE AS FOLLOWS: 1) COMPLACENCY AND FATIGUE. WE WERE ON OUR 7TH LEG AND 13TH HR OF DUTY FOR THE DAY. 2) 'GET HOMEITIS'. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTHERED WITH RNAV WHEN WE WOULD HAVE BEEN GETTING DME WITHIN MINUTES ANYWAY. 3) POOR USE OF COCKPIT PROCS, ESPECIALLY ALT CALLOUTS. 4) NO INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CREW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AT HAND. THE IMMEDIATE SOLUTION FOR ME IS A STRICTER COCKPIT AND ADHERENCE TO PROPER CALLOUTS AND PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.