Narrative:

Departing dca. Runway 19. The national five departure. Prior to takeoff clearance we were told to climb and maintain 3;000 feet. Takeoff was normal; switched from tower to departure control at approximately 2;000 feet MSL. At approximately 2;700 feet MSL departure control instructed us to turn initially right to heading 270. During the turn; as the aircraft captured the preset 3000 foot altitude; we received a TCAS resolution advisory (RA) that instructed us (I forget the command) to monitor our altitude. The green indication on the vvi directed us to maintain a zero rate of climb; indicating we should maintain our altitude as our aircraft was leveling off. I saw on the screen an aircraft at the 11 o'clock position in red with a relative altitude of 400 feet above us. During our right turn; departure control told us to continue the turn to 310 and then to 320. I saw the intruder aircraft (a turbo commander) out my left window with its landing gear down (it was close). I told departure control we were responding to an RA. As the aircraft rolled out on the 320 heading we received a TCAS TA for traffic at our 12 o'clock position; 200 feet above us. Simultaneously departure control instructed us to turn left to 270. The left turn was immediately initiated using the autopilot. I was never able to get visual contact with this second aircraft. I told ATC we were receiving a second RA (though it was only a traffic advisory TA). Departure control stated that 'they were taking pictures'. I told him we were hauling passengers. Departure control stated that he thought we could 'climb better than that'. I'm not sure what was meant by this comment since both TCAS advisories were given while level. After established on the 270 heading we were given a climb and eventually a frequency change. Prior to the frequency change I asked departure control to 'mark the tape'. There was no acknowledgement of this request. In short: on departure out of dca we we received both a TCAS RA and TA within one minute of each other while under positive control of departure control. I believe we were given evasive headingchanges to avoid contact with other aircraft; two evasive heading changes within a minute of each other during the critical takeoff/departure phase of flight. I suggest better departure procedures out of dca. We should never have been given takeoff clearance with the aero commander crossing our departure path.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ900 Captain experiences a TCAS RA shortly after leveling off at 3;000 feet on the NATIONAL5 departing DCA on Runway 19. ATC issues heading changes resulting in a TCAS TA. ATC questions the aircraft's climb capability; indicating that 3;000 feet may not have been the expected level off altitude.

Narrative: Departing DCA. Runway 19. The National Five Departure. Prior to takeoff clearance we were told to climb and maintain 3;000 feet. Takeoff was normal; switched from tower to departure control at approximately 2;000 feet MSL. At approximately 2;700 feet MSL departure control instructed us to turn initially right to heading 270. During the turn; as the aircraft captured the preset 3000 foot altitude; we received a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) that instructed us (I forget the command) to monitor our altitude. The green indication on the VVI directed us to maintain a zero rate of climb; indicating we should maintain our altitude as our aircraft was leveling off. I saw on the screen an aircraft at the 11 o'clock position in red with a relative altitude of 400 feet above us. During our right turn; departure control told us to continue the turn to 310 and then to 320. I saw the intruder aircraft (a turbo commander) out my left window with its landing gear down (it was close). I told departure control we were responding to an RA. As the aircraft rolled out on the 320 heading we received a TCAS TA for traffic at our 12 o'clock position; 200 feet above us. Simultaneously departure control instructed us to turn left to 270. The left turn was immediately initiated using the autopilot. I was never able to get visual contact with this second aircraft. I told ATC we were receiving a second RA (though it was only a Traffic Advisory TA). Departure control stated that 'They were taking pictures'. I told him we were hauling passengers. Departure control stated that he thought we could 'climb better than that'. I'm not sure what was meant by this comment since both TCAS advisories were given while level. After established on the 270 heading we were given a climb and eventually a frequency change. Prior to the frequency change I asked departure control to 'mark the tape'. There was no acknowledgement of this request. In short: on departure out of DCA we we received both a TCAS RA and TA within one minute of each other while under positive control of departure control. I believe we were given evasive headingchanges to avoid contact with other aircraft; two evasive heading changes within a minute of each other during the critical takeoff/departure phase of flight. I suggest better departure procedures out of DCA. We should never have been given takeoff clearance with the aero commander crossing our departure path.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.