Narrative:

On climb out the number one engine failed. We were at 3;000 feet AGL with the autopilot on. There was moderate turbulence reported in the area and we were experiencing some light turbulence during our climb. Near 3;000 feet AGL; I deleted the reduced climb 1 so we could climb through the turbulence at a faster rate. About 30 seconds later we heard a loud bang and the aircraft yawed significantly to the left and rolled slightly. The autopilot immediately disengaged.I was the pilot flying (PF) and took the controls manually. I returned the aircraft to straight and level. The captain called ATC and reported the engine failure and the desire to return to [departure airport]. The captain ran the appropriate checklists and the engine was secured. I reengaged the autopilot and began reprogramming the FMC for a return. As the captain finished the QRH procedures; I had intercepted the final approach course and armed the approach. Outside of the FAF the captain assumed control of the aircraft and landed. The landing was 'normal'. We had emergency personnel inspect the aircraft and ran brake cooling numbers through the opc before proceeding to the gate.there is no way to prevent this from occurring again. Although we most likely will never see this sort of thing on an actual flight; when it happened to me I felt my training was so comprehensive and routine that in many ways this seemed like a non-event. At the time I did question; in my mind; the value in requiring this to be a captain only landing as is required by our current procedures. The difficult part of all this was the pilot monitoring (pm) duties of running the QRH and ensuring all proper steps were completed. Flying the aircraft was the 'easy' part. We flew a 20 mile final (probably farther than was necessary) mostly due to the fact that I wanted to give the captain enough time to complete all his duties and have enough time to take control of the aircraft for the required landing; along with some time for him to get 'used to' the feel of the aircraft under the power of one engine. I had been flying the aircraft since the initial engine failure and felt like the CRM (rrm) would have been much smoother had I been able to remain at the controls and all the pm would have to be concerned with was the pm duties instead of both the pm and eventual PF duties. Overall everyone involved did a fantastic job and it was the coordinated effort of everybody that resulted in the successful outcome of this flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew reported engine failure shortly after takeoff. The flight returned to departure airport and landed in emergency condition.

Narrative: On climb out the number one engine failed. We were at 3;000 feet AGL with the autopilot on. There was moderate turbulence reported in the area and we were experiencing some light turbulence during our climb. Near 3;000 feet AGL; I deleted the reduced CLIMB 1 so we could climb through the turbulence at a faster rate. About 30 seconds later we heard a loud bang and the aircraft yawed significantly to the left and rolled slightly. The autopilot immediately disengaged.I was the Pilot Flying (PF) and took the controls manually. I returned the aircraft to straight and level. The Captain called ATC and reported the engine failure and the desire to return to [departure airport]. The Captain ran the appropriate checklists and the engine was secured. I reengaged the autopilot and began reprogramming the FMC for a return. As the Captain finished the QRH procedures; I had intercepted the final approach course and armed the approach. Outside of the FAF the Captain assumed control of the aircraft and landed. The landing was 'normal'. We had Emergency Personnel inspect the aircraft and ran brake cooling numbers through the OPC before proceeding to the gate.There is no way to prevent this from occurring again. Although we most likely will never see this sort of thing on an actual flight; when it happened to me I felt my training was so comprehensive and routine that in many ways this seemed like a non-event. At the time I did question; in my mind; the value in requiring this to be a Captain only landing as is required by our current procedures. The difficult part of all this was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties of running the QRH and ensuring all proper steps were completed. Flying the aircraft was the 'easy' part. We flew a 20 mile final (probably farther than was necessary) mostly due to the fact that I wanted to give the Captain enough time to complete all his duties and have enough time to take control of the aircraft for the required landing; along with some time for him to get 'used to' the feel of the aircraft under the power of one engine. I had been flying the aircraft since the initial engine failure and felt like the CRM (RRM) would have been much smoother had I been able to remain at the controls and all the PM would have to be concerned with was the PM duties instead of both the PM and eventual PF duties. Overall everyone involved did a fantastic job and it was the coordinated effort of everybody that resulted in the successful outcome of this flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.