Narrative:

Aircraft X; a boeing 777 slated for a maintenance visit at ZZZZ1; was dispatched from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 with a known bad part installed. Aircraft Y; a boeing 777; was also in ZZZZ at the time I began my scheduled night shift. It had a right hand wing inboard flaperon fairing that had become delaminated and which a section of the flaperon had departed the aircraft. Initially it was attempted to complete a temporary repair on the fairing and fly revenue back to ZZZ and complete permanent repairs at that time. Engineering decided that they would not agree to a revenue flight but would allow one cycle for a maintenance ferry. I had no direct contact with engineering. Our maintenance control technician X was talking to them through this event. The decision was made to remove a good fairing from aircraft X; the inbound maintenance base visit aircraft and use it on aircraft Y to provide a good aircraft for our passengers. Aircraft Z; another B777; was being ferried from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ for a return to revenue service at this time as well. The crew flying aircraft Z was slated to take aircraft X back to ZZZZ1 for its maintenance check. They had limited crew legality time and due to slot availability needed to get aircraft X back to ZZZZ1 in a timely fashion. At this time the temporarily repaired fairing was placed on aircraft X and it was maintenance ferried to ZZZZ1 at the time this event was occurring there were approximately 150 aircraft out of service. There were two maintenance ferries occurring and the work card management system was not operating so that no work cards could be printed for any maintenance work being performed worldwide. The workcard issue was about to become a major event as nearly every maintenance station required multiple cards to complete the overnight bills of work on their aircraft. It would also cause disruption for those european and asian flights which were preparing to depart. This kept me and my assistant thoroughly occupied throughout the night. The underlining cause was the sheer volume of work and my inability to give this item the necessary time needed to make the correct decision. My suggestions for avoiding a repeat event such as I have described; would be to make sure that when the workload becomes heavy; the individuals involved need to use the same methodology to make decisions as they would when the workload is light. Important decisions need time and thought to ensure the outcome is safe and legal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Maintenance Controller reports about the sheer volume of work that contributed to a B777 aircraft being dispatched with a known damaged flaperon installed. Major contributors were failure of their Work (Job) Card Management System to issue job cards and multiple aircraft out of service.

Narrative: Aircraft X; a Boeing 777 slated for a Maintenance Visit at ZZZZ1; was dispatched from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 with a known bad part installed. Aircraft Y; a Boeing 777; was also in ZZZZ at the time I began my scheduled night shift. It had a right hand wing inboard flaperon fairing that had become delaminated and which a section of the flaperon had departed the aircraft. Initially it was attempted to complete a temporary repair on the fairing and fly revenue back to ZZZ and complete permanent repairs at that time. Engineering decided that they would not agree to a revenue flight but would allow one cycle for a maintenance ferry. I had no direct contact with Engineering. Our Maintenance Control Technician X was talking to them through this event. The decision was made to remove a good fairing from Aircraft X; the inbound Maintenance Base visit aircraft and use it on Aircraft Y to provide a good aircraft for our passengers. Aircraft Z; another B777; was being ferried from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ for a Return to Revenue Service at this time as well. The crew flying Aircraft Z was slated to take Aircraft X back to ZZZZ1 for its Maintenance check. They had limited crew legality time and due to slot availability needed to get Aircraft X back to ZZZZ1 in a timely fashion. At this time the temporarily repaired fairing was placed on Aircraft X and it was maintenance ferried to ZZZZ1 At the time this event was occurring there were approximately 150 aircraft out of service. There were two maintenance ferries occurring and the work card management system was not operating so that no work cards could be printed for any maintenance work being performed worldwide. The workcard issue was about to become a major event as nearly every maintenance station required multiple cards to complete the overnight Bills of Work on their aircraft. It would also cause disruption for those European and Asian flights which were preparing to depart. This kept me and my assistant thoroughly occupied throughout the night. The underlining cause was the sheer volume of work and my inability to give this item the necessary time needed to make the correct decision. My suggestions for avoiding a repeat event such as I have described; would be to make sure that when the workload becomes heavy; the individuals involved need to use the same methodology to make decisions as they would when the workload is light. Important decisions need time and thought to ensure the outcome is safe and legal.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.